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"La Revolucion es un sueno eterno " (Andres Rivera 1987, La 
revolucion es un sueho eterno) 
1 
he organisation does not supply the troops for the 
struggle, but the struggle, in an ever growing degree, 
supplies recruits for the organisation " (Rosa Luxemburg 1971, 
p. 66) 
"For ever non e' solo un individuo. - e' un tipo sociale. Da 
questo punto di vista non deve essere trascurato: deve essere 
conosciuto, studiato, discusso e superato " (Antonio Gramsci 
1969, p. 2 10, Lo Stato e il Soeialismo) 
For ever is not just an individual: it is a social type. In this 
perspective it does not have to be dismissed: it must be known, 
studied, analysed and surpassed 
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Abstract: 
in this research is provided a comparative analysis of workers' 
mobilisation through a qualitative interpretation of processes, dynamics 
and effects of collective action in two car multinationals in Cordoba, 
Argentina, during 1996/1997. What drives workers to periodically contest 
their surrounding reality and how do they structure their protests? The 
thesis is based on the view that conflict is inevitable, mobilisation 
representing one possible forin of it, due to the position workers have in 
the employment relation and for the constant existence of a gap between 
social needs and commodities produced within capitalist systems. 
Mobilisation is based on these theoretical objective conditions but subject 
do not immediately realise this and in the same terms, the process of 
collective protest implying in itself a deeper consciousness among 
workers of the meaning of their action. When subjects contest the 
inevitability of the social system surrounding them remains unpredictable, 
but the thesis has identified some factors whose absence or presence 
profoundly influences the chances for collective action to start and be 
maintained. At the same time the emphasis on the factors that are 
obstacles to mobilisation allows us to understand the concept of solidarity 
and its importance within the same process of mobilisation. Contrary to 
theoretical perspectives that intend collective action as based on 
individuals' sense of injustice, this thesis emphasises the need for a 
reconceptualisation of solidarity within a theory of mobilisation. More 
generally the thesis calls for a re-evaluation of collective action as a 
process intrinsically collective whose nature disappears within a social 
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context that constantly tends to individualise and divide. The case of 
Argentina and the historical perspective within which the mobilisations 
analysed are inserted, invite us to reconsider the role of traditional trade 
unions as organisers of protest and the relations between isolated workers' 
struggles and more generalised social protests. 
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Introduction: 
This research started in October 2000 as a comparison of labour relations 
in two factories owned by the same multinational, FLAT, in Brazil and 
Argentina. The original idea was to look at the forms and methods of 
adaptation to new working practises used by trade unions and workers of 
the same company but within different industrial relations environnients. 
The research seemed initially feasible as access to the plants for 
interviews and data collection was guaranteed by previously established 
relations with executives of the same enterprise. But as often happens to 
those who investigate into sensitive business areas, the economic crisis of 
the company produced, with workers' redundancies and plant closures, 
management's decision to suspend any co-operation with researchers and, 
in my case, making it impossible to enter into the factories and develop 
the empirical part of the research. 
Dunng November 2001 and February 2002 1 did the first field trip to 
Cordoba as a sort of ritual way to put an end to my original research 
project but also with the aim and hope of finding sufficient elements for a 
reformulation of the whole dissertation. I needed more details to explain 
myself why a modem plant inaugurated in 1997 and built to employ 5000 
people and to produce 120000 cars a year was, after less than four years, 
practically inactive. I was not certainly interested to write a thesis on how 
this happened. At the time of my visit to Cordoba, Italian newspapers in 
particular pointed to managerial mistakes and a short strategic vision of 
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the enterprise as the causes of the unsuccessful Argentinean case. But in 
the plant closure there was something more important for a researcher in 
industrial relations. It was somehow essential to find an answer because 
the crash of FIAT in Argentina could also be seen as the confinnation that 
the paraphernalia of those practices labelled as human resource 
management (workers' involvement, empowerment, participation) was 
more rhetoric than reality, as Legge (1995) reminds us. At the same time 
the failure of such managerial strategies, whose real effects both on the 
increase of productivity and individualisation of the employment relations 
have been extensively criticised during the 1990's, was also questioning 
my approach to research. Was there any valid reason to look at industrial 
relations continuing to insist on the analysis of the differences of workers' 
and unions' reactions to a managerial established agenda? Even from a 
perspective sympathetic with a "new" model of labour relations based on 
reciprocal advantages for workers and companies, what happened at FIAT 
was the analysis of a failure. 
The two factory occupations that took place in the Fiat Ferreyra's plant in 
September 1996 and January 1997 were certainly a surprise. I knew that 
the company had problems with its labour force in Argentina (trade 
unions have an old mentality once said to me the Industrial Relations 
Director) but I could not imagine that a severe labour conflict was lying 
behind the triumphalism that the inauguration of the new plant was 
receiving in both Argentina and Italy. In particular, for the European 
standards, factory occupations were almost a relic from the past. The 
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search for more data on conflict in local newspapers revealed that another 
factory occupation occurred in the city, in the Renault plant at 
approximately the same time, I approached persons who could help me to 
establish ftirther contacts with those who directly participated in the 
mobilisations and that were not working any more in the plants. My 
original research had changed completely and was now a comparison of 
workers' mobilisation. It was an investigation into the causes that 
produced it and into the social processes that took place among workers in 
such events. Within this broader scope, the following questions, in 
particular, represented the framework within which the entire research has 
been structured: is it possible to offer a reconstruction of mobilisation 
around a set of categories not entirely correspondent to those provided by 
mobilisation theory? From a more theoretical point of view, into which 
epistemological field should we inscribe mobilisation? Can we identify 
different dynamics in the two cases analysed? Are there any special 
conditions that can influence the ways and the times of workers' 
mobilisations? Is there any common denominator in the two cases 
analysed? Which type of long lasting effects can mobilisation produce? 
To what extent may the conclusions offered by the research be applied to 
other realities? 
This long autobiographic introduction is important because it fixes the 
concrete bases and the motivational impulse around which the whole 
research has been developed. First preparing the theoretical and historical 
background for the field work and later on in the elaboration and writing 
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of all chapters. If any bias is detectable from the argumentation and 
findings of this research it has to be referred to my own personal 
experiences. The plant closure and the decision of the company to suspend 
its co-operation with researchers, left me unexpectedly "on the road", 
touching probably the same emptiness, worries, fears and anger that is to a 
certain extent common, notwithstanding material differences, to all those 
who have just lost a job. The study of workers' mobilisations became my 
own, almost natural, response to a passive and uncritical acceptance of the 
inevitability of the social system. The need to look at industrial relations 
as the study in which labour could be considered again as the central 
concern was, also because of my own experience, becoming urgent. 
The thesis is organised around four chapters. 
In the first, the methodology used for the collection of data is described, 
justifications for the preference of qualitative analysis are offered and 
problems and difficulties encountered during the field work are also 
outlined in order to test and scrutinise the reliability of the research 
findings. The justification of the approphateness of the methodological 
approach has been based on four basic principles: a tradition in the field of r- 
study, coherence with the aims and hypotheses of the research, feasibility 
and data availability, accuracy and rigour in the collection and analysis of 
data. 
In the field of industrial relations both the quantitative and qualitative 
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methods have been used alternatively. Mobilisation is intended here as the 
study of the social processes involved in collective action and the 
importance the micro contexts have in shaping and influencing the ways 
in which mobilisation is produced, requiring the adoption of a qualitative 
approach to the study. This is in the tradition of the 1970's workplace 
studies in industrial relations and sociology of labour but is also common 
to other related disciplines (cultural, political and criminal sociology, 
social anthropology, oral history) when people at work are the subject of 
these studies. In particular I have used unstructured interviews because 
mobilisation often appears in workers' accounts as a single, unitary event 
whose flow has to be observed with scarce external intervention. Just once 
the particular event considered has been fully described, we could be able 
to detect and analyse specific tuming points in the development of 
collective action and to give meaning to the theoretical categories we are 
using. 
This research is also based on a comparison of two different mobilisation 
events. As mentioned before, in November 1996, soon after FIAT's first 
plant occupation and a few months before the second one, Renault's 
workers too mobilised and occupied the plant. Despite the fact that both 
companies operated in the same political and social context and with a 
labour force sharing identical labour culture, the level of conflict and 
mobilisation shown by Renault was much less intense than in the case of 
FIAT. The comparison is evidenced in that there are certain factors that 
can hamper and be an obstacle to mobilisation. In the case studies under 
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examination it has been possible to identify two distinct conditions, a 
specific managerial approach to conflict and trade union bureaucracy, 
whose "absence" or "presence" has alternatively influenced the process of 
mobilisation. As is going to be presented more clearly in the empirical 
chapter, the companies have reacted to the need to reduce labour costs 
trying to dilute conflict in complicity with the trade union (Renault) or 
implementing straight away salaries reductions in a momentary absence of 
union control on the shop-floor (FIAT). We can explain mobilisation and 
its different outcomes on the base of the alternation of these inhibiting 
factors but it will remain open if we can generalise them. 
Data have been collected in different moments. A first visit to Cordoba 
was used to make an exploration on the feasibility of the research. In 
particular it was necessary to find those people who were directly 
involved in the events considered and due to the conflict and economic 
crisis the majority of them were not working any more in the same plants. 
Through local contacts I established a relationship with the leader of 
mobilisation at FIAT who provided, during the second visit to Cordoba, 
the first names of people to interview. At the same time access was 
gained, through the company (FIAT), to the plant where 180 workers were 
still working and many of them had participated in the conflict. A third 
group of interviewed was fort-ned of both people that were introduced to 
me by those already interviewed and others presented by people who 
knew of this research. A total of 36 interviews has been collected among 
these three groups of workers that, considering the source of origin, can be 
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labelled respectively as the more militant, the less militant and 
heterogeneous. In addition to this, four interviews with managers, the 
analysis of company's documents and local newspapers have also been 
used and contributed from another point of view to the understanding of 
mobilisation. In the case of Renault, 16 workers have been interviewed 
from different departments and of different ages and working experience. 
However, due to the difficulties of access to the data, selection did not 
follow any precise strategy and people were approached basically through 
community channels at the beginning and direct presentation and by a 
snow ball effect with the rest. 
The theoretical chapter is built around the need to offer a framework and a 
base for the interpretation of mobilisation that I intend here as a social 
process which can be better understood by examining it from three 
different empirical dimensions. First each event of mobilisation is the 
direct or indirect result of external social conditions and it has always to 
be considered as inserted into a context of national and increasingly 
international competition. The second dimension that explains the process 
refers to those internal conditions and contingent situations specific to 
each plant and working environment. Third, and of paramount importance 
while studying social processes that produce struggles and collective 
actions, we should understand how actors have perceived those external 
ing their daily understanding of the and internal conditions that were changi II 
workplace and of the employment relation. Within this latter dimension, 
in particular, we should investigate to what extent consciousness, 
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solidarity and leadership have strengthened workers' mobilisation and 
provided a base to resist employers' repression. These three dimensions in 
the study of mobilisation require us to adopt a theoretical framework 
flexible enough to account for the complexity of workplace relations, as 
directly depending on the interplay and alternation of the three dimensions 
mentioned above, always show. 
On the base of these considerations one aspect of the theoretical 
background refers to the theory of mobilisation as recently re-proposed by 
Kelly (1998). This framework for empirical analysis offers both a general 
vision of society and a set of categories (injustice, agency, attribution, 
leadership, repression) through which to understand social relations and 
collective action in the workplace. These two dimensions of the theory 
can be used separately and the categories outlined could still maintain 
their validity to explain what happens in micro contexts. But the theory 
loses its ground if not inserted into a Marxist interpretation of societies 
and political economy and Kelly's emphasis on this is important. In 
particular, these two aspects of the theory are fundamental when a process 
that is dependent on both external and intemal conditions is investigated. 
Mobilisation is not just one of the possible outcomes of the employment 
relation, something that we can technically and somehow aseptically 
analyse, but is also a process that, because of increasing international 
competition and the level of radicalisation in Argentina, is influenced by 
and influences waves of social mobilisation. Considering the undergoing 
relation between micro and macro factors, the theory offers the 
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opportunity to look at the cause/effect nexus between mobilisation and 
counter- mobilisation. and, within the same perspective, at the use and role 
of enterprise and state repression. 
However, the findings of this research are not always in agreement with 
te existing arguments of the theory. In particular, empirical evidence 
suggests that the concept of injustice, for its own subjective nature, cannot 
be considered as the base of mobilisation and should be best seen as a 
concept acquiring a meaning in action. At the same time and as a more 
general consideration, there is detenninism and fixity in the development 
of the different moments that should produce a process of mobilisation 
that does not, always, produce results beneficial to the validity of the 
theory. 
Workplace analyses have often shown how complex is this specific reality 
and how difficult it is to establish fixed patterns in the understanding of 
people's interactions at work. Although a number of "objective" rules and 
trends surround the understanding of conflict at work, our knowledge 
remains fragmented because the specificity of each case, with its local 
culture, traditions and labour legislation, and the continuous changes in 
the forins of labour/capital relations, constantly raises new questions and 
doubts. That is why the second aspect treated in the theoretical part refers 
to the way conflict at work has been interpreted , its centrality and 
inevitability being fundamental in the study of mobilisation, and this with 
particular reference to both Marxist and pluralist accounts of it. But a 
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further dimension to understand objective tendencies in labour/capital 
relations is also offered, looking at a reconceptualisation of workers'needs 
intended as the base around which the objective conflicting interests of 
workers and capitalists are structured. 
A third aspect of theoretical importance is related to the definition of those 
concepts, like solidarity, that operate at a subjective level setting the 
boundaries within which the character and the nature of the employment 
relation acquire more significance. In this part it is argued that it cannot be 
ojuk-, red as a static or predefined vision of solidarity, since it is in its own 
nature a concept whose meaning can be better perceived looking at it from 
a dynamic perspective. At the same time this discussion is the base for a 
more general consideration on the epistemological stance adopted in the 
research. 
The third chapter of this thesis is dedicated to an historical analysis of 
mobilisation in Argentina and this with the aim to identify the existence of 
factors that could have both hampered or triggered the processes of 
mobilisation that occurred in the plants. The interviews with workers of 
both plants indicate that three major factors could have affected 
mobilisation: the inheritance of the last military repression, the relations 
between workers and trade unions, and the socio-political and economic 
context at the time of mobilisation. The historical analysis starts from 
these data extracted from the interviews but these latter let emerge just 
part of the truth, of a much more complex and debatable reality. 
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Following the main concerns of workers, the chapter is structured into 
three main sections. The first refers to the role played by the last military 
regime on workers' potentials for mobilisation. The second focuses on 
specific aspects of Argentinean unionism, its relation with the state and 
governments in power and workers' criticisms of it, often expressed and 
resumed in the bureaucracy/anti-bureaucracy dichotomy. The third puts 
the cases analysed in the socio-political and economic context existing at 
the time of conflict. 
To sum up, the chapter can be considered as both a way to explore some 
issues relevant for the cases studied and, for the historical perspective that 
it offers, as an attempt to highlight the overall mobilisation capacity of the 
Argentinean Labour Movement. 
In the fourth chapter the cases are introduced by first presenting an 
overview of the companies and the unions involved. Empirical evidence 
and data concerning the two cases of mobilisation analysed are organised 
by the identification of five major issues/thematic areas, each representing 
a separate section of the entire chapter: dynamics of mobilisations, 
solidarity and mobilisation, leadership, evolution and radicalisation, 
repression. Alongside these areas of enquiry is also developed the 
companson between FIAT and Renault. 
The five thematic areas identified can be considered to refer to the causes 
and effects of mobilisation. The companson of these two categones 
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indicates that they are clearly influenced by the alternation of some 
contingent factors whose absence or presence profoundly shaped the cases 
analysed. At FIAT, the introduction of a new contract, with the salaries 
reduction it implied, and the contemporary change in workers' 
representation created a vacuum of power within which an anti- 
bureaucratic organisation, result of the action of cohesion leaders exerted 
on the solidarity movement that was at the origin of the mobilisation, first 
established and later on consolidated. The same organisation led workers 
throughout nine months of open conflict with the enterprise during which 
another factory occupation occurred within a process of increasing 
company's repression and workers' political radicalisation. Also 
influenced by the social unrest present in the country at that time, conflict 
remained a dominant feature in the FIAT plant and contributed to workers' 
more conscious understanding of the relations between their workplace 
and the society as a whole. 
In the case of Renault we have a company which managed to cope with 
the pressure of international competition by externalising some of the 
production sections in agreement with a bureaucratic and business union 
(SMATA). This arrangement favoured the dilution of conflict and 
maintained workers' grievances within the limits of traditional unionism 
and of the critics to it. But an attempt to build an internal opposition to the 
union's leadership was ftustrated by the co-optation of fom-ler opposition 
leaders at the top of the organisation. 
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A concluding chapter resumes and highlights the main findings of the 
research while it points out some limitations. The main idea outlined in 
the chapter is that mobilisation should be seen as a social phenomenon 
whose forms and meanings have to be analysed from a double dimension. 
We could see it as from a static or dynamic perspective and this by 
looking more at the "technicalities" and contingent causes that have 
produced it in specific cases or by stressing more on mobilisation as a 
process inserted into a complex social reality. But underlying this double 
dimension means that it is necessary to decide within which 
methodological and epistemological perspective we may prefer to insert 
the main findings of the research and how to consider them as applicable 
to other cases. 
Summansing, we can consider that the empirical evidence collected 
shows how it is the alternation of the absence or presence of certain 
specific factors that create differences in the dynamics and causes of 
mobilisation. We can also add, and the research undertaken has 
determined this, that in the cases studied these factors are namely: the 
company's strategy and the union bureaucracy. But other authors may 
reach a totally different conclusion and show that their empirical analyses 
of mobilisation indicate different dynamics, causes and factors whose 
influence may be considered determinant. Potentially an infinite number 
of cases can be added and all being equally valid but an emphasis just on 
"findings", the empirical chapter of this research providing the reader with 
full details of them, does not help to understand mobilisation as something 
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more than a pure mechanical artefact. Not denying the importance of 
empirical analysis, this thesis aims to intend mobilisation as a moment of 
collective rupture and opposition to a formerly taken for granted reality. In 
this moment subjects react to a system of impositions previously accepted 
or socially hidden (for instance the existence of a labour market, 
subordination within the employment contract, ideological dominant 
values) and their action changes the way they look at the reality 
surrounding them. Although mobilisations cyclically appear in workplaces 
and societies as expression of one of the forins of the labour/capital 
opposition, it still remains unpredictable to establish precisely the time 
and circumstances in which mobilisations develop. The thesis may have 
added some suggestions in this direction. 
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Chapter 1: A Discussion on the appropriateness of the 
methodology used. 
1. Introduction. 
This chapter will attempt to justify the methodological approach that has 
been followed in the research process. As a general consideration we can 
say that each research method used in the social sciences has, at least in 
theory, an intrinsic validity as an instrument to translate data into 
explanations and interpretations of the reality analysed. Studies on 
industrial and labour relations have used both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to analyse similar issues. For instance, Kelly (1998) has 
supported the validity of his mobilisation theory and of the rise in 
collectivism world-wide using long wave series and survey data, while 
this research aims to explain mobilisation relying more on workplace 
interviews. Other authors researching sl ilar issues have preferred a 'in* 
different methodological approach, using in depth ethnographic case 
studies (see, for instance, Edwards and Scullion 1982, Batstone et al. 1977 
and 1978). The existence of a plethora of different approaches to examine 
similar issues shows that there is no definite formula that defines the 
methodological approach to be used. The appropriateness of the method 
adopted has to be assessed on its coherence with the data available at the 
time of the project or that could be available and gathered during the 
temporal limits of each research assignment. Once this requirement has 
been satisfied, personal choices, opportunities and preferences of each 
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researcher also have an important role in shaping the methodology 
adopted. 
Summansing, we could say that the appropriateness of a research method 
is justified and strengthened if: 
e It is related to a specific methodological tradition in the field of study under 
consideration 
9 It is coherent with the aims and hypotheses of the research 
9 It is feasible in teims of data availability 
* It is scientific and ngorous in tenns of data collection and analysis 
The development and selection of the methodological approach adopted in 
this research has been based on these principles. The research attempts to 
study workers' mobilisation and management counter-mobilisation 
through an historical analysis of the events that occurred at FIAT and 
Renault, in the city of Cordoba, Argentina, during the period September 
19961May 1997.1 have adopted a qualitative approach based on in-depth, 
unstructured interviews with workers, managers and unionists who took 
part in the events analysed. This latter method is in the tradition of the 
1970's workplace studies and has been widely used in many fields of the 
social sciences (from sociology to social anthropology, from oral history 
to development studies) when investigating into the world of Labour. The 
use of unstructured interviews, in particular, seems better indicated to 
explain and analyse the subject under study. In workers' accounts, 
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mobilisation is represented as a unitary event, a whole undisrupted series 
of actions, apparently a single moment rather than a process. Because of 
this representation and to let the flow of workers' reconstructions follow 
its own rules, the use of unstructured interviews seemed to be the proper 
one. Limiting external interventions to few questions, I have obtained 
detailed accounts of what happened in the moment of mobilisation and on 
the base of these descriptions I have been able to detect and analyse 
specific turning points in the development of collective action and to give 
meaning to the theoretical categories used in the research. 
The Renault factory has been used as a control case/comparison that has 
been developed alongside four thematic areas of enquiry: dynamics of 
mobilisations, solidarity and mobilisation, leadership, evolution and 
radicalisation. Renault did not show a level of conflict similar to that of 
FIAT, nonetheless it operated in the same political and social context and 
with a labour force sharing an identical labour culture. Why this did 
happen? Can we identify those factors whose alternative presence and 
absence has generated different results in the two cases? The comparison 
can certainly offer some elements to identify tendencies and, possibly, 
generalisations. However, on this latter point, caution is required, not just 
because the history of Argentina shows contradictory trends in the forms 
and models of mobilisations, but also because to identify "lessons" and 
"best practices" is often difficult. Certainly, the validity of data is also 
strengthened, together with interviews and comparison, by the use of 
documentary data on previous researches and analyses on other 
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geographical settings so as to cross examine and evaluate the overall 
findings. This is something that, considering the limit of a doctoral thesis, 
has been attempted in this research. 
We should however admit that, despite efforts and accuracy, we could be 
nil, able to reach just a relative level of objectivity and this is a common 
concern to all social sciences. We can nicely describe and explain 
mobilisation but this will always be just a picture of a bigger movie 
representing our journey toward an approximation to objectivity. 
Objectivity represents an aim and a target not just because the same 
concept, as is intended in the natural sciences, does not apply to the social 
world. Furthenuore in the case of mobilisation and conflict, we cannot 
avoid considering that the social system surrounding us is unbalanced and 
unequal and this, inevitably, alters our perceptions and behaviours in 
social reality. 
This brief introductory statement on the methodological approach used in 
this research needs to be explained and justified. In the following 
paragraphs I will attempt to do this, in particular grounding my discussion 
on: qualitative against quantitative methodologies, researching by 
interviewing, limitations of qualitative methods, validity and reliability of 
qualitative methods, issues of generalisation and some epistemological 
considerations on the way we can interpret mobilisation within social 
reality. In addition to these more theoretical considerations, a final 
paragraph will describe the problems encountered during the field work 
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and how data have been collected. 
2. Quantitative or qualitative? 
Emphasising the mutual exclusion of these two research approaches is 
probably misleading since research practice has often shown that 
quantitative and qualitative methods can easily co-exist and be mutually 
used as control tools of the research findings. For instance in development 
studies, where numerical data are often incomplete and not always 
representative of ethnic diversities, populations are studied using 
statistical data together with ethnographic methods (Fern and Jasper 
Ingersoll 1987). In international comparative studies of industrial relations 
it has gained increasing attention, also for researchers that adopt a more 
pronounced quantitative approach, to select statistical variables bearing in 
mind variations in meaning of the same concept in different countries (this 
is, for instance, the case of strikes and data on the measurement of 
unemployment). Recently, the influence of leadership in workers' 
mobilisation and participation in union activities has been studied, relying 
alternatively on semi-structured interviews (Green, Black and Ackers 
2000 and Darlington 2001), or on questionnaires (Metochi 2002), 
depending on the educational and professional background of the 
researchers. But in both cases preference for one method did not 
necessarily exclude the other, if we consider that also the theoretical 
foundation common to these researches (Kelly's mobilisatIon theory) is 
the product of an investigation based on both qualitative and/or 
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quantitative approaches. These examples can, indeed, prove that 
quantitative and qualitative methods should be intended as 
complementary. This seems particularly necessary in the current society 
that while stressing homogenisation and standardisation allows space for a 
renewed role of subject's specificity in each social context. 
Bearing this in mind, the dichotomy of qualitative/quantitative should, 
however, be maintained since it performs a very useful function. It helps 
to distinguish between two groups of methodological orientations that 
have, in turn, their origins in a clear cleavage in the general understanding 
of social phenomena. If we follow the framework proposed by Burrel and 
Morgan (1979) quantitative methodologies should be based on a realist 
ontology, on a positivist epistemology, detenninistic in tenns of human 
nature and deductive in scope, while, conversely, qualitative approaches 
should tend to be nominalist, anti positivist, voluntarist and inductive. 
These opposed categories echo the historical aspiration of the social 
sciences to reach the scientific status and transparency of natural sciences. 
From a positivist perspective, Durkheim argued that social scientists 
should investigate social reality "in the same state of mind as the 
physicist, chemist or physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored 
region of the scientific domain" (as quoted in May 1997, p.? ). There is 
undoubtedly a set of philosophical assumptions within which each social 
researcher feels more comfortable but, since we are investigating into 
aspects of human life and behaviours and not into natural/physical 
phenomena, a consistent amount of relativity is inherent in our activities 
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whether the methodological approach adopted is qualitative or 
quantitative. In this sense I agee with Weick (1979, p. 52) when he states 
that we should be able to 'think in circle' and to intend mobilisation, I 
would like to add, as a circular process. This means to consider and to 
analyse the reality not as a static and monolithic entity but rather as a 
dynamic process where voluntarism/determinism and realism/nominalism 
interact with each other. 
Social sciences are, always, to a certain degree an approximation and 
interpretation of human events. There is, I would argue, a constant state of 
conflict inherent in the nature and goals of these sciences. On the one 
hand, we can identify a tension toward the scientific status and objectivity 
of research methods which is, in turn, based on the illusion to reach the 
same tangible and testable results as the natural sciences. On the other 
hand it is recognised that we are, essentially, dealing, from a human being 
perspective, with phenomena belonging to human nature. This 
objective/subjective counter opposition is at the roots of the 
quantitative/qualitative debate within the social sciences. 
It is useful for a better understanding of the different positions within the 
debate, and before the justification of my methodological stance, to 
summanse briefly some of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach. 
Qualitative research seems particularly indicated to investigate highly 
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sensitive social contexts. Sociology, Anthropology, and, to a certain 
extent, Industrial Relations aims to enter into and explain uncovered social 
interconnections and processes. In these settings a more individualistic 
approach is necessary and researchers operate, most of the time, through 
in-depth case studies and analyses. This method is for its own nature 
concentrated on the explanation of the particular and for this reason is 
open to criticisms because it does not allow for generalisations. This is, in 
turn, what can be obtained using surveys and questionnaires that, 
detennining associations between variables, are able to depict a broader 
picture of the issues under investigation. Mitchell (1983), however, 
prefers to defend the validity of case studies and of qualitative methods, 
reforinulating the concept of what we should intend for generalisation. He 
argues that there are different kinds of generalisations because different is 
the scope of each method. A qualitative analysis aims to uncover the 
causal links of social action, the "why" of social phenomena, while a 
quantitative analysis tends to represent social facts in a statistical manner, 
the "what" of social phenomena. The objective/subjective counter 
opposition which is at the roots of the quantitative/qualitative debate is 
here, once again, evident. The advantage of a certain method is at the 
same time, at least from the perspective of its critics, its worst 
disadvantage and a justification for the adoption of the alternative method: 
both seem to offer valid solutions to ground scientifically the research. 
These considerations lead us to reforinulate the question placed at the 
beginning of this discussion, that is whether, in research, we should adopt 
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a qualitative or quantitative approach. Qualitative and Quantitative are 
attributions that express tendencies and orientations within social 
scientists on the most appropriate methods able to create, transfer and 
diffuse scientific knowledge of a certain field of studies among the society 
(or, as often and regretfully happens, among other academics with similar 
interests). In this sense the distinction maintains its value. But if we want 
to avoid the generalisation that each method is valid in its own, we have to 
move to a specific research context and in relation to this justify the 
coherence of the methodological stance adopted with the research 
hypotheses forinulated. Other researches in the same field and with the 
same method can further support our positions. The next paragraphs 
intend to review the validity of the qualitative approach, in particular, 
within studies on workplace industrial relations. 
3. An overview of the qualitative approach in labour studies. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph the distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative method is not always clear. The difficulty of 
putting a clear demarcation line is also increased by the fact that it is not 
unusual in social sciences to elaborate new theories and assumptions 
working with a quantitative approach on secondary literature based on 
qualitative fieldwork and vice versa. Notwithstanding these problems of 
definition, we could say that workplace research in industrial and work 
Studies has mainly tended to adopt a more qualitative approach. The 
following are examples of researches that have positively contributed to 
enrich the knowledge of the field of study under investigation. 
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In Argentina, labour movement historians (for instance Pozzi 1988, James 
1988, Gordillo 1999) have often explained social protests and uprisings on 
the base of oral testimonies with direct protagonists of the events. The 
scarcity of documentary data on trade unions and political movements' 
activities, due to military repression, often imposed the reconstruction of 
history through this method. The work of Brennan (1994) on 20 years of 
labour conflict in the city of Cordoba is particularly relevant for this 
purpose. But also in Italy, Turin's working class during fascism has been 
the subject of Passerim's oral history research (Passenni 1984) and, more 
in general, there is an established tradition in oral history (see, among 
others, Thompson 2000, Yow 1994, Portelli 1991). 
In Britain the Manchester School during the 1950's and from the early 
1970's scholars of the Industrial Relations Research Unit at the University 
of Warwick have consistently contributed to imposing the ethnographic 
method in industrial relations research. Studies such as that of Edwards 
and Scullion (1982) on the social organisation of industrial conflict and 
the works of Batstone, Borastone and Frenkel (1978 and 1977) on shop 
stewards and strikes have consistently enhanced our understanding of 
conflict, accommodation and resistance within the workplace. The same 
approach is currently used to investigate similar issues within a global 
comparative perspective (Belanger, Edwards and Halven 1994, 
Waddington 1999, Meardi 2000). The influential work of Burawoy is in 
the ethnographic tradition. He extensively worked on the labour process 
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and on workplace relations with the state (particularly in The politics of 
production, 1985) using participant observation in the analysis of the 
American workplace (1979) and later comparing factory regimes within 
capitalist and socialist economies. 
The rapid expansion of multinationals and the introduction of new 
production technologies have, in turn, created new work and organisation 
practises (that commonly go under the label "lean production"). These 
changes have been, in the last decade, the material base for a vast 
academic production. Critical case studies research has been conducted on 
Human Resource Management (HRM) putting in evidence, in particular, 
the difference between theory and practice and that these managerial 
strategies are in reality more sophisticated forms of workers' control than 
an instrument for the achievement of the so called "mutual gains 
enterprise" (Kochan and Osterman 1994). 
In the field of the sociology of labour we can refer to the ethnographic 
work of Beynon, and in particular to his Workingfor Ford (1984), and to 
Fantasia's (1988), Cultures of Solidarity: consciousness, action and 
contemporary American workers. Both researches approach the issues of 
leadership, union representation and mobilisation through a direct 
participation (as in the case of Fantasia), or a deep involvement of the 
authors in the events described. Similar to this is also Linehart's (1978) 
research on Citroen in France. These contributions, even if written in a 
historical context dominated at production level by Fordism, still represent 
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very important documents in the understanding of working conditions and 
workers' ives in ig manufacturing industries. The shift in focus, from 
Fordism to Post Fordism, of current studies in the sociology of 
organisation did not change the confidence in the methodological 
approach (in Italy see, for instance, the works on FIAT of Bonazzi 1994 
and Pulignano 1999). Last, but not least, we should mention the work of 
Touraine, in particular Workers' Movement (1987), and the French school 
of sociology of labour on trade unions and workers' movements. 
4. Oral history and interviews. 
The first problem concerning oral history is related to its meaning, since 
the same instrument, recorded or transcribed interviews, has been used by 
social scientists in different fields of enquiry. Life history, self-report, 
personal narrative, oral biography, taped memories, life review, are all 
words that have been used to basically identify this particular 
methodological tool that 
"implies that there is someone else involved who inspires the narrator to 
begin the act of remembering, jogs memories, and records and presents 
the narrator's view" (Yow 1994, p. 4). 
This seems the base on which a common agreement on the meaning of 
oral history could be found. Ethnographers and anthropologists will then 
integrate in depth interviews with participant observation while 
quantitative sociologists may prefer to test it with aggregate data or 
surveys and historians with the analysis of documentary data from 
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archives. More, in general, it is probably the scope of each research that 
will give the answers to the question "how and why do I use interviews? " 
As far as this research is concerned,, the use of in-depth interviews is 
fundamental. Oral sources are the base for an historical, even if a recent 
history, reconstruction of conflict and mobilisation in a particular setting. 
From an historical point of view, in the case of the events that occurred in 
Cordoba during September 1996 and May 1997, the scarcity or the 
impossibility of accessing documentary data from both the company and 
the unions gave no other choice than the use of interviews as the base for 
the reconstruction of the events that occurred. The use of in-depth 
unstructured interviews has proved to be also the best instrument to 
achieve detailed accounts of the mobilisations analysed. As mentioned in 
the introduction, particularly in workers' reconstructions of the events, 
what happened was described as a whole whose parts almost naturally 
seemed bent together, an automatic succession of actions and agents. 
Because of this, efforts to direct and fragment the interviews according to 
the categories of the theory adopted would have been in vain and could 
have altered or confused the description of the events. 
From a theoretical point of view, the specific issues under investigation, 
conflict and mobilisation, have to be studied, as tradition in the field has 
shown, from a methodological perspective that allows the investigation of 
motivations, identities and attitude of the people at work. On the one 
hand, the conflictual nature of the employment relationship, the need to 
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transfonn labour power into labour, does not always produce a state of 
constant conflict and workers' reaction to managerial control may vary 
from resistance to accommodation to consent (Edwards 1986). On the 
other hand, as Kelly suggests in his mobilisation framework, mobilisation 
is not an immediate consequence of the existence of conflict but a 
phenomenon that could be explained in presence of a diffused sense of 
dissatisfaction and injustice among workers within a context in which 
facts can be attributed to the action of a specific agent and where 
collective interest also has room for representation. Interviews allow us to 
observe more closely and intensively a subject's perceptions, views and 
motivations. The interpretation of the data recorded in the interview and 
the possibility to interact (unobtrusively) with the interviewees,, uncover 
hidden facts and causal connections (Gordon 1980). For these specific 
reasons this instrument seems the best methodological tool that can be 
used in this research. 
I am here concerned , in particular, with unstructured interviews. This 
method tends to generate a discussion, to create room for interchange 
between interviewer and interviewee in which is likely to be produced that 
kind of knowledge on a subject's perceptions, points of view and 
motivations necessary for the research. The fact that the interview is 
unstructured does not mean that the discussion does not have an 
underlying framework. The interviewees should be free to talk of the 
is gui issues they consider more relevant, but the researcher I ided by his 
research hypotheses; otherwise we should be considered just as story 
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tellers, in the selection of general arguments around which the discussion 
can start. 
"From general discussions on these matters it (is) possible to follow up 
specific aspects of them and, as always happens in this kind of research, 
(facts) which had not been thought in advance " (Edwards and Scullion, 
1982 p. 18). 
There is no one specific technique or procedure more valid than another in 
conducting this type of interview. We could cite and refer to many 
methodological textbooks (see, for instance, Thompson 2000) as useful to 
learn some of the techniques adopted by the most skilled researchers, but 
there is still a set of attitudes, codes of conduct, while interviewing, that 
are probably related to the sensibility of each researcher and just the fact 
of being involved in fieldwork can explain this. There is, indeed, a 
consistent amount of variables that can influence an interview. For 
instance, from the point of view of this research, the geographical setting 
and the nationality of the researcher matter. What is driving an Italian 
researcher to do historical research on conflict and mobilisation in an 
Argentinean plant owned by an Italian multinational? Prejudices, 
suspicions, misunderstandings are the unavoidable part of each research 
by interviews and in this case is confirmed, once more, the need to listen 
to the interviewee in a sensible, friendly and smooth way. 
5. The validity and reliability of qualitative methods. 
Thus far N),,, e have tried to justify the methodology used in this research 
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referring to other works in the same area of study using similar 
approaches and in parallel explaining the coherence of the method used 
with issues, hypotheses and subjects under study. This is just part of our 
assignment since internal coherence and tradition in the field of study are 
necessary but not sufficient to give solid consistency to our research 
findings. 
When discussing the validity and reliability of qualitative methods and 
moreover of the methodologies in social sciences, a premise is necessary: 
there are no valid criteria that could give absolute scientific nature to our 
findings. As we have argued in the first paragraph, it is the intrinsic nature 
of the social sciences, the human dimension, which is object and subject 
of the study that do not allow us to reach an uncontested and demonstrable 
result. Nonetheless, all the criteria and methods that have been developed 
to reduce this approximation are of a fundamental importance, since they 
fonu the base of accepted knowledge in the social sciences. 
Reliability and validity are interconnected and interdependent concepts. 
Reliability, as Gordon states, 
It refers to the probability that an observation if repeated at a different 
time by the same person, or at the same time by another competent 
observer, will give the same results " (Gordon 1980, p. 39). 
In comparison to this latter concept, validity has etymologically (the ten-n 
comes from the Latin word validus, strong) and in the common practice a 
stronger meaning. Reliability is a conditio sine qua non but not sufficient 
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for the validity of the research. This is particularly evident in cases in 
which the complementary nature of the relation reliability/validity 
becomes conflictive. This is likely to appear when the subject under 
investigation is of a particular abstract nature (as in this research workers' 
sense of dissatisfaction, injustice). Here reliability tends to decrease 
because "there is a strain between the true essence of the highly abstract 
construct and measuring it in a concrete manner " (Lawrence Neuman 
1997). In these cases, common to the majority of qualitative research, a 
strict adherence to the concepts of validity and reliability as proposed by 
quantitative traditions could be confusing (Janesick 2000). A detailed 
questionnaire could give highly reliable measures but the validity of the 
data could be questioned for its deficiency in grasping the subjective 
essence of the concept. 
Having agreed on the need to define some precise rules and procedures to 
obtain credible data as a precondition for validity, this does not solve the 
problems and the controversies on the same concept of validity that, 
among methodologists, still remains a discussed topic. Lincoln and Guba 
argue that what is questioned is not the necessity to develop or maintain 
rigorous methodological criteria but rather to reflect on the existence of a 
rigorous approach in our interpretation. "Can our co-created 
constructions be trusted to provide some purchase on some important 
human phenomenon? "(Lincoln and Guba 2000, p. 179). From this post- 
modem position the issue of validity is strictly related to that of 
interpretation because that it is the way in which we interpret social 
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reality, whether we consider it objective, scientific or based on individual 
experiences, moments, emotions, that profoundly influence our 
understanding of validity. 
"Social scientists concerned with the expansion of what count as social 
-7 -- aata rely increasingly on the experimental, the embodied, the emotive 
qualities of human experience that contribute the narrative quality to a 
1 ife [ ... ] (in order to) overcome the abstractions of a social science far 
gone with quantitative descriptions of human life and to capture those 
elements that make life conflictual, moving, problematic" (Lincoln and 
Guba, 2000, p-179). 
Among other radical writers, Schwandt (1996) suggests that we should 
tend to abandon what he calls "critenology" and approach social research 
as a form of practical philosophy where knowledge is produced from 
moral critique. Richardson (1997), metaphorically, proposes the image of 
a crystal as a form to look at social realities and intends validity as an 
examination and interpretation of the many different faces the same 
crystal can assume. 
Validity is not objectivity. There is always a high level of subjectivity and 
contextual elements that have to be taken into consideration and we are, 
probably, in condition, from our human point of view, to describe just part 
of a reality or, in the words of Harnmersley (1992, p. 50), we can represent 
but not necessarily reproduce reality. But this apparent weakness of the 
qualitative methodology is at the same time a powerful instrument of 
knowledge in specific contexts where the same protagonists of events 
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could have been, at their time, involuntary subjects of representations. 
Portelli, for instance, in his historical account of Terni's workers' struggles 
in post war Italy, reports that almost half of the workers he interviewed, 
unequivocally, placed the killing of a worker by the police in 1953 when it 
is uncontested that the same event happened in 1949. In the words of the 
same author 
"Oral sources are credible but with a different credibility[ ... 
fthe 
importance of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact but 
rather in its departure ftom it, as imagination, symbolism and desire 
emerge" (Portelli 199 1, p. 5 1). 
The same argument could be used in the case reported by Weller (1994) of 
workers evidently not telling the truth. 
Even though the concept of validity is, as we have seen, questionable, it 
remains essential to set criteria and procedures to test the validity of our 
findings. Methodologists from many fields of social investigation have 
offered solutions to this specific problem identifying different research 
procedures for different research techniques. As far as the case of 
interviews is concerned, particular importance is assumed by the selection 
of the sample of people that has to be interviewed. The selection is highly 
dependent on the nature of issues under investigation and on the case 
studied. 
When the inforination we need is related to subjective orientations or 
personal opinions about events that everyone, in the specific group of 
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persons under investigation, knows, we should select randomly. In this 
case, assuming that the sample is representative, we could argue that the 
opinions of few tend to correspond to that of the entire population 
(Gordon 1980). On the contrary when the information we need belongs to 
the memories of certain specific persons, we are forced to build our 
sample so as to include in it as many informants as possible. This 
selection, of course, does not always provide true and authentic opinions 
of the facts we are analysing. As stated above in the case of Portelli's 
workers, the representation of a reality does not necessarily correspond to 
the reality. Despite this evidence, there is a social value and cultural 
substratum embedded in this representation of "reality" which is 
extremely important to take into consideration especially when the 
research, as in this case, aims to investigate the motivational processes 
that could have generated workers' mobilisation. 
6. Issues of generalisation. 
Another very important issue that needs to be addressed is the 
generalisation of research findings. Can we extend the conclusions drawn 
from a specific case to similar settings and situations? The criteria 
commonly adopted in oral history and in research on social and political 
processes are based on the concept of saturation proposed by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). This principle is particularly useful in interviews since it 
gives a criterion to determine when the quantity of information obtained is 
enough to reach conclusions. Saturation means completeness, therefore. 
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Once the researcher is not getting, from his interlocutors, any new 
inforination or variety of interpretation of the same facts, there is no need 
to continue with interviews since this will be a repetition of what has 
already been obtained. In this case a saturation point has been achieved 
and the research could be considered as complete. If this stage has been 
reached we can be confident in the validity of what we discovered from 
the analysis of our case. However the issue of generalisation could be 
partly solved just through a comparison with other settings similar or 
dissimilar to the one previously analysed. If the findings of the two cases 
tend to show similarities, the strength of what is discovered increases, and 
generalisations (tendencies) might be established. This is true in the case 
of comparison with contexts presenting features totally opposed (for 
instance unionised vs. non unionised workplaces). 
In the field of ethnographic workplace studies, in particular, five ways to 
generalise the lessons learned from case studies have been considered 
(Edwards 1992 and Belanger, Edwards, Haiven, 1994): 
e The discovery of hidden forms of be aviour 
e The identification of critical cases 
e The exploration of causal mechanisms linking phenomena 
* The explanations of variations 
9 The understanding of the nature and the sources of variation 
These patterns of generalisation rest on a conceptual base that considers 
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qualitative research as the method oriented toward the explication of the 
analytical connections existing among social processes (see Mitchell 
1983). In this perspective considerable emphasis, as a way to proceed to a 
scientific examination of the research hypotheses, is put on comparison 
with similar or dissimilar settings and on cross-country comparison. 
Undoubtedly the importance of comparison, particularly in studies of 
unionism and industrial relations, does not have to be underestimated. 
Hyman (2001), for instance, argues that we should use this latter method 
to give ground and general applicability to theories and to identify 
"lessons" and "best practices" (even if he questions, considering the 
distance between practice and theory, the compatibility of academic and 
practical motives for comparative research). But there is also the risk that 
ýt a research design featuring comparison substitutes the comparison for 
the case as a focus of the study" (Stake 2000, p. 444). This position, while 
not undervaluing the importance and usefulness of research by 
comparison, refocuses our attention on the nature of case-study research 
and on the possibility of incoherence between this method of investigation 
and the space for its generalisation, as this is coinnionly intended. Stake 
supports the view of constructivists that there is a transfer, a creation of 
knowledge, in the dialectic relation researcher/reader. The translation into 
narrative and report operated by each researcher doing case research is 
perceived by readers and interpreted in a process of naturalistic 
generalisation. 
"The reader comes to know some things told, as if he or she had 
experienced it. Enduring meani . ngs come from encounter, and are 
40 
modified and reinforced by repeated encounter" (Stake 2000, p. 442). 
If we intend this process of "natural generalisation" as the base for a first 
generalisation of the findings of case study research it will be possible to 
restore the original function of this methodology as thick description 
(Geertz 1973), in-depth interpretation of particular contexts and situations. 
In this sense I agree with Stake when he criticises the improper use of 
comparison in actual case study research since it tends to cover and to 
decrease the importance of the knowledge we could extract from the 
single case: 
"Comparison is a grand epistemological strategy, a powerful conceptual 
mechanism, flXing attention upon one or few attributes. And it obscures 
case knowledge thatfails tofacilitate comparison " (Stake 2000, p. 444). 
In conclusion, while the tendency to theoretical generalisation of 
qualitative research has to be emphasised, not less valuable have to be 
considered the insights coming from the in-depth analysis of each case 
studied. Regarding this research, particular attention has been placed in 
the selection of interviews so as to obtain, through a constant 
diversification, reliability and validity of reporting and analysing factual 
inforination. In addition to this and to strengthen the generalisation of the 
findings a direct comparative case, Renault Cordoba, has been used to 
control and test the hypotheses of the research. Furthennore, and within 
the same aims, documentary data (from the companies, unions, local and 
national newspapers) on the conflict have been used. Reference to 
historical trends of mobilisation in Argentina during the last 50 years is 
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also offered as a way to test the findings of the research. 
7. Mobilisation and social reality 
Mobilisation is certainly a social phenomenon of which we can take a nice 
and detailed picture and, if colours appear very clearly, we can also think 
that the same picture is very well representative of the social reality and 
that it deserves to be put into a (theoretical) framework. More analyses 
will then be added, our understanding of mobilisation will be greater, the 
picture will be much more detailed, we will know more about how and 
why workers act collectively. This dimension of knowledge, when an 
historical series of cases is put together as the thousands of pictures that 
make a movie , is the best way to proceed in our journey toward an 
approximation to objectivity. r, 
Those who will read and comment on this research will probably accept 
this reconstruction, symbolised by the idea of a picture and a movie that 
the static and dynamic dimensions can respectively suggest. Yet there is a 
tendency in the social sciences and in case study research in particular to 
analyse processes of social interaction with too much attention to the 
technicalities and specificities of the case and this inevitably leads us to 
underestimate the whole picture. This does not mean that in the attempts 
to generalise the findings of our own research we should dismiss as 
irrelevant and exceptional the cases that present a different reality. The 
results of this research are ultimately the product of a comparison and 
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other "pictures" have also been taken into consideration. 
But, often, the impression is that many things are taken for granted, are 
not considered because obvious and, it follows, the analysis of all this 
does not add much to what we already know. As far as mobilisation is 
concerned, I think of the "obvious" pressures the labour market constantly 
produces on workers, of the repressive methods used by enterprises all 
over the world, of the cultural values produced in a workplace in a global 
era. We should avoid dismissing these issues as "old" or ideological. All 
this points implicitly to a cntic of the social system that we are living in; 
however critics are fundamental if research can contribute to a better 
society. 
These considerations are important to establish our epistemological 
stance. Workers have always mobilised, everywhere, for different reasons, 
in different ways. We may have some suppositions about what's the 
common denominator of all these cases, we can show which factors, at 
least in our social system, favour or hamper mobilisations, we can 
establish differences and believe that subjectivity and objectivity both play 
a part in the determination of these social processes. But we cannot avoid 
emphasising that we live and reproduce a system that is profoundly 
unbalanced and that this influences our behaviours and perceptions of the 
social reality. 
Refusing both mechanistic objectivism and marginalist subjectivisin, 
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Bourdieu has expressed the following view: 
"In the determination of the collective classification and the hierarchy of 
the fiduciary values set on individuals and groups, not all judgements 
have the same weight, and the dominant groups are able to impose the 
scale ofpreferences most favourable to their own products (in particular 
because they have a de facto monopoly over the institutions which, like 
the educational system, establish and guarantee ranks). Moreover, the 
representations that agents have of their own and other agents'position in 
social space (and also the representations they give of them, consciously 
or unconsciously, through their practises or their properties) are the 
product of a system of schemes of perception and appreciation which is 
itse4f the incorporated product of a class condition (that is, a particular 
position in the distribution of material properties and symbolic capital) " 
(Bordieu 1990, p. 139-140). 
8. How and what to compare? 
We can say that comparison, more than a method in the social and natural 
sciences, is an almost spontaneous way to articulate our thoughts and 
ponder our judgements. Everyday, to different degrees, each of us engage 
in some sort of comparison, independently of whether this may concern 
the quality of food, the beauty of a landscape, job attitudes or politics. In 
the current global world the increased knowledge of societies and cultures 
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of previously geographical forgotten places, the tendencies of the world 
economy, migration, the homogenisation of consumption models, regional 
processes of integration, all contribute to the need for comparison (May 
2001). 
However, and especially in the social sciences, the boundaries of what 
should be compared may be uncertain, and the way to define the 
categories we want to use in the comparison, arbitrary. According to 
Hyman (2001), in cross-national research on trade unions, these problems 
may be circumscribed if a clearer understanding of the limits of social 
research is established. Going beyond nomothetic or idiographic 
perspectives, "we may identify an iterative process: through our 
inadequate attempts to understand the " eculiarities " of "the other", we P 
can better aDDreciate our own uniqueness, constructing a basis for a . AF 
better approximation to truly comparative knowledge " (Hyman 2001, 
p. 223). 
If in cross national comparison it may be difficult to identify analytical 
categories with similar meaning and common use in different national 
systems; in the other cases of comparison the risk is to use categories 
whose conceptual definition is not flexible enough to account for 
Variations among cases or whose peculianties do not allow for a 
systematic analytical understanding. Particularly when studying the social 
relations among people at work, the interaction of power, opportunities, 
agents, organisation, and interests may profoundly change from place to 
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place and differently influence collective action and workers identities. 
The unstable equilibrium between conflict and accommodation, structure 
and agency that characterises workplace relations is the most important 
reason for adopting a research method that, although comparative in 
perspective, "Sensitizes the researcher to particular areas of study rather 
then providing specific hypotheses ....... . 
(and) permits a high degree of 
flexibility and the maximum collection of data in a form which can cater 
for the richness of social life" (Batstone, Borastone and Frenkel, 1977, 
13). 
This kind of approach, that tries to maintain a strong interrelation between 
evidence, ideas and theories, focuses on a type of comparison constructed 
around thematic areas rather than on fixed rules and strict matches 
between the cases. The same idea seems to inform much of the academic 
production at the Warwick ER-RU during the 1970's but also more recent 
work, for example, by Darlington (1994) and Green (200 1). Moreover not 
necessarily a systematic comparison offers elements for generalisation, 
having sometimes the knowledge produced by the case as an intrinsic 
value (es. Beynon 1984, Burawoy 1979), a comparability in historical 
perspective or, considering the issues under investigation, the potential for 
comparison with future research (Fantasia, 1988). 
As far as this research is concerned, because of the subject under 
investigation and empincal data availability, the comparison between 
mobilisation at FIAT and Renault has to be intended not in ten-ris of 
systematic matches between the cases but rather as asymmetrical. But 
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reflecting on the asymmetry between the cases, with FIAT showing an 
entire process of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation and a much higher 
level of conflict, means setting patterns of diversity among apparently 
similar cases (same production, workforce, and city) and establish causal 
links (Ragin 1994, p. 105-130). 
Thus in the empirical chapters the cases will be developed around: 
* the dynamics of mobilisation 
e solidarity and mobilisation 
o leadership and the consolidation of mobilisation 
In the first section, comparing how differently the companies have 
mobilised will give us elements to identify the intemal. and extemal 
factors influencing the cases and this will contribute to spread light on 
workers' perceptions of injustice and the role this latter should have in the 
theory of mobilisation. In the second section the transformation of 
solidarity from compaherismo (the cultural and social ties that are 
non-nally produced among people working in the same environment) into 
mobilisation is considered. This point may create problems depending on 
the way we intend the concept of solidarity. In the theoretical chapter 
solidarity is defined as a "process" with its basis in human beings' 
tendency for mutual help when involved in collective action and in joint 
production activities. If we assume that the abstract minimum for a 
definition of solidarity is an outcome belonging to the human condition, 
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we may then identify how dominating social relations alter and modify 
this basic experience and consequently in the cases analysed how specific 
factors have altered the possibility for workers to establish solidarity links. 
Following this perspective solidarity is analytically distinct from 
mobilisation but at the same time represents, even in its minimum form of 
companerismo, a necessary condition of the same mobilisation. In the 
third section, included in a separate chapter, the focus will be on the 
emergence of leadership and the effects of mobilisation considenng 
exclusively the case of FIAT. 
For a more precise understanding of the method used, in paragraph 9, 
"methodology in practice", a list is provided of all the issues/subjects 
treated while interviewing people and in the annex is included the 
transcription of the entire interview with FIAT mobilisation leader. 
9. Methodology in practice. 
This research intends to analyse from a historical perspective conflict,, 
mobilisation and counter mobilisation in the plants that FIAT and Renault 
own in the outskirts of Cordoba. In the analysis the categories of 
dissatisfaction, injustice, solidarity, leadership, collective interest and 
mobilisation have been used as a methodological framework in the 
historical analysis of labour conflict in the plants during the period 
1996/1997. 
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It is worth mentioning that these categories should not be considered as 
static and unchangeable. These have on their own a subjective dimension 
that powerfully influences the meanings people can attribute to the 
concepts. Dissatisfaction and injustice, in particular, change their essence 
in parallel to variations in ideologies. Each subject attributes to the same 
concepts a different colour depending on the idea of society he/she has 
and the objective political conditions of a specific moment. On the other 
hand, this subjective dimension and the influence produced on it by the 
ideological sphere has to be inserted within the employment relationship 
and the Argentinean context. These subjective/objective conditions have 
been taken into consideration while talking with people and justify the 
decision to conduct unstructured interviews. In particular, while looking at 
the different meanings and articulations of dissatisfaction/injustice,, 
collective interest, leadership, mobilisation, the dialogue with the 
interviewees went through the following issues/arguments: 
9 Workers and their relations with the employer 
9 Workers and the socio-political enviromnent 
9 Workers and the union 
* Workers, leadership and activism 
o Workers and the dynamics of mobilisation 
9 Managers and the dynamics of mobilisation 
As far as issues of validity and reliability are concerned, special attention 
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has been given to the selection of the sample. In the case of research by 
interviews this could probably have been obtained building a random 
sample in the selection of the interviewees. The random sample has 
proved to be, as this method usually is, impracticable because the events 
investigated were very specific. Not all the workers necessarily 
participated in mobilisation or in all the phases of it. To overcome this 
problem all the interviewees have been selected, when possible, through a 
systematic diversification (generations, working position, and union 
affiliation) in both comparative cases. As will be evident from the 
empirical section of the thesis, in all the interviews quoted those who 
speak are males. It is legitimate to believe the thesis is gender blinded and 
that female opinions should have been added to the analysis. This can be 
considered a limitation of the whole research with which I am concerned. 
But unfortunately, and despite the efforts to add more balance in the 
gender distribution of interviews, female workers in the production 
sections of both plants were absent at the time of conflict. Consequently 
we have to consider that, with a mixed composition of the labour force, 
mobilisation patterns and managerial strategies may have been different. 
FIAT's management allowed me to enter in the plant and to hold 
interviews with workers, middle managers and managers that took part in 
the mobilisation of 1996/1997. With workers in particular, when possible, 
interview meetings were held outside the plant in the facilities of the 
Funclacion Milesi, at workers' houses or somewhere else where a long 
interview session was comfortable to be held. Another source of 
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information came from the independent union (SITRAMF) that 
established the representation of workers in the days of the mobilisation. 
Interviews have been held with the former secretary, union activists and 
ordinary members. A third source of information came from a group of 
people introduced to me by those already interviewed or by those who 
knew of my research. In the case of FIAT a total of 36 interviews' 
have been collected among the three groups mentioned above that, 
according to the level of involvement in the conflict, can be defined 
respectively as the less militant (workers still employed), the more 
militant (activists) and the heterogeneous. 
The Renault (CIADEA) factory of Cordoba has been used as a control 
case of the research hypotheses. This company did not show a level of 
conflict and mobilisation similar to that of FIAT, nonetheless it operated 
in the same political and social context and with a labour force sharing an 
identical labour culture. In particular, as previously stated, during 
November 1996 conflict at Renault followed patterns and times similar to 
that of FIAT. But in this latter case mobilisation continued soon after the 
opening of the new plant. Why did workers mobilise again at FIAT and 
not at Renault? Answers to this and other fundamental questions can be 
offered by the comparison. Sixteen interviews have been collected among 
workers of different departments and with different ages through already 
established contacts and the snowball effect. The interviews' structure and 
content were similar to that of FIAT and, in particular, special attention 
was given to workers' opinions on conflict and mobilisation in the 
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company different from the one to which they belonged to. Inviting 
workers to express their point of view on issues external to their company 
could help to test and to enhance the research hypotheses and the research 
findings in general. 
Other interviews and/or informal discussions were held with reporters and 
people that had the opportunity, directly or indirectly, to be part of the 
mobilisation events. In all the cases interviews were approximately of one 
hour each and have been fully transcribed and recorded (transcript 
examples in the annex). When for technical or opportunity reasons this 
was not possible extensive notes were taken. 
The validity of data has been strengthened also by the use of documentary 
data. In the case of FIAT, company's internal reports, security videos and 
press conferences have offered a different point of view of the event and 
more clarity on the strategy pursued by management dunng mobilisation 
and counter mobilisation. Archives of the local newspaper and of the 
university's television channel have also been scanned for references to 
the time of conflict, adding in this way a further perspective to the events 
analysed. 
10. Conclusions. 
This chapter has dealt with methodological aspects concemed with the 
current research. In our analysis we have considered the appropriateness 
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of the use of a qualitative, case study based on unstructured interviews, 
method as the one that best fits within the aims and the scope of the 
research. This conclusion has been reached through: an evaluation of other 
works in the same field of study using similar methods, the importance of 
interviews in the understanding of social motivational processes, the 
adequacy of the method as the only instrument to gather historical data 
relevant to the research issues, a detailed exposition of the interviews' 
style, selection method, total number and issues discussed during sessions 
with inforinants, a list of sources used in the data collection. 
As far as the method in itself is concerned, as previously discussed, the 
issues of generalisation, validity and reliability of the research remain 
consistently influenced by personal/subjective interpretations. The concept 
of objectivity in social sciences is always, for its own nature, an 
approximation to reality. This seems particularly evident in a case of 'r- 
historical reconstruction of events and social decision-processes through 
unstructured interviews. This method involving a direct paiticipation of 
the researcher in the collection and interpretation of data. In addition to 
this, a case study research tends to be concerned with the analysis of the 
particular. 
Nonetheless the theoretical weaknesses of the method adopted, devices to 
increase the validity, reliability and generalisation of the findings have 
been outlined. In particular has been underlined the usefulness to establish 
some validity criteria in the selection of interviews and to identify a 
comparative case to test the research hypotheses. in the first case, and 
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considering the subject under study, we have followed the criteria of 
constant diversification of the interviewees. In the second case, and to 
extend the generalisation of our findings, the case of a similar factory, 
operating in the same environment and during the same time, has been 
used as a control case. Both criteria seem accepted and used among social 
scientists dealing with similar issues and this, together with accuracy and 
transparency (records of interviews) in the collection of data could help to 
strengthen and give credibility to the findings of the research and to depict 
a balanced picture of events and issues analysed. 
At the time of conflict 1700 workers were employed by the company but less then 200 were still 
working when the data were collected. Many of those formerly employed were retired, jobless, 
emigrant and these situations, inevitably, created difficulties in the way interviewees were selected. 
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Chapter 2: Mobilisation and its theoretical foundations, 
between subjectivity and the inevitability of conflict. 
1. Introduction. 
This research is based upon a comparative analysis of how mobilisation 
and collective action have been produced within two different workplaces. 
There are three dimensions that we consider to explain mobilisation and 
collective action through empirical analysis. First, we should investigate 
how external social situations have produced the base for mobilisation and 
eventually conditions for demobilisation. Second, we should look at how 
workers and management have shaped their relations as a consequence of 
predetennined external conditions and in which sense mobilisation has 
also been determined by internal dynamics. Third, and most importantly, 
while studying social processes that produce struggles and collective 
actions, we should enhance our understanding of how actors have 
perceived those external and internal conditions that were changing their 
daily understanding of the workplace and employment relations. Within 
this latter dimension we should investigate, in particular, to what extent 
consciousness, solidarity and leadership have strengthened workers' 
mobilisation and provided a base to resist employer's repression. 
This framework for analysis should be maintained even when our attempt 
is to build a theoretical foundation on the base from which further to 
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develop and ground empirical data. lt does not seem superfluous to stress 
this point since the danger is to offer detailed, empirical accounts that do 
not allow for any type of generalisation or artificial and fictitious 
connections between Grand Theories and concrete realities. The 
complexity of workplace relations and the study of them in a context of 
mobilisation justify the search for a theoretical background that could be 
flexible and varied enough to account for the "in progress" social 
processes that the study of mobilisation implies. In this research a series 
of theoretical debates and positions are used as a framework, as a direction 
in the development of the issues analysed and as reference points in the 
discussion of empincal data. 
Considering the three dimensions of analysis mentioned above, the 
following paragraphs focus on the theory of mobilisation, on studies of 
conflict at work and on issues of consciousness, solidarity and action. 
Kelly's theory of mobilisation offers both a set of categories 
(dissatisfaction, injustice, leadership, repression), through which social 
processes at work can be analysed and a more general view of society as a 
totality, that provided by Marxist analysis, within which the cases of this 
research can be explained. Theories and studies addressing the concept 
and function of conflict in the workplace and on behavioural patterns of 
labour/management relations, help us to understand the contradictory 
nature of the employment relationship and the consequences this has for 
collective action. Issues of consciousness, solidarity, collective action and 
their interrelations are fundamental in the study of mobilisation. This 
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study is based on the idea that workers structure their perceptions and 
identities, the cost and opportunity of collective action, their 
organ sational resources and their capacity to resist counter mobilisation 
around the level of consciousness and solidarity achieved in and through 
the struggle. This may appear and, in part, is a circular argument, with 
collective action dependent on the level of subjects' consciousness and 
perception which in turn depends on collective action. However my point 
here is not to determine which one comes first, but rather to underline the 
mutual interrelation and influence that moments of struggle have on 
workers' consciousness of current or future struggles. My argument here is 
referred to the ways the same dynamic of mobilisation acts on those who 
mobilise. 
The three theoretical sections mentioned above have been written, on one 
side, with the aim to maintain a direct connection with the levels of 
empirical analysis; and on the other side with the idea of offering an 
understanding of mobilisation as a process whose detennination has both 
a subjective and an objective dimension. Based on this, the first part of 
this chapter is concerned with mobilisation theory and presents a critique 
of the category of injustice by arguing that the concept is subjective and 
volatile and that a reconstruction of mobilisation as a process based 
exclusively on injustice is reductive. Injustice , in my view, 
is just one 
forrn of subjective intervention whose importance remains unquestioned 
in shaping workers' grievances and, eventually, in maintaining action, but 
not as a basis for mobilisation. 
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Once it is assumed that injustice alone does not explain what has produced 
mobilisation, the theoretical discussion moves to the sphere of objectivity. 
The second part of the chapter intends to look for "objective" rules and/or 
for the possibility of identifying general tendencies in the ways workplace 
conflict has presented itself and has been investigated. By arguing that 
under capitalist labour relations, conflict is a general feature and that there 
is a constant dialectic between working class struggles and the way the 
system adapts and changes itself, some objective conditions are set, whose 
influence on the process of mobilisation has to be taken into 
consideration. 
However, the identification of some objective, historical and theoretical 
directions in the ways workplace conflict has evolved is not sufficient to 
explain why in a specific case mobilisation has happened. In the last pait 
of this chapter both structuralist and post-structuralist interpretations of 
the reality are critically reviewed and subsequently, according with the 
work of several authors who have studied mobilisation in workplaces, a 
point is made for the importance of solidarity and the need to 
conceptuallse it. lt is necessary to look at the reality of the workplace as 
something in which a constant interrelation of objective conditions, 
depending on the fluctuation of the market economies and on the 
institutional factors produced by the same system, and subjective 
interventions are at work. In other words there are moments in which the 
inevitability of the daily reality, the impossibility of changing the system 
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of rules at work and of influencing the social system into which we are 
inserted, become questioned. In these moments there are "eruptions" of 
subjectivity, more space for solidarity, and the system is contested. 
The importance of studying mobilisation in specific settings and in a 
comparative way, relies certainly on the need to understand its different 
dynamics and effects. But, more ftindamental, is to identify those 
elements that have opposed and/or triggered mobilisation and to establish 
under which conditions the same elements have operated differently. This 
can give, in turn, insights into those moments in which systems are 
contested. 
2. Mobilisation theory: interest, dissatisfaction and injustice. 
John Kelly's mobilisation theory put together the result of the work done 
by North American social movements' theorists and in particular Tilly 
(1978), McAdam (1988) and Gamson (1992,1995) on collective action 
and social conflicts. Central to Kelly's theory is a Marxist vision of 
economy and society. This is also common to Tilly which is, with the 
exception of Kelly, the only one who explicitly bases his model of 
mobilisation within this theoretical framework, even if concessions to Mill 
and Weber exist when he recognises that the analysis of certain political 
processes and interests could be read in a form not directly connected with 
class conflict (Tilly, 1978, p. 48). An explicit reference to Marx and his 
vision of society is important because it sets the basis around which a 
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"theory" of mobilisation is possible offering the categories of interests, 
dissatisfaction and injustice solid boundaries for their interpretation. As 
we will see later in this section, the works of McAdam (1988) and 
Gamson (1992,1995) provide useful categories for the analysis of 
mobilisation as social process but are flawed over the problem of 
establishing a connection between micro contexts and macro political 
conditions. 
In Marx's view the organisation of production is the starting point in 
understanding society and, with it, the possibilities of collective action, 
which is seen as emerging from a class conflict on the disposal of the 
means of production. In his view political action is collective and rational. 
Within this broad perspective, Tilly identifies interest, organisation, 
mobilisation, opportunity and collective action as the conceptual basis for 
a theory that aims to explain why people act together and the potentiality 
social groups have to engage in collective action. 
Interest is interpreted by Tilly (1978) in a way that immediately draws our 
attention to the relation between individual and collective interests. He 
starts recognising that Marxists have, often, tended to define interests a 
prion on the base of the social relations to the means of production and 
that other theorists have too closely related to groups' concrete actions as 
the only way to detect these latter interests. To overcome these positions 
he proposes to operate a distinction between short and long terin run 
interests analysis. In the first case interests could be better defined by 
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groups' concrete actions while in the second case the social relations of 
production should assume a more important role. In other words there is a 
sort of overlapping between individual and collective interest that 
consequently affects collective action. 
"We should deliberately treat the degree of conflict between individual 
and collective interests ...... as increasing the cost of collective action to 
the individuals and to the group as a whole" (Tilly, 1978, p. 62). 
As this dichotomy and overlapping between individual and collective 
interests and the cost for collective action of the mediation among these 
two categories implies, it also represents the basis around which McAdam 
(1988) develops his argument. For the author the couple 
individual/collective and the social mediations underlying it, is reflected 
in the micro/macro conditions for collective action. Although he 
recognises the importance that macro political conditions (regime crisis, 
political opportunities, absence of repression, and politicisation of private 
life) have in the generation of a social movement, he is mainly concerned 
with the forins through which subjects start to believe that a situation or 
relation is unjust and that it could be changed. He identifies, following 
Piven and Cloward (1979), three moments in which a change in 
consciousness, a" cognitive liberation" is produced: 
The system loses legitimacy 
People begin to assert rights and to demand change 
People perceive that a change in their condition is feasible (personal 
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efficacy) 
This individual change in consciousness, the cognitive liberation, is 
favoured by improved political conditions that while altering the status 
quo, provide insurgents with an alternative to what they believed was a 
legitimate system of rules. This causal connection has undoubtedly the 
advantage of underlining the role each individual plays in the 
understanding and mediation of his/her social reality, but it does not 
provide with a satisfactory explanation. It remains still unanswered why 
political conditions change. In which moments can this change happen? 
Which factors influence the political level? 
Opinions are not uniform and Marxists claims that economic crises and 
class conflict can contribute to the understanding of the logic of politics 
have been highly criticised. The same concept of class, in particular, has 
been contested from a post-modem perspective. The passage from 
Fordism to Post Fordism and the inforinatisation of production have 
reduced the importance of manufacturing and agricultural workers. This, 
together with the ability of companies to produce more, faster and with 
fewer employees, has put into question the role of the working class as 
promoter of social change. In Bauman's (1998) view capitalism needs 
people more as consumers then producers and this change involves 
reconsidering on which elements to build a new anti-capitalist alliance. At 
the same time these perspectives, denying the actuality of class, are 
contested on the basis of the fact that class is nowadays hidden in gender 
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and ethnic differences and that work is decentralised rather than 
disappeared (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994). In the theoretical field a 
reconceptualisation of class is proposed from dIfferent parts (see for 
instance, Edwards, Belanger and Wright 2002, Wright 2000, LabourAgain 
debates 2003). Even against those who support the view that class and 
workers have currently not much importance, in Latin America, for 
instance, popular mobilisations in the last years have been led by alliances 
of traditional trade unions confederations, rural workers and the 
unemployed. In Brazil a former trade unionist and leader of the Workers' 
Party has been elected to the presidency of the Republic. These trends in 
the levels of workers' mobilisation were also typical, more generally, of 
popular protests during the 1980's and 1990's (Eckstein 2001). 
The existence of class, its capacity to mobilise and the extent to which talk 
nu about class conflict is currently a valid interpretation, may be questioned. 
Despite these opinions, an emphasis on political change and on the causes 
that could have provoked it is still fundamental to understanding issues of 
mobilisation. 
At the same time, returning to McAdam's analysis, this is not to argue that 
a cognitive liberation does not exist at all. Individuals do not immediately 
perceive their sense of belonging to a class or opposed group. This is in 
part a consequence of the repression, that acts on individuals restricting 
the room for solidarity, and in part because their lack of access to the 
means of production and their need to survive imposes the acceptance of 
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rules and systems of dominance on which they have scarcely any 
influence. 
These assumptions have direct consequences for the way we understand 
the categones of dissatisfaction and injustice and if these exist as such. 
Kelly is correct in underlining the importance ideologies have in the way 
people understand social reality and feel "cognitively liberated", but he 
does not explicitly consider that the influence of ideologies has to be 
detected in all the three instances of cognitive liberation mentioned by 
McAdam: the system loses legitimacy, people begin to assert rights and 
demand change, people perceive that the moment offers opportunities to 
change their conditions (personal efficacy). 
The breach of existing rules or of consensual social values by 
management, for instance, is possible at a time when a system, along with 
its codes of written and oral rules,, loses legitimacy. Macro political 
changes (regime crisis, political opportunities, absence of repression) can 
offer workers the possibility to interpret their conditions and rights fixed 
by the employment contract in a more open and favourable way because 
they can perceive that solidarity for their action is widespread. In a 
generallsed political and social opposition to labour flexibility, an 
employer's decision to violate established rules (for example, traditions of 
workers' protection), putting into practise new flexible contracts, 
undoubtedly offers support to workers' reaction. But in many countries,, 
during the Second World War, managerial control over the labour process 
64 
was strict and authoritarian and, most of the time, respect for established 
rules (e. g. overtime, workers representation) was neglected. In the 
majority of cases nationalistic and patriotic propaganda supporting the war 
efforts on the front line and on the assembly line imposed socio-political 
conditions not favourable to insurgency and protest. How many times 
have workers been forced to accept reduction of labour rights, salaries, 
union representation? Did they always feel managerial violations as 
unjust? 
Moreover how should we interpret variations in salaries within the same 
country or geographical areas? For instance, workers employed by 
multinationals in new decentralised areas of Brazil are paid consistently 
less and show low levels of conflict if compared with their counterparts in 
old industrial districts (see Fiat in Minas Gerais and VW in Resende). The 
same can be said of Spanish workers whose salaries are inferior to those 
of their Gennan colleagues. These cases cannot certainly give the 
opportunity to establish a sort of general theory of justice based on equal 
salaries around the world but can put in evidence how the definition of a 
situation as unsatisfactory and/or unjust cannot be evaluated just in money 
tenns and that mobilisation should be rather intended as a social process 
built around a detennination of what are the needs of a certain group of 
workers/people. The level of what they consider as necessary for their 
lives, in a certain society and considering the levels and differences of 
redistribution, geographical location, historical moment, are as well what 
can define their level of tolerance. Within this perspective, injustice is a 
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manifestation of the impossibility to satisfy all those needs, conceming 
both the material reproduction and the social/cultural achievements that a 
specific society creates with its development. ' 
Barrington Moore Jr. (1978) analysed in detail different societies in 
different historical contexts to reach the conclusion that a sense of 
injustice is inevitable if a state of "social reciprocity" has to be re- 
established. In his conclusions reciprocity assumes the meaning of 
((mutual obligation, a term that does not imply equality of burdens or 
obligations " (Barrington Moore Jr. 1978, p. 459). Assuming that 
reciprocity does not mean equality he recognises that within societies the 
tendency is to protect individual and group's interests and that this attitude 
has inevitably created an acceptance by certain groups of subordinate 
positions. 
"People are evidently inclined to grant legitimacy to anything that is or 
seems inevitable no matter how painful it may be. Otherwise the pain 
might be intolerable. The conquest of this sense of inevitability is essential 
to the development of politically effective moral outrage (injustice) " 
(Barrington Moore Jr., 1978, p. 459). 
In order for people to feel aggrieved they should start to question the 
concept of inevitability of a system or a social arrangement, the social 
contract on which reciprocity is rooted. It is possible to argue that he is, 
implicitly, attributing to ideologies the power to change social perceptions 
of the sense of injustice. 
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Also, on the basis of these considerations, we can say that the concept of 
injustice is extremely volatile and subjective. People tend to adapt and 
accept a changed situation in many different ways and the limits of 
tolerance vary depending on the ideological position of each one, the 
economic conditions of the moment, the priority in the life of each person. 
Workers develop needs that are dependent on and are the product of a 
specific society and this implies that a reflection on the concept of 
injustice and the limit of tolerance to it is an endless exercise without a 
consideration of the objective social conditions within which subjects are 
inserted. Injustice is a self-evident concept, is too common and at the 
same time serves to justify feelings that often do not have any relation 
with a mobilisation. It creates confusion. It is pleonastic to think that 
people before a mobilisation have to feel somehow affected, of course 
they are. But considering injustice as the starting point for reflection is 
probably misleading and to think about a mobilisation as a process which 
has its base in the concept of injustice does not help to understand more in 
the process of collective action. The empirical part of this research, for 
instance, will show that workers become conscious of how "unjust" a 
certain situation is once action has already started, once collectively they 
can share and strengthen the same perceptions. We should then investigate 
the emotions, sensations and beliefs of the actors and the way they process 
them as built and made explicit in the moment of collective action and not 
before. There are no mechanical, predetermined movements from injustice 
to mobilisation: but it is the status of mobilisation, the action in itself, that 
allows a "conscious" injustice and consequently an operative and cohesive 
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function of it within the whole process of mobilisation. This does not 
necessarily mean that without collective action injustice does not exist at 
all, the sentiment can be to different degrees perceived but Is domInated 
by the acceptance of the inevitable, the actor has already processed the 
changed situation and has accepted it, willingly or not. 
Within this line of argumentation we also have to understand the relations 
between dissatisfaction and injustice. Workers' vulnerability to employer's 
decisions on redundancies, wages, working time, productivity, discipline 
in the workplace comes from the fact that "objectively", by contract, 
workers are selling, with their labour power, their right to dispose of it 
during and within the limits defined by the employment relation. There 
could be, using Barrington Moore, a sense of inevitability of their 
conditions depending on the fact that a contract binds them. Moreover, 
workers often depend on their employment to survive and have to accept 
compromises, especially in moments of economic recession, with the 
system. Due to their position in the employment relation workers can, and 
have to, tolerate a certain degree of dissatisfaction if their relation with the 
capitalist system is not seriously questioned. In this perspective injustice, 
if we really want to look at it as the basis around which a collective 
interest can coalesce, appears as a vanation of the same concept of 
dissatisfaction but not as a theoretically different one. Injustice may be 
seen as the moment in which tolerance and acceptance of the compromise 
with the system is no longer sustainable, when too many violations (both 
to rules and social values) have been perpetrated. It is then the extent to 
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which workers are prepared to tolerate their subordinate position that 
determines the emergence of injustice. 
For this analysis the use of the concept of injustice is misleading. Injustice 
does not have any abstract and predetennined fonn, it is a general concept 
that does not refer to anything specific in the employment relationship, it 
vanes in different historical moments and geographical places, it is 
volatile and fundamentally mobilisation does not depend on it. The cases 
of this research, for instance, show that it is action that gives meaning to a 
sense of injustice specific to the situation of conflict. Injustice becomes 
explicit in action when is collectively shared and that is why it does not 
make any sense to consider it as the base in a theory of mobilisation. In 
addition to this and as a general consideration, the impression is that, by 
emphasising and analysing mobilisation as the result of the sum of 
individuals' sense of injustice, we may lose the collective nature of the 
same mobilisation and with it all those moments of collective 
determinations on which all social conflicts are necessarily based. 
The fact that a reference to a sense of injustice, intended as a subjective 
element in a process of mobilisation, does not satisfactorily explain why 
people mobilise, creates the need to look at some objective determinants. 
This means, in the case of formal workers in particular, to reflect on the 
way to understand the nature of the employment relationship , to analyse 
the role of conflict in it, to establish the needs around which workers 
constitute and place themselves within the system. 
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3. Conflict in the workplace, the nature of the employment 
relation and workersneeds. 
In a capitalist system "the capacity to work is thus bought and sold, rather 
like fruit and vegetables (though unlike ftuit and vegetables, workers can 
band together and at times stand up andfight) " (Hyman 1975, p. 19). 
"Conflict. - the demon that I tried to exorcise through several chapters of 
countless statistical analyses, through patient reconstruction of the 
historical record, through a sympathetic earfor the words of many of the 
participants, through careful mapping of causal arguments, is back, and 
back with a vengeance, with the passion and anger of the participants, 
with all the disruptive power of massed numbers (not those of statistics 
but those of mobilisation). Of conflict I would have expected no less " 
(Franzosi 1995, p. 343). 
We can argue that conflict is still at the heart of industrial relations studies 
both if we consider it as a manifestation of workers' emancipatory 
potential or as a reality that we can control and eventually eliminate. The 
impression is that much of the academic debate over the last three decades 
has been developed around these two main ideological poles with the 
interest of many researchers shifting, particularly in the last decade, from 
a Marxist/Labour to a realistic/managerial agenda, from class and class 
struggle to the paraphernalia of human resource management, from social 
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sciences to business analyses. But the centrality of conflict remains. In 
fact, and despite this shift, what goes under the label human resource 
management, on one side seems to underline the need for participation, 
co-operation, between management and labour for the benefit 
(profitability) of the firm and the "mutual gain" enterprise (Kochan and 
Osterman 1994). But on the other side is an attempt to freeze conflict and 
eliminate collective action from the employment relation (Lewchuk and 
Robertson 1997, Harley 1999) or undennine the position of unions as 
principal organisers of discontent and mobilisation (Milkman 1997, Bacon 
and Blyton, 1999). 
Nevertheless conflict remains central not just because HRM has often 
proved to be more rhetoric than reality (Legge 1995) but also because 
even the most successful cases of labour management integration and 
employee involvements have not resisted market crisis and increased 
global competition (Waddington 1999). Globalisation has imposed faster 
rhythms of production, flexibility of the labour force, application on a 
world wide scale of similar production methods and geographical 
dispersion of productive sites, as well as a renewal of workers' struggles. 
Korea, Brazil, South Africa, India, Argentina, Bolivia, for instance, have 
shown high levels of workers' and unions' mobilisations against 
privatisation, redundancies, reduction of labour rights, discrimination (see 
Panitch et al, Socialist Register 2001, Moody 1997, Watennan and Munck 
1999). 
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But is conflict central to our understanding of mobilisation because it is 
the nature of the employment relation to be in itself conflictive? Or should 
we rather look at market crisis and capitalist competition, and the effects 
these latter have on working conditions, as those turning points in which 
labour management relations become contested? 
Starting our discussion from a theoretical point of view, the emphasis on 
labour as a commodity and its consequent treatment as cost within the 
logic of capitalism, seems hard to be contested and this, paradoxically, for 
both Marxists and neoclassical economists. Differences emerge just in 
terms of which consequences should be drawn and aspects of the relation 
emphasised but not on the nature of it. Whether the stress is on 
exploitation and social change or on the pragmatic need to consider 
human relations as exclusively inserted within the logic of market 
economy, labour is always considered as a commodity" 
If we accept that in the market economies the logic of profit dominates 
enterprises' decisions, employees have to be considered as one of the costs 
in the business process, a cost that can be reduced, flexibly used, 
optimised to the needs of the firms. The fact that labour can be sold and 
bought is not just part of the social enviroment surrounding subjects in 
societies (as the existence of a labour market reveals), but has also been 
codified in a contract, a supposed free space of negotiation, among two 
parties. Even historically labour has been treated as a commodity and it 
has been around the need to defend its value that trade unionism emerged 
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as organiser of workers' mobilisations. But those who sell their labour 
power, are selling with it not just the capacity for their material 
reproduction but are also trying to satisfy a set of needs whose limits and 
contents vary depending on the society within which workers achieve 
their social development (Lebowitz 2003). Behind the image of a Eree 
contract, there is a ftindamental difference between the interests pursued 
by the employers and those of workers. We can say that both tend to 
reproduce themselves, (physically and socially in one case and 
economically in the other), but going in opposite directions. 
The idea of a basic opposition is shared also by a materialist perspective 
that, trying to overcome Marxists' paradigms, sustains the view that 
(16 capitalism is exploitative in that surplus value is generated under the 
constraints of the accumulation process" (Edwards 1986, p. 321) and thus 
that a "structured antagonism", a notion which avoids the view that 
capitalists and workers are always opposed classes supporting totally 
different interests 
, is the tenn. that "refers to the basic split between 
capital and labour" (Edwards 1986, p. 55). It cannot be objected that 
conflict is not always open and that workers and managers often find 
forms of coexistence and mutual adaptation and that their concrete targets 
can also overlap. Moreover, even from a statistical point of view, conflict 
is not something that happens daily nor is exploitation in terms of surplus 
value extraction for workers a self-evident concept. Yet in an historical 
perspective labour conflict has been a constant feature of capitalist 
societies that have changed and adapted themselves under the pressure of 
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working class protests (Hobsbawm 1995). The same idea of an industrial 
relations "system", with its codes, actors, agreements and regulations, 
demonstrates the need to institutionalise conflict and to find secure 
channels into which to manage labour-capital relations both at workplace 
and national level"'. Conflict exists but has to be regulated. 
As far as the study of mobilisation is concerned, we cannot avoid 
considering conflict as a dominant feature of the employment relation. 
This emphasis does not imply making an apology for conflict and for 
workers' subjectivity as necessarily conflictual but stresses the fact that the 
mechanism around which the employment relationship is built and the 
requirements of the form of production determine the creation of 
contradictions. It is not just the existence, from a more abstract 
perspective, of a "structured antagonism" between labour and capital that 
has to be taken into consideration. This situation goes together with the 
fact that the boundaries of workers' obligations within the employment 
contract are never easy to define. In fact, despite working conditions and 
tasks being apparently intended as a free space of negotiation (a contract 
among two parties), the lack of alternatives in the labour market many 
times does not offer other possibilities than accepting the conditions 
imposed by the employer. This situation generates in response a condition 
of "inevitable" (using Barrington Moore) subaltern position on the part of 
the wage labourers both in society and in the workplace. In this latter 
context, for instance, the employer's right to dispose of the labour force 
and the management right to manage are rarely questioned. The same 
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unavoidable reality of a labour market imposes the acceptance of 
conditions decided autonomously by the impersonal law of the market. 
Workers can be redundant and accept this passively or act collectively in 
defence of their rights. State repression/intervention and managerial 
strategies can reduce the possibility of collective action and workers are 
not always willing to be involved in such actions because their salaries 
depend on the possibility of maintaining their employment. But 
nonetheless different outcomes, the fact that workers depend on a salary to 
live and that this is conditioned by the logic of profit that dominates the 
system, implies that there is always a state of potential conflict. 
Empirically, as mentioned before, both co-op eration/conflict, and 
adaptation/resi stance, appear alternatively. These patterns are the natural 
consequence of the position in which workers are forced by the 
organisation of production at the workplace and beyond this at the level of 
society. Because of this workers have to accept compromises, reductions 
in demands, co-operation with the employer. Hence, as Burawoy (1979) 
suggests, this condition of dependency and subordination and the need to 
achieve some rights and gains from their position often helps to 
incorporate workers in their own exploitation. 
It should be clear from the discussion developed until now that by 
emphasising the centrality of conflict I am not arguing that other forius of 
labour/capital relations do not exist. It is exactly the contrary because if 
conflict exists, it is to contest and change a specific social arrangement 
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previously assumed as "normal" reality. The point is that theoretical and 
historical arguments and workers' position within the capitalist system, 
justify considering conflict as an unavoidable feature in the workplace. 
Conflict is inevitable, mobilisations representing one forin of it, not 
because social revolution is at the door but because the system has always 
developed and has been shaped by the influence of the dialectic and 
contradictory labour/capital relation. And of conflict, as Franzosi has 
pointed out, we would have expected no less. 
But in order to understand the centrality of conflict it is also fundamental 
to reflect on what we should consider as "workers' needs" and the inner 
connection these have with the way the capitalist system develops. A 
recent book by Lebowitz (2003) tries to address these issues, starting from 
an analysis of Marx's work inspired by the idea that the book on Wage- 
Labour, although planned and scattered in other texts, was never written. 
Together with this a renewal was necessary to underline the deficiencies 
of the theory for both its faith in a social revolution that never happened 
and for its silence over the struggles for women's emancipation, cultural 
identities and life's quality. 
Three sets of workers' needs can be identified: physiological, necessary 
and social. The first group refers to the physical reproduction of the 
human being, the second concerns those requirements that have already 
entered in human life as the product of uses and customs, the third 
represents the upper level of needs created by the developments (cultural, 
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technological, intellectual and the physical means to achieve it) of a given 
society in a given time. Considering capitalist relations of production, a 
capitalist structure of needs can be as well assumed on the side of capital: 
the need for valorisation and surplus value. Due to the fact that workers as 
consumers are limited in this activity by what they earn with their wages, 
there will always be a certain amount of social needs that will remain 
"hidden" and unrealised. According to Lebowitz, 
"there is, thus, a critical difference, a gap, between the need for 
commodities in the market at a given point and the genuine social 
need ........ .. the difference between the quantity of commodities that is 
demanded and the quantity that would be demanded at other money prices 
or with the buyers being in different financial and living conditions" 
(Lebowitz 1992, p. 27). 
Wage increases provide workers with the means to access and consume 
those social needs that before were hidden just as if we assume that the 
same needs remain constant. But, as in particular the most developed 
economies can show, capitalism has in itself the capacity to generate new 
products, new consumers, new wealth and new needs. These latter in turn 
constitute 
it a real moment of economic life insofar as they pre-exist the purposeful 
activity on the part of workers to posit those social needs as necessary, 
i. e., insofar as they determine the actions of wage labourers. In short, the 
existence of unfuýiilled social needs underlies the worker's needsfor more 
momýv ....... 
but, that, of course, involves a struggle for higher wages. To 
77 
realise unsatisfied social needs involves a struggle in the "opposite 
direction " to capitalists" (Lebowitz, 1992, p. 3 0) 
We can argue that the struggle for social needs can assume different forms 
considering the levels of development of a certain society and the means 
workers have to support their demands. If we take the case of Argentina, 
fornial workers will probably go on strike while piqueteros will block the 
main roads, the first group will ask for salary increases, while the second 
will demand a job or the means through which its material reproduction 
can be guaranteed. The level of social needs to which each group tends 
can be slightly different, depending on the degrees of marginalisation and 
the lack of access to social development, but fundamentally what they are 
struggling for (often in alliances) is the satisfaction of those social needs 
(if not necessary needs) that are present in a given society and at a given 
time. In the case of advanced capitalist countries, although differences 
among social classes remain, the emphasis on needs reveals how workers 
have achieved through decades of struggles better living conditions than 
those existing in the first industrial factories. Yet the evolution of the 
system, producing more wealth and more goods, creates new social needs 
and a gap between what is desired and what can be achieved. 
From the perspective of social needs many cases of conflict in the formal 
sector could be explained as well. The differences between what is 
promised or expected and the harsh reality of the law of the market, 
increases in the production rhythms, fragmentation of working time, stress 
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on the job can be all seen as situations that generate the impossibility of 
satisfying (both in terms of lack of money, time and freedom of 
enjoyment) those social needs regularly produced in our societies. 
Consequences in tenns of mobillsatlon can be expected. Thus the 
implementation of flexible contracts and working conditions that changed 
pejoratively previous conditions of employment has, as in one of the cases 
of this research, provided the spark for mobilisation among a workforce 
not used to conflict. Barchiesi (1998), drawing examples from the South 
African automotive industry, concludes that flexibility can provoke 
conflict also when the expectations of greater workers' control raised by 
its ideological propaganda are associated with authoritarianism in the 
workplace. Tuckman (1994) argues that HRM practises, and TQM in 
particular, generate harsh relations between labour and management. 
Unions' non involvement in the new "mutual gains" enterprise could 
provide the basis for future conflicts (Milkman 1997, Bacon and Blyton 
1999). 
In many of these cases the paradox is that the same factor, a precise 
managerial strategy thought of as a way to individualise labour relations 
and avoid or "freeze" the conflict, produced in reality the opposite effect. 
Again we find conflict on our road: labour relations were once 
"conflictual and antagonistic", today not much has probably changed but 
all efforts are made and strategies are implemented to avoid open conflict. 
Conflict exists by its negation. 
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4. Objective and subjective reconstructions of consciousness 
and collective action. 
The distance between subjectivity and objectivity recalls the gap often 
existing between theory and practice. Epistemologically, subjectivity is 
not practice and objectivity is not theory but once we try to describe and 
analyse social reality we naturally swing from one side to the other 
looking for a case that could fit in a theory and for a theory that could 
explain the case. This dialectic profoundly enriches our knowledge of 
social reality. 
If we look at how the subjective/objective dimensions have been analysed 
with respect to labour and workers we can find concrete examples of the 
polarisation we have mentioned above. From the perspective of 
structuralism, subjectivity acquires a secondary role since subjects 
fundamentally react to an objective situation of social relations based on 
labour exploitation by capital. For the post-structuralist, rational 
individuals and not structures are central in the understanding of societies. 
Both perspectives should be abandoned in the light of the criticisms 
received and the evidence available. Structuralism has usually been 
related to many orthodox Marx ist/Leninist accounts of societies and of the 
predestined mission proletarians should have in a future emancipated and 
capital-free social system. Two hundred years of capitalism and the failure 
of real socialism, and of revolutionary parties with it, represent just part of 
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the evidence that could be used to criticise a notion of subjectivity as 
rooted around issues of false and true consciousness (Lukacs 1971). With 
this distinction there is also an implicit recognition that a sort of objective, 
pure and natural forrn of consciousness already exists and that those fonns 
of acceptance of capitalism have to be seen as deviations, maybe to be 
corrected by illuminated intellectuals, of unconscious minds. The 
compartmentalisation of consciousness into "true" and "false" does not 
take into account all the processes of subjective mediation that take place 
in a specific working environment and of the pressures and practical 
necessities that the capitalist system imposes on subjects. At the same 
time, it does not explain why conflict often emerges out of a direct 
connection with a clear workers' understanding of social relations of 
production. Turner's ethnographic account of Japanese workers 
mobilisations stresses a notion of consciousness and solidarity as the 
combination of experience as much as ideology and as the result of 
discursive as well as non-discursive knowledge. "In my experience, people 
analysed not only their social world and its forms and actions but their 
own ideas about such things as well. I emphasise the non discursive to 
balance a too often unbalanced picture of thought and action" (1995, 
p. 18). Fantasia (1988) , in 
his analysis of workers' mobilisation in USA, 
adopts the tenn "cultures of solidarity" to give account of fonns of 
consciousness and solidarity that cannot fit within a predetennined, 
objective notion of them. In the cases presented we can see how action is 
taken as the result of the interaction of fonnerly established cultural and 
orce not used to conflict. Within a similar identity relations among a workf 
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perspective, Aronowitz, criticising the view that all social phenomena 
have to be seen as functions of capital, argues 'for the relative autonom, 
of labour, culture and consciousness within the broad framework of 
Marxist theory of capitalist development "(Aronowitz 1992, p. 83) and 
considers subjectivity as having "a material basis within the process of 
production" (A-ronowitz 1992, p. 103). In the cases of FIAT and Renault, 
solidarity can be similarly understood as something naturally emerging 
from shared cultural and identity patterns. Workers summarised this as 
companerismo, the fair relations nonnally established in the workplace 
with your colleagues. 
But consciousness and workers' understanding of their position within the 
broader society rather appear as post mobilisation achievements and this 
invites us to look at how other factors acted to motivate collective action 
and to think about the potential that experience can have in radicalising 
workers' opinions. 
As we have seen, workplace case studies in the tradition of labour process 
theory have explained conflict, its forms and its appearance on the basis of 
the alternation of acceptance and resistance. Conflict can emerge at 
different times and with different fonns depending on a variety of 
variables (Edwards and Scullion 1982) and, as Edwards claims, 
lf workplace relations need to be seen as involving continuing struggles 
ii, hich develop logics of their own and in which the unintended 
consequences of actions are i. mportant " (1986, p. 318). 
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In the same tradition and returning to Burawoy (1979), the fact that 
workers, while looking for spaces of freedom from capital Imperatives, 
are also reproducing the same mechanisms of production and social 
dominance is highly 11 ndicative that a notion of subjectivity intended as 
result of a predetennined social reality is reductive. 
But the alternative view offered by post-structuralist analyses, denying the 
importance of structures and stressing the individuals as the main 
detenninants of subjectivity, are also not sufficient to explain the 
formation of collective interests and actions. Rational choice theory in 
particular sees collective action as the result of the sum of individual 
strategic decisions motivated by calculations on the cost and benefits that 
each participant in action can expect (Olson 1971). In this perspective, 
subjects are always considered as rational and this is even truer in cases of 
collective actions in which individuals are forced to participate. For Olson 
unions' use of picket lines, for instance, is considered as a demonstration 
that, for collective action to be successful, coercion is necessary and that 
without the use of this form of compulsion, rational individuals would not 
take part in the action (Olson 1971, p. 75/76). Rational choice theory has 
profoundly influenced studies in industrial relations and more generally 
seems to have achieved a predominant role as a method to investigate in 
the social sciences. Golden (1997) studied trade unions' actions in 
different situations of job losses and previously Crouch (1982) established 
a set of rules to understand the "logic of collective action". Golden's work 
is of particular importance because it provides on the one hand 
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conclusions that sound not just coherent with the theory used but also 
historically credible and, on the other hand, shows the limits rational 
choice theory has in the understanding of collective phenomena. The main 
argument is that, despite the slogan adopted during the strikes, in reality 
with these actions unions were defending their own organisations and 
activists against management and/or government attacks. Thus, there is an 
apparent reality of actions (strikes to defend the jobs) that should be 
intended as irrational, defining irrationality "in the sense of claiming ends 
that seem inherently unattainable "(Golden 1997, p. 4), and a "true" reality 
in which actors are perfectly rational in their behaviour and strikes can be 
fully interpreted as rational considering the interests of the parties 
involved. 
The first problem faced in this analysis is the definition of 
rational/irrational. What should be the basis to define an action as 
inherently "unattainable"? Which parameter can establish this? For 
Goldman it certainly appears as irrational that unions strike to prevent job 
loss because 'ýprevention of job loss in a modern market economy is 
hardly a realiStic goal" (Goldman 1997, p. 4). It is generally acceptable to 
consider unions as an integral part of a market economy; but behind the 
organisations that act in the industrial relations arena, there is a number of 
living people whose jobs are consistently threatened and that often have 
no idea of how a market economy works. For them it is perfectly rational 
to oppose the decisions of the company, even if we assume that they were 
conscious of the fact that the unions were following their own 
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organisational interests. There is probably a need, following Hyman 
(1989, p. 112), to reformulate rationality as a less static category. In this 
sense the rationality of a collective action should be measured in relation 
to the actors' own interests, to their knowledge and understanding of the 
situation and to what extent means and ends fon-n a coherent system. 
A second and related problem is, if it is realistic to think of individuals as 
economists calculating in advance the cost and benefits of their action. 
Workers have different priorities and could prefer to look at their 
employment following an individualistic approach rather than a collective 
one. But, and to what extent, is this decision a simple calculation of cost 
and benefit? Are workers really free and, in the conditions, to evaluate 
their actions in purely individual economic terms? Or should we rather 
connect their behaviour to the rules and impositions in which they 
constantly frame their working lives? Otherwise how to explain those 
cases of conflict in workplaces previously described as peaceful and 
where individual choices seemed to be dominant over collective matters? 
Thirdly, and as a general consideration, we should be able to analyse 
collective action not as the sum of individual decisions but as an action 
with its own character and ends that do not always correspond to the 
majority of individual opinions. For this reason the focus on the rational 
choices of industrial relations institutions (unions/employers) explain just 
one part of the how and why conflict has emerged. The questions and the 
points raised until now create contradictions with a view of social 
relations as based on rational and calculating individual decisions and at 
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the same time have to be seen not as a demonstration of cases of apparent 
"irrationality", understanding this in Goldman's terms as realistic ends in 
market economies, but rather as elements that contribute to the complexity 
of social reality. 
Post-structural analyses emphasise the role of rational individuals in 
shaping and creating social phenomena and claim freedom and 
independence from any ideological imposition. But the essence of the 
argument is to see how real is this freedom and how real is subjects' 
autonomy in the reproduction of social processes. If reality is shaped by 
the principles of capitalism and the decision-making parameters, 
rationality/irrationality, are based in market related axioms then collective 
actions will appear to be constituted as moments of apparent irrationality. 
The discussion we have up till now developed, allows us to understand 
better the complexity of social reality and the difficulties of inserting it 
under a single formula. The holistic and objective vision of a society that 
pen-neates all spheres of individuals' lives, has been proved to be 
insufficient to account for the diversity and complexity of people's 
interactions with the capitalist system. It is certainly true that our societies 
are dominated by social relations shaped by capitalistic modes of 
production and that, especially in an era of globalisation and improved 
communication, the ideological and repressive apparatus of power groups 
tends to unify and standardise individual perceptions of the world. We are 
all used to relating ourselves to the reality of a labour market, to consider 
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the value of commodities in money terms, to accept the existence and the 
future of the world as it is, as something moving independently from us. 
Acknowledging this, it does not necessarily mean that subjects live their 
lives unconsciously and uncntical of the system. There is undoubtedly a 
sphere of individual understanding in those moments in which the 
imbalances of opportunities and the inequalities are visible and people 
become conscious. The analysis of these situations, in which objective 
social relations appear as they are, is the analysis of processes of social 
mediation that individuals constantly put into practice in the workplace or 
within the broader society. In this perspective rational choice theory, de- 
emphasising the influence of social relations and considering individuals 
as masters of their own will , is deterministic as well as structuralism. 
Our attention should then be focused on those moments in which 
collective subjectivity interrupts the fluidity and inevitability of social 
relations fortnerly taken for granted and reproduced. Unquestioningly, in 
the workplace these "eruptions of subjectivity" (Barchiesi 1996) are most 
visible when conflict emerges and solidarity and consciousness are shaped 
and shape collective action. 
It is not in the aims and possibilities of this research to establish when and 
why these eruptions are produced. We have provided certain evidence of 
the cyclical but constant appearance of conflict in the workplaces and this 
partly as consequence of the basic antagonism between workers and 
employers, and because the same system Nvith its development creates a 
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gap between the new social needs produced and the workers material 
access to them. This gap can have consequences in terms of conflict at the 
more general level of society and political and social change is expectable. 
But despite this evidence, it remains difficult to establish the predictability 
of conflict, this being the result of a complex interrelation between 
objective and subjective levels and micro and macro dimensions. 
However one of the ways in which subjectivity, that is collective 
subjectivity, intervenes in the sphere of social relations detennining 
mobilisation, is through solidarity. The empirical evidence provided by 
the cases of this research and the centrality of solidarity in explaining the 
origins and the developments of mobilisation invite us to reflect on some 
practical and theoretical aspects related to this. 
5. Toward a conceptualisation of solidarity. 
The concept and the function played by solidarity in a process of 
mobilisation are questionable and certainly raise doubts and concerns. Is it 
possible to give a definition of this concept? How can we operationalise 
it? How can we detect it? What's the nature of it? Probably we cannot 
provide clear answers to all of these questions and there will always be a 
deficit of knowledge and a possibility for criticism and this depend also on 
the way we interpret social reality: solidarity is not the sum of individual 
wishes and it is difficult to think of it as having an economic value that 
can be calculated in terms of costs and opportunities. 
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A definition of solidarity cannot easily be grasped from previous works on 
the issue. Firstly, among commentators of collective action, this one is 
unthinkable without at least a minimum of solidarity and in this sense we 
can say that is almost taken for granted and the need to define it does not 
appear. A partial exception to this is represented by Church and Outram 
(1998) who studied the historical propensity to strike of mine workers in 
Britain and argue that solidarity and group solidarity, rather than the 
occupation, is the central element to explain the mobilisations they have 
analysed (a point that is confinned also by the findings of this research). 
On the basis of recent anthropological work on social exchange, solidarity 
appears in their view as based on changes at political level and networks 
of social relationships strengthened by unionists and leaders. However, a 
precise definition requires a contextualisation because the concept 
changes depending on the different historical/social moments, groups' 
composition and the function these latter attribute to solidarity (defensive, 
oppositional). Secondly, the difficulties that we encounter in the definition 
of the concept have consequences with the methods used to detect the 
presence or absence of solidarity. Due to its inherent dynamism and 
contextual meaning, solidarity cannot be easily investigated using the 
structure of a questionnaire or a survey, and quantitative analyses in 
general have been criticised for this (for instance Fantasia 1995 and 
Portelli 1991). But qualitative methods as well, although better equipped, 
could have their limitations because the concept is in itself difficult to 
grasp even from interviews or participant observation and has often been 
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studied together with issues related altemately to the labour process (for 
instance Beynon 1984, Edwards and Scullion 1982), to class 
consciousness (Rosendhal 1985, Fantasia 1988), within cultural accounts 
of the working class ( Bruno 1999) or in historical perspective (Hanagan 
1980). 
However, the excess of taxonomy that often in the social sciences creates 
the problems of definition and classification mentioned above, does not 
seem to affect workers. A review of historical conflicts from the 
perspective ot ose directly involved (with reference especially to oral 
history works) reveals that their concerns are not about the meaning and 
the existence of solidarity, but rather about the possibility of establishing 
and maintaining it in presence of employers, managements or 
governments attempts to break it. Many of the interviews collected for this 
research confirm this, and frame the issue of solidarity not within the 
limits of a definition (often the word does not even appear) but as 
something that in a certain specific moment existed (sometimes with 
surprise) or it did not (sometimes with disappointment), it was strong 
enough to maintain a mobilisation or leave room for divisions and 
individualism. In a certain way solidarity could be connected to an idea of 
already established preconditions for the emergence of it (compaherismo, 
the cultural and social ties that are normally produced among people 
working in the same environment, living often in the same 
neighbourhood). But the existence of these relations, common within 
small groups or departments in both factories before the conflict, does not 
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explain alone the mobilisation and the role of solidarity in it. Thus, at this 
stage, the point we should stress is neither to offer a static definition nor to 
look for possible preconditions of solidarity but rather to acknowledge the 
fact that many factors in different times can shape the forms it takes, the 
function it assumes, the moments in which it appears, and if it appears at 
all. This in turn imposes an interpretation of solidarity as a social 
phenomenon "in progress" whose boundaries are defined by the same 
process in which it is manifested. 
The need to interpret solidarity as adapting itself to the changes of the 
surrounding social reality has influence on the conceptualisation of it. The 
importance attributed to this dynamic aspect may, in fact, undermine the 
existence of an abstract minimum around which a basic definition of 
solidarity can be forinulated. As far as this thesis is concemed, it is 
assumed that the first level of solidarity lies in human beings' tendency for 
mutual help when involved in collective action and in joint production 
activities. The stress on the anthropological/workp lace aspect of the 
concept rather than on the political assumptions that have been attached to 
it, is fundamental to establish the base around which a further 
conceptualisation may be formulated. By assuming that the abstract 
minimum for a definition of solidarity is an outcome belonging to the 
human condition, we may then identify how dominating social relations 
alter and modify this basic experience. In fact, once we take for granted 
that for collective action to be successful a certain level of solidarity has to 
be achieved, we are also recognising that there are circumstances in which 
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the original mutual relation among people at work can be strengthened, 
weakened or eliminated considering the social and power relations 
influencing the specific reality analysed. These considerations bring us 
back to the centrality of solidarity in cases of mobilisation and reconfirm 
the need to investigate it as a social phenomenon "in progress". 
To recapitulate, solidarity is here conceptually intended as constituted of 
two interrelated parts. The tendency to co-operate among people involved 
in joint production activities is assumed as the necessary base for the 
possibility of interpreting solidarity "in progress". This framework allows 
us to understand how variations in the social relations existing in a 
specific context influence the ways, fonns and opportunities for solidarity 
and its function in a process of mobilisation. 
Despite similar conceptual problems with injustice, solidarity seems more 
appropriate as a conceptual category whose centrality within a process of 
mobilisation has to be confinned. First , it refers 
for its own nature to a 
sphere of necessarily collective relations: its meaning stressing mutual 
dependence and unity or agreement of feeling or action. Second, and 
because of its nature, solidarity rests on group identification with those in 
similar conditions (although not necessarily working together). But at the 
same time and for its dynamic character, it may also generate moments of 
4 (. collectivisation", of grievances and eventual planning of concrete 
actions. Third, there is historical evidence of the symbolic value attributed 
within subaltern as well as other groups to the strength solidarity can offer 
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in the moment of mobilisation. Fourth and of not secondary importance, 
solidarity can be somehow measured considering the number of those who 
concretely participated in action or the existence of previous social mutual 
relations. But as we have previously seen the difficulties inherent in the 
identification of secure indicators, put in evidence on the one side the 
existence of elements that hamper the possibility for the emergence of 
solidarity and on the other side the need to look at the concept as a 
phenomenon in "progyess". A last element to consider injustice not 
completely adequate to analyse mobilisation is probably offered by the 
same Kelly (1998, p. 27-32). Kelly seems to move from individuals with a 
sense of injustice to social groups with a collective interest and a 
potentiality to mobilise not by virtue of an abstract common sense of 
injustice but rather for the existence of "attributions" and "social 
identities" constructed by activists within groups (that is collectively 
determined). In this way it is implicitly recognised that injustice alone is 
not sufficient to account for a collective phenomenon. 
The perspective on solidarity as a phenomenon that has to be interpreted 
in "progress" seems confirmed also by Fantasia (1988,1995), who 
analysed a situation of spontaneous mobilisation among a workforce not 
used to conflict and whose representation was in the hands of a 
bureaucratic union, a case with many similarities with the one at FIAT. 
Although the main aim of his research was to investigate mobilisations as 
a way to contend the idea of the supposed classless character of the North 
American workers, the definition he provides of class consciousness as 
93 
based on "cultures of solidarity" has profound influence on the way we 
have to understand solidarity and its relation with events of mobilisation. 
Fantasia, in particular, while arguing on the Marxist concepts of "class for 
itself' and "class in itself', raises a point whose consequences are very 
important for the concept of solidarity. For Marx what later became the 
subjective (for itself) and objective (in itself) dimensions of class were not 
distinct aspects but co-existed in the dynamic process that the same 
struggle of the working class was creating. Solidarity has then to be seen 
by looking at it as a process, as something in movement, as something in 
action. Interviews collected for this research, offer an interpretation of the 
concept in this way and the emphasis on processes also invites us to look 
at those elements/factors whose presence and absence could have altered 
the fonns taken by solidarity in specific occasions and influenced the 
mobilisation. 
Fantasia's emphasis on the dynamics of collective action as the fon-native 
moment of a class consciousness, or in his definition "cultures of 
solidarity", epistemologically moves our analysis, once more, toward 
those moments of subjective interpretation and mediation of the reality 
that people at work create by interaction with their enviromuent. The 
emphasis on these subjective accounts and their identification as 
expressions of workers' cultures has been particularly evident in the 
research conducted by cultural sociologists. We have seen how Turner 
(1995) stresses the discursive and non discursive form of knowledge as a 
way to balance a supposed direct connection between thought and action. 
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Barchiesi (1998) explains mobilisation as the moment in which an 
Iferuption of subjectivity" could be identified. McAdam (1988) underlines 
the importance for action of people's interrelations in micro contexts. 
Aronowitz, in his interpretation of the "logic of cap'tal", while considering 
deskilling as a tendency in capitalist historical development, argues that 
"contemporary labour has obliged workers to be more inventive in their 
resistance [ ... 
I and has forced many of them to take their culture 
underground" (Aronowitz 1992, p. 115). 
All these researches point to a recovery of the subjective/cultural 
dimension in the explanation of social realities at work and at the same 
time they foster a view of dynamism and flexibility in the 
conceptualisation of solidanty and consciousness. Within this line of 
investigation that thinks in ten-ns of processes' we could insert solidanty 
and consider it as a ftindamental element in the understanding of 
mobilisation. At the same time, the centrality of solidarity in collective 
interests formation does not have to introduce an idealised vision of 
workers standing together and always fiercely opposing their employer. 
We said that it is the same nature of the employment relationship, creating 
resistance as well as acceptance, and of the social system, creating 
dependency on consumers as well as opposition to inequalities that alter 
workers' capacity to band together. In other words, there are factors that 
favour or hamper the process of solidarity formation that can influence 
mobilisation outcomes. In this sense we should look at leadership and 
repression. The importance that the first factor has in strengthening 
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workers' identities and the function of the second as an instrument 
available to capital to weaken collective struggles will be best understood 
within the socio political context the case studies provide and through the 
comparison these latter offer. It is, then, to the empirical part of the 
research that we should now move. 
6. Conclusions. 
This chapter has explored three main theoretical aspects concerned with 
the issue of mobilisation. In the first, drawing from Kellys mobilisation 
theory, the category of injustice has been analysed and its role within 
collective action has been questioned. Arguments have been offered to 
reconsider the category, based on a concept in itself volatile and 
subjective, as just one of the forins in which subjectivity is expressed 
within a collective action but not necessarily as the basis of it. In 
particular the empirical evidence provided by the cases analysed in this 
research if on one side shows how injustice (or a sense of it) can 
eventually frame and unify workers' grievances, on the other side also 
stresses that there are no mechanical determinants in the way collective 
action is produced. 
In the second has been reaffinned the centrality and inevitability of 
conflict. Despite recent tendencies to under-represent the importance this 
latter has in shaping working conditions, and more in general to influence 
political changes, conflict is fundamental if we want to understand 
mobilisation, representing this latter natural background. The emphasis on 
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inevitability does not imply that conflict is the constant and that social 
revolution is what we can expect in the immediate future. Quite the 
opposite, conflict can exist just as a moment of rupture with an assumed 
and previously established social reality. These ruptures can be considered 
in part as a consequence of the basic antagonism that structures 
employers/workers relations in the workplace and in part are the results of 
the gap existing in capitalistic societies between the production of new 
goods and new wealth and workers'matenal capacity to possess them. 
In the third, attention has been primarily directed to structuralist and post- 
structuralist analyses of social reality and arguments have been provided 
to criticise both perspectives. On the one hand, the idea that subjects can 
scarcely intervene in shaping a social reality whose boundaries have been 
already defined by capitalist social relations at the level of society, does 
not help to identify the variety and complexity of people's/workers' 
responses to the impositions of the system. On the other hand, the focus 
on subjects' actions and the stress on individuals as the main determinants 
of social processes, does not provide satisfactory answers. This in part 
because certain situations, as is mobilisation, are collective in their own 
character and cannot be understood as the sum of individual decisions and 
in part because rational subjects tend to frame their actions within the 
limits imposed by the same system. Consequent with the cnticism of both 
approaches, and drawing from the works of other authors who have 
studied mobilisation, a third interpretation is offered that while not 
denying the powerful influence of capitalistic logic on social reality also 
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reconsider the role of individuals in shaping it. There is a huge variety of 
reactions and adaptations to the impositions of the system that call for a 
renewed role of subjects. In particular concerning mobilisation, we should 
look at those turning points in which collective subjectivity may emerge 
and contest the system. Solidarity represents a fundamental element of 
these turning points. The concept may be understood as composed of two 
interrelated parts. The first refers to the existence of natural ties among 
people jointly involved in a production activity. Once we assume that this 
minimum is a constant component of solidarity, collective action always 
implying this, a second aspect of the concept as a dynamic process may be 
identified. Variations of power relations can produce obstacles or 
opportunities for solidarity to intervene in the social reality and that is 
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why a perspective on the concept as something "in progress" should be 
used in the analysis of it. 
The three sections of the chapter can be considered as well just as an 
attempt to reflect on "The" epistemological problem of the social sciences: 
objectivity versus subjectivity. Through the chapter both ways of 
interpreting social reality have been used, often implicitly. They are not 
mutually exclusive and evidence has been provided, depending on the 
situation, to justify one approach instead of the other. In this sense, in the 
first part the critics of injustice as volatile and subjective were not directed 
to the whole role of subjectivity. In the second part the consideration of 
conflict as inevitable did not mean a belief in an immanency of it, conflict 
and co-operation alternate but objective trends can also be identified. In 
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the third part both interpretations play a role and subjectivity in the form 
of solidarity frames the way in which subjects can contest a previously 
accepted reality. 
'The issue of "needs" is more extensively treated in the next section on the inevitability of conflict. 
" Labour as a resource and not as a cost within an employment relation based on "mutual gains" is what 
the HRM school has sustained. The criticisms received during the last decade however put into 
question the compatibility of this approach with a market economy. More references to this at the end 
of the section. 
Although the idea is not to make a general argument here, it is worth mentioning and of particular 
importance for the cases presented in this research, that cyclically grass roots movements and 
spontaneous workers' protests have appeared in many countries and at different times: shop stewards 
in the UK during the 1970's, consigh di fabbrica in Italy in 1968 and during the so- called biennio 
rosso 1919-1921, the resistencia peronista (1955/1957) and anti-bureaucratic struggles in the 1970's 
and 1990's in Argentina, comisi6nes obreras in Spain, among others known and statistically unknown 
cases. Not always the institutionalization of trade unions and their legalization as workers' 
representatives have guaranteed that institutionalization of conflict pluralists hoped. The fact that 
conflict escaped in these cases the rules and limits imposed on it, tells us that there should be an 
element, deep in the social relation of production, whose logic does not always fit within the system of 
rules prepared to receive it. 
'v On the need to look at class, class structure, class consciousness, and I would add at solidarity, in an 
anti-e ssent ia list way that stresses processes instead of structures, Munck (2003). 
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Chapter 3: The roots of mobilisation, workplace and social 
conflict in Argentina in historical perspective. 
1. Introduction. 
This chapter presents an historical backgTound for the analysis of 
mobilisation. Consequently, attention is drawn to those aspects of 
Argentine social history and of trade unionism that could help to explain 
the cases of mobilisation in this research. The analysis, starting from the 
data collected during the field work, looks, in particular, at those historical 
or contextual factors that the same workers have indicated in the 
interviews as main obstacles in the process of mobilisation and/or in the 
radicalisation of it. Three thematic and recurrent issues have been 
identified: 
* Military repression and workers mobilisation 
e The relation between trade unions and workers' mobilisation 
9 The socio-political context at the time of mobilisation 
Each theme has been considered as the base for the development of a 
debate and a discussion that could allow an evaluation of the reality 
emerging ftom the data collected in an historical and more critical 
perspective. I have tried to consider the interviews, in particular, as 
representing just part of a more complex and debatable reality and in 
doing this I may have given more validity to the overall findings and 
contributed to their strength. 
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The chapter is organised in three main sections. The first refers to the 
heritage of the last military dictatorship on workers' potential for 
mobilisation. The second investigates how the trade unions ftinction and 
structure has been shaped by their relation with the state and how and why 
workers have criticised these developments of unionism. This historical 
analysis shed light on specific features of Argentinean unionism, 
bureaucracy and the anti-bureaucratic struggles in particular, that in the 
cases of mobilisation of this research have played a major role. The third 
section puts the case studies in the socio-political context dominating at 
the time of the conflict. 
2. Military repression and workers' mobilisation. 
"those who were militants and that had a voice among us are all gone, 
they have disa eared, they have been killed, they were simply not there PP 
anymore. Unfortunately all those, like me, who remained, now I can say, 
for cowardice, for necessity, for thefamily, for whatever reason, we never 
had the strength, the capability [ ... 
] we disagreed but we didn't act, we 
disagreed but at the end we did all it was ordered to do by bending the 
head [ 
... 
j an entire generation has grown without those leaders able to 
unifi, people, leaders respected by the rest. When the newfellows came to 
work thev could Just see our examples and this meant for them to see 
people alivays nodding the head and saying. ves" (Renault white collar 
worker)' 
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"Argentina i's like this... "don't get yourse4f into trouble", "let's go fight 
together but better you go first". this society has been severely punished 
during the epoch of the military so peoplefear to expose themselves. You 
have seen what happened last year in Buenos Aires for the protest against 
the corralito" 
, there was repression and people dead. Because of this, people remain 
fearful that something can happen to them if they protest ""' 
(Renault production worker) 
"I have always tried to maintain myse4f capable of thinking and this is 
what, in these years, has been removedfrom people's minds .... 
here we still 
have a clear image of what the dictatorship represented and this will be 
veiy ifficult to change .... 
here there is no participation 
(Fiat production worker) 
These quotations represent just a sample of a recurrent issue concerning 
the heritage of the last military dictatorship on mobilisation and workers' 
solidarity. The interviews allow us to depict a picture in which military 
repression and the climate of terror so created appear as the direct or 
indirect causes of a number of factors that have hampered mobilisation 
and have broken solidarity and participation among workers. Putting 
together, these factors are: 
a) fear, "no te metas " ("don't put yourself into trouble"). 
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b) destruction of activism, no combative examples/leaders for the new 
generation of workers. 
c) tendency to individualism (both within the plant and in relation to other 
workers' struggles). 
d) no participation in society, no interest in politics, "yo cumplo con lo 
Mi . oY es suficiente " (I do what I have to do, what I am ordered to do and 
this is enough). 
The validity of these factors and their generalisation is highly debatable. 
But whether or not we consider them true or false and applicable to other 
cases, it still remains important that many workers have indicated such 
factors as direct or indirect consequences of the military dictatorship on 
their mobilisation and solidarity behaviour. As we have mentioned in the 
methodology, there is in oral history and interviews a dimension of 
knowledge that although not objectively true is still rich in information 
about the contexts where the same protagonists of events could have been, 
at their time, involuntary subjects of representations. This is what Portelli 
(1991) calls the "dififerent credibility" of oral history, the possibility to 
extract from the representation of facts not in adherence with reality the 
nicanings that actors have attached to it. 
Iii order to better evaluate the meanings and the reality workers have 
described we will draw examples concerning their attitudes under the last 
military dictatorship as NN, cll as from other cases of both authoritanan and 
non-authoritarian govemments. Anticipating some conclusions xve could 
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say that it remains doubtful if the last period of military rule really was a 
watershed in hampering workers' mobilisation and introducing a 
generalised passivity among Argentinean workers. This could be argued 
especially if we look at the high level of mobilisation that occurred in the 
decades after, and even during, the military government. But at the same 
time it seems undeniable that part of the reality coincides also with FIAT 
and Renault workers'point of view. 
If we look at mobilisation waves in Argentina during military and 
authoritarian goverrunents previous to that of 1976/1983, we can conclude 
that repression and dictatorship have produced radicalisation and uprisings 
both at plant and societal level instead of fear, lack of solidarity and the 
search for individualistic solutions as seems to emerge from the 
interviews. In 1969 the city of Cordoba, as well as Rosario and other 
inland industrial agglomerates, was the major site of a popular 
revolutionary uprising against the government of Gen. Ongania and the 
economic and labour policies he was implementing. In the context of 
Cordoba,, a newly industrialised city developed around the labour- 
intensive automotive industry and with a tradition of independent trade 
unionism, military repression acted as a catalyst for mobilisation. If we 
look at the dynamics of the so called C6rdobazo, that mobilisation started 
as a traditional workers' protest, with marches to the city centre, against 
the government's decision to cancel the so called Sýbado IngMs. ' 
But social support and solidarity at that time" and the homogeneity of the 
working class helped to identify in the dictatorship the common enemy 
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and to transfonn a labour protest into revolutionary mobilisation (Gordillo 
1999, Brennan 1994 and Delich 1970). In the same city two years later 
another protest, similar to the C6rdobazo, the so called Viborazo, " also 
occurred and both were determinant factors in the removal from power of 
Gen. Ongania and Gen. Levingston, who at the time of the events were 
Presidents of Argentina. 
In June and July 1975 another wave of mobilisations and general strikes 
affected the country. At that time the anned forces were not directly 
involved in the governxnent, but the repression and physical disappearance 
of militant workers and the takeover by the authorities"" of independent 
unions were common features. The state of fear and terror created by the 
activities of the AAA" (Argentinean Anticommunist Alliance) and the 
obstacles to mobilisation imposed on workers by the central unions' 
bureaucracies,, ' did not prevent collective actions and workers' 
mobilisations were often part of a broader political confrontation between 
left and right sectors within Peronism and in the whole Argentinean 
society (Thompson 1982). 
The military regime that took power in Argentina with the 1976 coup 
represented, with respect to previous authoritarian and repressive 
govemments, a quantitative and qualitative change in the fonns and ways 
in which repression was implemented. The military intervention was 
officially justified by the state of anarchy, insurrection and guerrilla 
actions, by the necessity to recover from an acute economic crisis and by a 
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general state of "sickness" that the virus of subversion and corruption had 
provoked in the body of the nation (to paraphrase the generals). On the 
basis of this "diagnosis", the so called Process of National Reorganisation 
was in reality not just planned with the idea of enforcing order in the 
country but rather with the aim of proceeding to a complete re-foundation 
of the state and of the society under the headings of discipline, 
Catholicism and free market. Considering the scope of this operation, the 
elimination of resistance and rebellion had to be carried out in all spheres 
of society, at the workplace, in the universities, in the trade unions, in the 
community associations and not just with regard to militant guerrilla 
organisations (Godio 2000). " The military junta was convinced that to 
stop waves of mobilisation, strikes and the political power of the trade 
unions decisive action had to be taken on the whole labour movement, 
both in its militant and independent forms and in the more centralised and 
bureaucratic unions' confederations. On the one hand, repression had to 
be exercised against the more militant, independent expressions of 
unionism of that time. The experience of clasismo and of anti -bureaucratic 
unionism was still fresh. This type of grass-roots movement, fostering a 
democratic participation in union affairs and promoting an effective 
protection of workers' rights in the plants, was the first target for the 
military. In their words these unions were performing a subversive 
activity and had to be physically destroyed since they were considered as 
a forrn of guerrilla, workplace guemlla (guerrilla fabril). On the other 
hand, the central confederation could represent a channel for future 
mobilisations and the centre of a political opposition to the dictatorship. 
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The CGT, and the 62 PeronIst Organizations that were representlng Its 
backbone, were a threat for the military and the anti-labour project they 
wanted to implement and were at the same time symbol and reality of the 
power of the Labour Movement and of Peronism. In the very first days of 
the coup the CGT and the major national union federations were put under 
direct control of the government, many leaders were arrested and military 
administrators were appointed to substitute for them. At the same time 
shop-floor delegates and internal commissions literally disappeared, were 
forbidden or their action was made ineffective by both military takeover 
of local trade unions branches and companies anti-unions campaigns. In 
many cases the companies willingly participated in military repression, 
providing lists of activists and militants to the police forces, erasing entire 
shop-floor commissions, extending control on workers' private lives and 
increasing the rhythms of production. These actions transformed the plant 
into a jail in which the aim was to break all forins of resistance and 
opposition (Falco'n 1982). Abo's (1984) refers to the unlimited use of the 
police forces that were called by the companies to intimidate and 
"convince" the workers that a protest was counter productive and often 
too risky. In the absence of any form of protection workers had not much 
option then but to accept rules and regulations as imposed by the 
enterpnse. 
"Wien we consider the period 197611979 we have to take into 
consideration the terrible charge that was attached to each industrial 
conflict. - the worker who challenged management authority, no matter if 
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to a lesser or greater extent, could risk his employment atfirst and, quite 
frequently, his freedom, security, his own life [... ] ideological persecution 
was also another constant of that period. The worker with political or 
unionist background was immediately labelled as subversive and this was 
sufficient justification not to employ him1her" (my translation from 
Spanish, Abo's 1984, p. 44). "' 
From these examples we can say that, particularly during the first years of 
the military dictatorship, the scope and range of repression was very 
relevant. A combination of anti-labour legislation, takeovers by the 
authorities of national trade unions, elimination of activists and shop-floor 
commissions, companies tightening control of workers' private lives and 
intimidation were introduced and/or increased. At the same time, inflation 
was growing, real salaries were decreasing and the workforce was reduced 
in key industrial sectors of the economy (Gallittelli and Thompson 1982). 
As far as the workplace is concerned the combination of company and 
military repression, the blacklisting of fellow workers, the physical 
disappearance of leaders, "" 
the intimidatory practices were a daily experience and this certainly 
contributed to create a climate of fear within all the spheres of a strictly 
controlled society. 
Evangelista (1998) argues that the last military rule destroyed the utopia 
of a social change that during the 1960's and 1970's was a common 
denominator of social protests in both Latin America. ) on the waves of the 
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Cuban Revolution of 1959, and in Europe with the revolutions of 
1968/1969. In the words of the same author the unleashed violence of the 
military dictatorship created: 
it a reign of terror, a process of collective unmaking (that) destroyed the 
links between social subjects and their perceptions of a world with which 
they had already lost all proximity andfamiliarity. After an almost tweniý, 
years interval and in the ominous reality of the memory, the concentration 
camps established by the so-called Process of National Reorganisation 
thus constitute themselves [ ... j as the originating scene that always 
returns, like a ghost, to take hold of the present, and without which it is 
I. mpossible to ponder Argentine culture in the years that followed the 
military dictatorship " (Evangelista 1998, p. XIX). 
Is then the fear and terror produced by the military Government a ghost 
that has affected the mobilisation capacities of the Argentinean working 
class? Are then credible the assumptions made by workers interviewed on 
the disruptive effects that the last dictatorship had on their mobilisation 
and solidarity behaviour? 
The labour conflicts that exploded at the workplaces during the first 
months of the dictatorship, for instance, seem to weaken these 
assumptions. "" 
Just to mention the automotive sector, the same day of the coup, Renault 
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workers went on strike and dunng September and October 1976 other 
conflicts emerged at Ford, FIAT Palomar, Mercedes Benz, Deutz. Most of 
these mobilisations were spontaneous and not led by the official trade 
unions, which were most of the time in the hands of the military, or by 
elected internal commissions, often physically cancelled by police and 
business repression (Falcon 1982). Despite all these obstacles and the 
probability of new restrictions, these grass root mobilisations took place 
and kept alive workers' opposition to the economic policies of the 
government, reconstituting or strengthening internal commissions and 
with this establishing the bases for further confrontations. At national 
level, the trade unions, after an initial period of disorganisation, 
recomposed their structures, became more and more confident in their 
challenges to the military and called for several national strikes that even 
if not always effective were the proof of labour movement vitality (Ab6 I11 os 
1984). 
If we look at the post-dictatorship period, thirteen general strikes were 
called against the govermuent of Alfonsin. Again in the 1990's other 
waves of mobilisation affected the country and this both from workers 
employed in the formal sector and from the unemployed movement and 
marginalised groups and in these latter cases with new methods of 
struggle. 
It is of course unquestioned that these examples of mobilisation occurred 
within different economic contexts, political conditions and organisational 
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forms. The use of the strike during the Alfonsin UCR government, for 
instance, reveals how, particularly, Peronist unions struggled to maintain 
both their prerogatives at the workplace and their political influence in the 
Peromst Movement. Alfonsin, and before him in 1963 his party colleague 
and president Illia, looked at the democratisation of the shop-floor as a 
way to break the link between trade unions and the Peronist Movement 
and facilitate his economic, anti-inflationary reforms (Roudil 1993). Soon 
after the govemment reached power, it aimed to "dilute both the political 
and economic strength of the Peron ist-dom inated CGT" (Richards 1995, 
p. 58) and democratisation in this context meant a process of 
"deperonisation" of the labour movement (Tedesco 1999). At the same 
time we cannot deny that within these political struggles the use of strikes 
was considered as an instrument of pressure by many Peronist unions in 
the CGT. They were mobilising workers against the government in charge 
to maintain their power and oppose democratisation but also to gain 
support for the Peronist candidate for the presidency. " 
Despite these differences of economic and political contexts, it is 
undeniable that all these struggles had a base of workers' support and 
showed their disagreement with the power in charge and the socio- 
political model implemented. But the fact that people mobilised 
independently of the nature of the party and the economic situation of the 
moment shows the degree of labour conflict in Argentine society as a 
whole, as is going to be further analysed in the following paragraphs. 
Despite this high level of conflict both at macro and micro level, there is 
evidence that the climate of fear and terror produced by the last military 
rule is, or at least has been, a reality for many workers and their lives. 
As reported by Corradi (1987), O'Donnell and Galli conducted in 
1978/1979 in Argentina, a research based on interviews, life stones and 
testimonies, with the questions "What does it mean to live under fear? " 
and "What types of personal reconstructions can people produce? ". The 
main conclusion of the authors was that there is a direct connection 
between the level of violence and repression at national level and the 
micro reality, such as the workplace. In these latter contexts cruelty, 
selfishness, de-politicisation, negation of evidence when related to 
forbidden topics (i. e. unionisation), lack of solidarity, individualism, are 
the immediate consequences of a climate of fear which is produced by an 
authoritarian regime in the public sphere and through media diffusion. The 
public example is then reinforced by micro despotism that can emerge in 
the various contexts of social life and this being justified by the same 
media under government control. All this creates, especially among the 
lower class, the condition for a state of political infancy and a search for 
political and charismatic leaders. 
Noe Jitrik (1987) reaches similar conclusions in his analysis of Argentine 
culture. For this author the fact that repression has been mainly directed 
against political activists, workers and intellectuals, 
"it has also damaged the critical capacity of sociqv as a whole, which, to 
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the same degree, has been led to a form of cultural existence based on 
counter-values such as repression, se4f- censorship, vigilance, the 
acceptance of a subordinate and secondary scheme of values" (1987, 
162). 
It is important to stress here that in the conclusions of both authors there 
are several points that overlap with what emerge from the interviews of 
this research. This coincidence, despite the time that has passed, should 
invite us not to underestimate what is stated in the interviews but rather to 
contextuallse it. 
In conclusion, from the discussion and the examples presented, emerge 
arguments and counter arguments to the hypothesis that the last military 
rule has acted as an obstacle to mobilisation. The examples provided 
certainly show that we cannot generalise the fact that all the workers have 
been affected by this culture of fear and by the consequences of this. But 
there is also evidence from the interviews and from the studies reported 
that effectively the last military rule, more than other authoritarian 
experiences in Argentine history from 1930 until the re-introduction of 
representative democracy, has produced in many people a progressive 
distancing from political and social participation. This sort of apathy for 
collective action and the feeling of impotence could have been reinforced 
by the worsening of the economic situation, the increase in unemployment 
and a more general crisis in the values of representative democracy. " 
FIAT's and Renault's workers certainly were in the 1990's, if compared 
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to the rest of Argentinean workers, a privileged category. They were 
employed in the sector of profit-making companies at the forefront of 
technological innovations. Because of their position in the labour market, 
these workers have always been used to a relatively stable job, good 
salaries and social protection in the context of increasing unemployment, 
labour flexibility and political corruption. Many of them, once forced to 
renounce any form of freedom in the climate of fear produced by the 
military dictatorship, could have found themselves not used to act 
collectively or not confident in their unions. We should add to this that 
they were probably disenchanted by the return of democracy and their 
loyalty to the Peronist ideal of social justice was a ghost during Menem's 
neo-liberalism. This seems confinued by the fact that, in the case of FIAT 
for instance, UOM (Union Obrera MetalUrgica, the trade unions 
historically representing FIAT's workers) had at the time of the conflict 
200 members out of 1900 workers. In addition to this they were also 
working for enterprises that, in a context of disruption of any forin of 
representation and instability of the labour market, could have gained their 
favour. The protection of the job and the maintenance of the social status 
achieved became their primary concems. At the same time, it is true that 
for the young workers the example of the old, the lack of charismatic 
leaders and the job stability and salary level in both companies were valid 
reasons for not engaging in collective action. If these conclusions are true, 
they nonetheless represent just part of the reality because otherwise we 
cannot explain why the same people mobilised in 1996, in the case of 
FIAT they occupied the plant after more then 20 years of collective 
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inactivity and reached an unexpected level of consciousness and 
radicalisation. 
In conclusion it seems important to stress that the climate of fear produced 
by the last military rule, with its corollaries of apathy and asocial 
behaviour, has probably played an inhibitory role in the mob1lisation 
capacity of FIAT's and Renault's workers. But at the same time the fact 
that they did mobilise despite this heritage of fear requires us to examine 
and reflect on other factors that could have influenced the process of 
mobilisation. The next paragraph will focus on the function and structure 
of Argentinean trade unionism and on the relation between grassroots and 
political/bureaucratic leadership. 
3. The relation between workers and trade unions: 
political/bureaucratic leadership vs. grass roots movements. 
The apathy over participation to which we referred before as a possible 
consequence of the last military dictatorship on workers' behaviour, in the 
cases analysed, was primarily directed toward trade unions. In this sense 
the low membership rate at the time of the conflict that we have 
previously mentioned, might be an indicator, although not always reliable, 
of workers' opinions. However it is also important to note that the 
decrease in unions' membership rates and workers' participation could be 
more a reaction to unchanging and corrupted leaderships than to the 
organisation itself Beanng this distinction in mind helps us to understand 
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why, in the Fiat plant, a previously non unionised workforce voted 
massively in the election for new representation and, on the wave of 
mobilisation, subscribed in large numbers to the newly created 
organisation (SITRAMF). However, what the interviews confinn is that, 
at least at the time of the conflict, the image workers had of trade unions, 
an image constructed from many years working in the same plant, was not 
particularly positive. Workers' criticisms were not directed toward the 
role and function that a trade union should have as an institution created to 
defend their interests. The presence of someone representing them in front 
of the company was something natural not just because they were really 
convinced of this defensive and protective role, but it was also a sort of 
unchangeable and immutable element in their life at the workplace and, to 
a certain extent , in society. Trade unions in Argentina have historically 
played a political, pivotal role that dates back to Peron's first presidential 
mandates and that signed for them being co-opted into the state. This 
represents a watershed in the function and structure of trade unionism in 
Argentina and on the law and legal arrangements that regulate trade 
unions' action in relation to their affiliates, the employers and the state. 
The Argentinean labour legislation recognises the existence of one trade 
union per industrial sector and workers have no practical possibility to 
organise themselves around a different form of representation. Workers 
can freely associate and organise themselves independently but they 
cannot take legal actions, sign and negotiate collective bargaining, 
participate in arbitration, defend workers at the workplace, without a legal 
authorisation (personeria gremiao from the Ministry of Labour. Due to 
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the particular structure of trade unionism in Argentina, the legal 
recognition of a new union is always opposed by the historically 
legitimate union of the sector and is normally refused by the Ministry. 
This, among other factors, has in many cases produced an increase in 
unions' bureaucratisation, a pennanent leadership, extensive corruption 
and, often with the complicity of the company, the repression of any forin 
of militant opposition. 
It seems very useful to refer to what has emerged from the interviews as a 
starting point of further discussions. In sum this is what workers think of 
their trade unions: 
9 No democracy in internal union affairs, no participation 
9 Union membership as a means for obtaining economic advantages (social 
security, social services) 
* Not efficient protection at the workplace, workers felt abandoned and 
tended to protect their own interests individually rather than collectively. 
9 When the union called for a mobilisation (national strikes, salaries increase) 
this was accepted more as an obligation to the union and its delegates 
("what will they think if I don't participate") than as a conscious act in 
defence of workers' interests. 
These views raise a number of questions. Can these findings be 
generallsed? Are they applicable to other contexts or are conditions 
specific to FIAT and Renault? Most importantly for this research, had the 
117 
negative view workers had of their unions influenced their capacity for 
action? Is there any difference between the two cases? 
These questions play an important role as they help us to focus on whether 
the historical developments of Argentinean unionism could have had a 
more direct relationship to our cases of mobilisation. In this section I will 
attempt to reach some conclusions on the basis of an historical analysis of 
certain particular characteristics of unionism in Argentina, but more 
precise answers will be developed in the empirical part of the research 
when more details will be available on each specific context. In the 
historical background that this section aims to provide, particular attention 
will be devoted to understanding: 
9 how structures and functions of unionism in Argentina have been shaped by 
its particular relations with the state. 
* how workers have perceived and questioned these forms of unionism. 
The two sub-sections that will follow have a point in common, that of 
union bureaucracy, that is the product of both the way the state has shaped 
the structure and function of unionism and the way in which workers have 
opposed this action. As a consequence of this overlap, historical events 
have to be looked at from this double and often contradictory perspective, 
and this could imply a non-linear exposition. A third sub-section will trace 
some conclusions and final considerations on the issues treated in the 
whole section. 
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a) Trade unions and their relation with the state 
- From 1943 to 1955 
In Argentina, for many years trade unionism and particularly of a certain 
style has been associated, although mistakenly, with Peronism. Not all the 
unions were Peronist,, not even during the apogee of Peron when the 
activities of non-aligned organisations were strictly controlled by 
govemment's authority (Torre 1988). But it is true that the majority of 
workers were genuinely Peronist and maintained their loyalty to Peron 
and Peronism to a certain extent until his death in 1974. 
Peron came to power in 1943 with responsibility for the National Labour 
Department in a cabinet formed by the military that took power that same 
year. The project that he gradually implemented was a sort of economic 
Keynesianism, of state intervention, within a populist fortnula adapted to 
the specific reality of Argentina and to its capitalist development. At that 
time the country was still substantially an exporter of agricultural products 
with the few industries related to and dependent on this business. The 
government, following a pattern of development common to other 
developing countries, fostered an economic model based on import- 
substitution, industrialisation and building infrastructures (Schvarzer 
1996). This project went together with a re-composition of class relations 
in which han-nony and co-operation were considered the essential 
conditions for national and common prosperity. Within this context, the 
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state had to play a role of social mediation, fixing rules and setting 
agreements for a redistribution of the national wealth. 
The legal system introduced during Peron's governments facilitated the 
creation of a highly centralised and bureaucratic union structure. This 
system functioned within the state-directed and planned economy and 
served the political machine established by Peronism. Trade unions and 
trade union leaders, as organisers of a strongly unionised mass of workers 
and administrators of social security benefits, had a fundamental role. 
Within this framework each union, depending on the number of its 
members, represented a nucleus of political and economic power often 
managed in pursuit of personal interests and in an authoritarian way. The 
legal system that supported unions and so much empowered leaders was a 
direct reflection of the hegemonic political design of Peron, which was 
symbolised in the "verticalismo", a top down militaristic style of 
governance that was the same as Peron introduced in its relations with 
union leaders. 
The powerful role trade unions acquired during the Peronist regime was 
both political and, as a consequence of this, effective in the workplace"". 
In this period the internal commissions increased their power and came to 
influence the labour process and the prerogative of capitalists in the 
control of it. Until the economic crisis of 1951/1952, workers' demands 
could be controlled, but after that time Peron's efforts to reduce workers' 
power at the workplace encountered resistance. This situation of conflict 
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produced stagnation in the economy and rendered evident the weaknesses 
of the social reformism promoted by Peronism. On one side capitalists 
aimed to regain full control of the labour force and increase their rate of 
profit by means of an increase in productivity and labour exploitation. On 
the other side, workers and trade unions were resisting such attempts 
through pressure on the government of which they were becoming the 
main supporter. The increase in productivity became the field of struggle 
in the following years between trade unions, local and foreign 
capitals""' and the dominant groups within and behind the state (Ghigliani 
and Flier 1998). 
- From 1955 to 1976 
For more than 20 years, from 1955, when Peron was overthrown by 
another military coup, until 1976, when the last dictatorship came into 
power, civil and military Governments alternated in power in Argentina. 
With the exception of the period 1973/1976 when Peron was re-elected to 
the Presidency, "' 
trade unions have been the target of the state's reforms and interventions 
that tended to reduce their financial and political power. Beside the need 
for capitalists to recover control of the workplace and to increase 
productivity, trade unions were, with Peron in exile and Peronism 
proscribed, the soul and body of a renewal of the Peronist class 
compromise which they were constantly stressing through their loyalty to 
Peron. " 
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During these years the labour movement lost the struggle over 
productivity, was alternately defeated, repressed and rehabilitated but 
maintained a high level of mobilisation and political pressure. Trade 
unions' financial power remained consistent as well as their internal 
structure, their centralism, their bargaining power, despite various 
attempts to weaken their legal recognition (Godio 2000). This happened 
for instance during the Frondizi government (195 8-1962) that gave the so- 
called personeria gremial to plant unions, often sponsored by the 
enterpnse, as was the case with FIAT's SITRAC and SITRAM. 
Paradoxically, the existence of these "yellow" unions and their 
independence from central organisations facilitated the emergence of a 
revolutionary leadership in 1970-1971. This reinforces the arguments, that 
I will deal with later on,, that bureaucratisation is both an obstacle and a 
catalyst for mobilisation. 
A fundamental process that took place dunng these years was the 
detachment of the workers from the politics of the leadership. The period, 
from 1955 to approximately 1958 corresponds to that of the so-called 
Resistencia Peronista (Peronist Resistance) when, with the central 
organisations under control of the military government, the focus of 
resistance was the workplace. In these latter contexts we can see the 
emergence of new leaderships forged in a struggle that, justified as a 
means for the return of Peronism, was, more importantly, a struggle over 
the increase in productivity and the control of the labour process. After the 
big defeats of 1959-1960 many of those who led the resistance , including 
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Vandor, secretary of the UOM, changed their position. They accepted the 
postponement of their claims for the return of Peron in exchange for 
formal state recognition and legalisation of their organisations and the 
recognition of their personal prestige so as to establish the basis for an 
autonomous power of negotiation with the state and the employers. The 
aII Dandonment of issues related to the control of labour and its exchange for 
collective bargaining over wage increases were the corollaries of these 
agreements. In this new situation workers' discontent could be overcome 
just with an increase of bureaucracy II in the leaderships that now, after 
government recognition, became further entrenched (James 1990). 
Thus far the analysis has been of how the function and structure of trade 
unions changed in its relation to the state during the first two Peron 
governments and in the period 1955/1973. What we can extract from this 
is that in both historical periods the relations of trade unions and the 
labour movement with the power structures has produced an increase in 
bureaucratisation. In the first case this was justified by the fact that the 
leaders were the repositories of loyalty to Peron and workers were, in the 
majority, loyal to Peron and to the leaders he nominated. Leaders were 
also responsible for the administration of consistent financial resources 
and this gave them tangible power. This point is very important for 
understanding the role of both bureaucratisation and leadership within the 
Argentinean system. Trade unions collected welfare funds at source, the 
so called Obras Sociales, to deliver healthcare. Thus by providing this 
fundamental service they replaced the state, they constructed citizenship 
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around workers'rights (Martuccelli and Svampa 1997). 
These political and financial reasons remain valid in the second case too. 
But when trade unions were antagonistic to power, bureaucratisation was 
fostered by the goverranent. The same government that, conscious of the 
mobilisation capacity of the working class and in need of a legitimate 
interlocutor for negotiation, recognised the authority and power of the 
established trade unions. In a third case,, that of the Peronist governiment 
of 1973/1976, trade union leaderships participated and supported the 
government, opposed the independent unions and strengthened their 
bureaucratic style. However, it is worth noting that bureaucracy was not 
always monolithic nor that bureaucracy necessarily means incapacity or 
unwillingness to mobilise. Even during Isabel Peron's govemirnent, when 
the compromise of the CGT with this authoritarian executive reached its 
peak, trade unions, pushed from the bottom (coordinadoras), mobilised 
massively in the national stnkes of June 1975. 
- From 1976 to 2000 
The last military government certainly reduced the role of the trade unions 
as political actors and introduced several reforms that attacked their 
financial power. However, the destruction of what remained of anti- 
bureaucratic experiences and the takeover by authorities of many 
organisations, strengthened bureaucracy. Internal opposition was banned 
and former bureaucrats in collusion with the military authorities, often, 
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gained the control of those organisations still formally recognised by the 
govemment". 
With the return to democracy in 1983, unions' internal democracy came 
again under discussion. The government of Alfonsin (Radical) presented a 
law that, although maintaining one union per productive sector, almed to 
stimulate internal democracy and more transparent electoral processes but 
the law was not approved because of CGT lobbying. Between 1984-1985, 
elections were held in the majority of the unions that most of the time 
were still managed by the same leaders elected before the military coup. 
In these elections more participation was granted, in 70% of the cases 
more then one list was presented, pluralist fronts gained in many unions 
and this contributed to widen the political spectrum and internal 
democracy (Palomino 1985). But 90% of the leaders elected were still part 
of the traditional Peronist unionism represented in all its variants 
(Fernandez 1998). In 1986, the first CGT Congress held since 1975, lasted 
only two hours with only one list presented and no further debates. It is 
significant how this culture of leadership, authority and top-down 
decisions that historically characterised Peronist unions was also part of a 
more general unionist culture independently of ideological orientations 
(Godio 2000). 
The perpetuity in the leadership and the lack of internal democracy are 
characteristics that remained in Argentinean unionism also during 
Menem's regime. Within the project of a reconstruction of the state under 
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the economic and ideological umbrella of neo-liberalism, he promoted an 
attack on unions' financial and political power at the same time co-opting 
those unions more prone to enter the business of privatisation of foriner 
state enterprises and to support the investment of social security funds in 
the market. Those union leaders that accepted to participate in these 
lucrative businesses had then another reason not to give room to possible 
challengers. Jozami (2000) argues that within a context of unemployment, 
policies against labour and a more general political apathy and de- 
mobilisation, trade unions were forced to stress those bureaucratic and 
more undemocratic traits of their organisations as a means of institutional 
survival. But I will return to this issue in the next section when the socio- 
political situation during the 1990's, which directly refers to the time of 
the conflict, will be analysed in more detail. 
- General considerations 
From this historical analysis, it is possible to say that bureaucratisation 
acquired different forms and methods depending on the way trade unions 
structured their relations with the state and the dominant power within it. 
At the same time, cultural patterns of a certain epoch (for instance 
diffused use of corruption or intimidation) and personal characteristic of 
the leaders can add differences in the ways and for which ends a 
bureaucratic position is used. However this emphasis on bureaucracy does 
not mean that trade unions and their leaders have remained attached to a 
rather static and monolithic idea of their functions and actions. 
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Contradictions often emerged between the base and the unions' top levels 
and in the labour movement as a whole and we have to consider these 
variations while explaining the specificity of the Argentinean case. 
Looking at these issues from a broader perspective, we can say that a 
process of more or less developed bureaucratisation is certainly a general 
characteristic of modem trade unions as organisations inserted in 
capitalistic societies. The sociological school that refers to Weber has 
considered as inevitable a certain degree of conforinity and 
bureaucratisation depending on the necessity for the union to become 
institutionalised. Marxists, although not against centralised organisations, 
have criticised the role of traditional unions as agencies of capitalist 
society and not perforniing a revolutionary hegemonic function but rather 
a sectional or corporative one (see e. g. Kelly 1988, Hyman 1971). These 
general interpretations applicable to western unions are certainly useful 
also in the study of Argentinean unionism. Nevertheless in this context, as 
discussed earlier,, the same phenomenon has been shaped differently. 
According to Fernandez (1998), the attempts to debilitate and alter the 
Peronist loyalties of the central confederation through legal refonns and 
the repeated occupations by authority of national unions by both military 
and civil governments until 1982 produced the need to identify continuity 
of action and unity of the movement in well-known and chansmatic 
leaders. The same author adds that especially in the past it was difficult to 
find workers educated and prepared to confront the challenges of the 
employers. This initial scarcity of competence was compensated by 
natural charisma and leadership. Later on, with growing financial 
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resources and political power, to be a unionist meant a career in the 
organisation from plant, to provincial and eventually national delegate. In 
addition to this, the particular geography of Argentina, a big country with 
one third of the population concentrated in the Great Buenos Aires,, 
created centralisation of decisions and financial resources"" 
in the capital and a relation of dependence between the provincial and the 
national federations. Another element that certainly has contributed to 
maintain high levels of bureaucracy in the Argentinean unions, is their 
role as administrators and providers of social security services. During 
past decades unions have managed a huge amount of funds with which 
they have financed, primarily, health services but also all sorts of social 
activities and security plans for their members: from holidays hotels to 
pharmacies and from houses to pensions. Most importantly, substituting 
the state in the provision of all these basic services, trade unions have 
acquired a central role in the daily lives of Argentineans as workers and as 
citizens. This concentration of economic power, within a legal context that 
already favoured a top-down and anti-democratic practice in the internal 
decisions, added more strength to a perspective that saw the union and its 
leader as perforining a political and "clientelistic", if not corrupted, 
function. ""' 
The rate of unemployment and the scarcity of social services offered by 
the state are today producing a renewed interest of workers in the services 
provided by the unions, " 
that even if weakened in terms of members, legal status and political 
influence still maintain a relevant organisational dimension. 
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On the basis of all these considerations it should not come as a surprise 
that the opinion many workers, at FIAT and Renault, have of the union is 
not positive. Instead of seeing the union as an organisation that defends 
their rights against the employer and the state, they have, often, 
experienced a different reality: that of a centre of power, managed anti- 
democratically by a bunch of fon-ner workers now enriched. In the best of 
cases they are if not suspicious certainly sceptical if and how a union, at 
least like the one they have known, can defend their interests. 
While bureaucratisation certainly represents a salient element in the 
understanding of Argentine trade unions, opposition to such practice has 
also appeared cyclically. At least in Argentina, grass roots movements and 
spontaneous workers' protests (that often go unnoticed in statistical 
reports) have repeatedly contested both the leaders and the scope of their 
organisations. In certain circumstances these pressures from below 
became almost a constant of workplace relations and put in evidence those 
contradictions we referred to before that Argentinean unionism showed 
over time. The resiStencia peronista (1955/1957), coordinadoras in 1975 
and anti-bureaucratic struggles during the 1970's and 1990's remind us of 
those that occurred in other countries and in different times: shop stewards 
in the UK dunng the 1970's, consigh di fabbrica, in Italy in 1968 and 
going back to 19205 COMisiones obreras in Spain dunng the last 
dictatorship. Trade unions are the institutions that historically have 
organised and represented those who work but are not necessarily 
129 
representative of all the different positions that can emerge from within 
the same class. In capitalism, the fact that unions tend to become 
institutions and insert themselves within a system of other institutions (as 
the idea of a "system of industrial relations" suggests) means that they, in 
practice, occupy an intennediate position, an institutional position, 
between capitalists, the state and workers' conflicting interests and this , in 
turn, can generate tensions and ideological struggles within the 
organisations itself This is the basis of understanding how workers have 
perceived and contested the forins their organisations have acquired in 
different historical moments. 
b) Workers and the opposition to bureaucracy 
In the previous paragraph particular emphasis has been put on the 
bureaucratic and contradictory character of trade unionism in Argentina, 
its different meanings and on the reasons and historical contexts that could 
have explained it. But beside, and in opposition to this type of unionism, 
antagonistic strands have often emerged within the labour movement. In 
this sense, we should look at the cases of rank and file activism, born out 
of a critique of the anti-democratic practices used in the management of 
internal union affairs and to the strategy adopted in the confrontation with 
the employers, and to the very important role they played in the social and 
labour history of Argentina. 
We have mentioned earlier that rank and file activism emerged right after 
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the military coup of 1955 during the so called Resistencia Peronista. At 
that time there was certainly a very deep sense of identification of unions 
and workers with Peronism. In the words of a worker 
'for us the return of Peron represented the return of dignityfor workers, 
it meant to get free from the owner's authority, it was the return of 
happiness, it was the end of sadness and bitterness for millions ofpeople, 
it was the end ofpersecution 
"(James 1990, p. 128). 
But,, according to James, the nostalgia for the golden age of Peron and 
what those times represented in terms of social justice and workers' 
legitimacy in the society, was just one aspect of a more complex and 
ambiguous sentiment. The unfavourable and repressive political climate 
also supported a process of entrepreneunal renewed authority on the shop- 
floor. Workers that once could intervene directly on matters concerning 
the rhythms of production and the labour process had now to accept more 
exploitative conditions, less freedom and less respect. The harshness of 
such a situation and the daily fights on the production site and at a more 
political level, contributed to the creation among workers of a sense of 
class identification that, while not assuming the form of an explicit class 
opposition, was nonetheless producing, among the rank and file, a 
diffused state of tension. Workers genuinely supported the official 
Peronist ideology of social justice and class hannony and fought for 
Peron's return. But at the same time a more radicalised and alternative 
discourse started to emerge because of the incapacity of Peronist ideology 
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to provide workers with satisfactory solutions to their changed reality. 
This tension between formal ideology and elements of a class conflict 
produced radicalisation but remained nonetheless latent, at least during the 
first decade after Peron's exile. It was made politically visible in the 
substantially classless dichotomy Peronism-Antiperonism. However it is 
worth mentioning that an ideological reformulation of Peronism within a 
more explicit Marxist framework started in the years following the 
"Peronist Resistance". These years corresponded to a confrontation in the 
Peromst movement between "duros", supporters of an intransigent and 
revolutionary opposition to each non- Peronist government, and 
"blandos", more open to dialogue and integration. In this latter group were 
included the majority of unions that after proscription, in 1957, elected 
new Peronist commissions openly in favour of immediate economic gains 
and organisational stability and, as in Vandor's era, within a political 
project of a "Peronism without Peron". Since the majority of unions were 
strategically oriented toward integration with the government in power, 
blandos soon became associated with bureaucrats and the anti-democratic, 
despotic, corrupted way of organising and managing the union. According 
to Raimundo (2000), Marxist inspired reformulation of Peronism have 
certainly contributed to question, if not the entire capitalist system, at least 
about the Peronist vision of a society essentially based on class hannony 
and labour/capital co-operation. This interpretation seems credible and 
supports James' views about workers' tensions and contradictions between 
what is stated by formal ideology and daily work practices, and the 
influences of such tensions on workers' consciousness (James 1990, 
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p. 128-144). 
Although the first signs of the emergence of a combative unionism could 
be traced back to the decade between 1955/1966, it is with the military 
government of Ongania and in the newly industrialised areas of the 
country, particularly Cordoba and Rosario, that a more radical and 
ideologically mature unionism found its confirmation. What later started 
to be called clasismo and sindicalismo de liberacion was a class-conscious 
and revolutionary, at least in its intention, movement that through the 
reaffinnation of workers' rights in the workplace, the control of the labour 
process, and a system of democratic participation and transparency in the 
union's internal affairs, aimed at the establishment of a socialist state. In 
the words of Agustin Tosco, leader of the Luz y Fuerza union of Cordoba, 
"the trade unionist has to fight with all his determination, with all his 
strength to change the system. The trade union leader has to know that 
despite a "good economy". if there is no justice in the distribution of 
wealth, exploitation continues. From this itfollows that he has tofightfor 
social freedom. The leader has to know that there will never be a good 
collective agreement within an economy dependent on monopolies. It 
follows that he has to fight for national liberation" (in James 1990, 
p. 307) XXVI 
In this perspective of national and social liberation the immediate targets 
of a union leader were to establish a direct relation with the rank and file, 
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gain the loyalty of the base through honesty, coherence, democracy and 
respect for different political opinions. 
This approach to unionism even if it didn't conquer ideologically the 
majority of workers, who remained profoundly Peronist, as the 
enthusiasm for the return of Peron in 1973 showed, was nonetheless 
accepted and demanded by the rank and file because at that time it 
represented a real instrument for the defence of workers' rights and dignity 
in the workplace and for their political participation in the society. As 
recognised by several authors (Brennan 1998, Munck 1987, Gordillo 
1999), clasismo has to be seen as the result of a combination of factors 
both related to the specific situation of Cordoba, as well as that of similar 
recently industrialised areas in the interior of the country, and to the 
general political situation. In the case of Cordoba, the establishment of 
FIAT and IKAJRenault in the second part of the 1950's produced a 
development of industrial activities based around the automotive sector 
attracting to the city migrants from the interior of the province that tended 
to live in new neighbourhoods near the plants and to share similar social 
environnients. This new industrial workforce had no union experience in 
part because they were young and with rural origins and in part because of 
the patemalistic policies adopted by the companies. In the case of FIAT in 
particular, the existence of a plant union totally identified with the 
enterprise, if at the beginning it served to maintain the workforce 
passive XXVII , after the 
C6rdobazo acted as an element of radicalisation. 
Events""' 11 of social mobilisation and upheaval, such as the C6rdobazo, 
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joined workers and students"" together 
in the demand for better economic conditions, and in the hostility against 
the rhythms of exploitation at the workplace and in the rebellion against a 
repressive dictatorship. The combination of these claims and the 
revolutionary potential of such mobilisation, even today part of the 
popular imagery, acted as a spark in the clasista transformation of 
SITRAC and SITRAM, FIAT's plant unions. These unions represented the 
prototype of the anti -bureaucratic and anti-dictatonal employee 
representation that effectively defended its members in the workplace 
through a democratic decision-making process. As recognised by Duval 
(2001), clasismo did not produce in the majority of workers in the labour 
movement of Cordoba an anti-capitalist position. There was still a firm 
belief, incorporated in the Peronist ideology, that a better redistribution 
was possible. Nonetheless clasismo and similar experiences of militant 
and combative unionism of those years were fundamental in the re- 
establishment, through the methods of internal democracy and 
transparency, of workers' control of the production process and of the 
dignity of workers against despotic management practices. In the words of 
a FIAT/Materfer worker in these months of democratic unionism 
"... in the plant, life changed completely. Shop stewards defended us with 
the foreman against all the problems that could emerge during work, we 
could control the rhythms of production that before were terrible. In 
general we could eliminate the oppressive climate that was normal in the 
plant and we could demand our rights as human beings" (in James 1990, 
p. 306). xxx 
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These anti -bureaucratic unions represented an important experience for 
the whole labour movement and a concrete threat for the establishment. 
This is best shown by the fact that, as we have mentioned before, the last 
military government detected explicitly in these forms of unionism a sort 
of guemlla activity and devoted to its eradication more attention then to 
the political guerrillas. Trade union activists promoted the first strikes 
during the dictatorship and paid a high cost in tenns of repression and 
disappearances. 
If, during Alfonsin's government, traditional trade unions were very active 
in their mobilisation, pursuing with these both workers' defence and 
political support for the Peronist movement, during the 1990's another 
grassroots movement detached trade unions from workers. This will be 
analysed in the next section. 
c) Preliminary conclusions 
In the previous section we have seen how trade unions' structure and 
function have been shaped by their relations with the state and how and 
why workers have reacted against the bureaucratic practices of their 
unions. Bureaucracy is certainly an element that emerges from the 
institutional process through which trade unions, as other organIsatIons, 
always pass. But in the case of Argentina, together with this "natural" 
element, the process of bureaucratisation acquired very particular 
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characteristics specific to the context. Legal arrangements that date back 
to the first Peron governnient and to the role of trade unions in its political 
project provoked the lack of interrial democracy, the centralisation of 
decisions, and the importance of leadership. This legal context, and in 
particular the lack of internal democracy, has been maintained through the 
years, probably increasing in a number of organisations during the 1990's, 
and has certainly affected the cases of mobilisation this research is 
considering. Anticipating some conclusions, in the case of FIAT the 
vacuum of union power provided the spark for mobilisation and the 
emergence of a radical rank and file movement, while at Renault, 
bureaucracy had been able to control and then co-opt internal rank and file 
opposition and with it eliminated any further possibility of mobilisation 
and radicalisation. The bureaucratic style, at least in the cases analysed, 
also influenced that sort of apathy, of scarce workers' participation that we 
identified as a possible consequence of the last military government. With 
the return of democracy workers could expect more freedom and 
democracy within the union but this did not happen. 
Bureaucracy and the culture of fear that the last military dictatorship 
produced, have certainly hampered workers' collective action. This 
background could have favoured apathy for participation and a search for 
individual solutions. Despite all these factors, a mobilisation happened 
and has to be explained. Other elements have certainly contributed to 
produce this event: solidarity at the workplace, leadership, how workers 
have perceived employers' action. But other questions could be raised: 
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does bureaucratisation have to be seen just as an obstacle to mobilisation 
or could it have produced (with this latter) more radical oppositions? Or, 
to put it in another way, is there a limit to workers' acceptance of a 
bureaucratised, non-democratic leadership? Without the action of 
bureaucracy are they more free to mobilise? The answer to these questions 
is directly connected with the way workers have historically understood 
their relations with bureaucracy and with unionism and once more it is 
very difficult to find an answer easily applicable to all cases. During the 
1964 CGT Plan de Lucha (Plan of Struggle), a totally bureaucratised 
leadership could mobilise workers in the occupation of 11000 plants, 
something that for its importance is comparable, for instance, with the 
Italian factory councils of 1919-1920. The same bureaucracy during the 
Peronist Government of 1973-1976 , if at the it beginning tried to freeze 
workers' protests also occupying by authority "rebel" local unions, in the 
strike of June-July 1975 led mobilisation and showed to the military its 
potential as an orgamser of massive workers' demonstrations. This also 
explains the repression that followed the coup, with the CGT and so many 
unions taken over by the military and their leaders arrested. But by 
contrast to this militancy, from approximately 1989 to 1996 the 
bureaucracy first contained, but then was bypassed, by a general wave of 
mobilisation that was emerging in the country. These examples provide 
evidence of the double role bureaucracy has played, being, often at the 
same time, both an obstacle and a trigger for collective action. This 
requires searching for other factors to explain mobilisation, to look 
beyond and contextuallse the issue of bureaucracy, and to consider the 
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general trends of the phenomenon as an adaptation to the particular case. 
In this sense an important element to be considered and that occurred 
frequently, as the history of unionism in Argentina has shown, is the 
emergence of grassroots mobilisation against the leaderships. The 
workplace has been at different moments the centre of opposition to 
employers' policies, to government repression, and to bureaucratic 
leaderships. In the 1990's, as we will see in the next section,, a new split 
between the rank and file and the leadership occurred within a context of 
more generalised resistance of the working class (employed, unemployed 
and underemployed) against neo-liberalism. In this context a bureaucratic 
style of unionism could have both produced and hampered mobilisation. 
4. The political economy and social conditions at the time of 
the conflict: neo-liberalism, labour flexibility, tTade union dis- 
empowerment, new labour struggles. 
The election of Menem in 1989 represents a watershed in many aspects. 
First it signalled the definitive supremacy of multi-lateral financial 
agencies (IMF, World Bank, Washington Consensus) over the state on the 
determination of the country's economic and social policies. Menem 
implemented a "modernisation" process that was finalised by the retreat of 
the state from welfare provision, the privatisation of public enterprises, 
and the flexible use of labour. This was inserted within the neo-liberal 
policy of structural adjustment imposed by multilateral financial agencies 
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to Third World Countries as a way to obtain new credits. Second, the 
implementation of this programme required a redefinition of Argentine 
trade unionism in relation with the state and with Peronism. The ideology 
and politics of Peronism were part of a societal project that through the 
inclusion of labour and the co-option of trade unions into the state aimed 
to achieve better social justice, and the redistribution of wealth and 
development in an harmonious class relationship (this was concretely put 
forward in the penod 1945-1952 and unsuccessfully in 1952-1955 and 
1973-1976). Menernism corresponded in the real world of the workers, 
even if it was not in the political discourse, to a radical departure from the 
idealised social justice in class harmony promoted by Peronism. In 
particular it broke the idea of development and redistribution with the 
state as mediator and protector of workers. The Peronist ideology of the 
majority of Argentine trade unions was put into crisis by a system that 
while reducing their political and financial power was pushing unions to 
adopt a business-oriented perspective. Third, the combination of neo- 
liberal policies, and their negative consequences in terms of employment, 
the redefinition and internal conflicts of trade unions over their nature and 
their relations with the political power structure, produced new labour 
struggles. These latter evidenced a new detachment of workers from 
traditional trade unions, the emergence of anti-bureaucratic organisations 
at local level and the development of alternative trade union 
confederations. 
In the expanding informal sector, the unemployed and underemployed led 
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protests and resistance which led to a reformulation of labour/capital 
relations through new forms (piqueteros, coordinadoras) and new 
identities. Social exclusion, exploitation and individualisation in the 
workplace is what the working class(defined here in the broader sense of 
employed, unemployed and underemployed) has experienced in the last 
decade in Argentina within a financial and industrial system, now open to 
the global economy, highly dominated and influenced by transnational 
capital. 
In this sense, we can say that the election of president Menem in 1989 
marked a turning point in the Argentinean political, social and economic 
scenario. In the last decade, following the neo-liberal doctrine promoted 
by the International Monetary Fund, as a condition of obtaining new 
credits, the country undertook a process of profound structural change. 
This was put into practice mainly through privatisation of public 
companies, fiscal bonuses to attract multinational investments,, anti- 
inflationary monetary policies, reduction of public employees, cutting 
public expenditures, privatisation of social security services, and labour 
flexibility. The Convertibility Plan introduced by minister Cavallo in 
1991, fixing the parity peso/dollar, stopped hyperinflation, created 
stability and market confidence creating the conditions for a period of 
constant economic growth (during 1991/1997 GDP increased at an annual 
average rate of 6.1 %) and political consensus. Privatisation of state 
companies, due to govemment concessions and to the panty with the 
dollar, turned out to be a highly profitable business for local and foreign 
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capital, producing at the same time extensive corruption, "clientelism" and 
unfair practises. "" 
But the euphoria of the economic stability of the first years of the Menem 
presidency did not correspond to better conditions for employed and the 
unemployed. The official unemployment rate rose from 6% in 1991 to 
17.3% in 1996, while underemployment in the same years rose from 7.9% 
to 13.6% (Lozano-Basualdo 2001). In 1996 the fact that neo-liberal 
policies were explicitly showing their weaknesses not just in terms of 
social marginalisation but also in terms of economic growth was already 
clear to Argentine business representatives, too. In an interview reported 
by the national newspaper Clarin in September 1996, a representative of 
the UIA (Union Industrial Argentina, Argentine Industrial Association) 
admitted that labour flexibility alone could not produce more employment 
and that it was a mistake to sell politically, as the Govenunent and the 
World Bank were doing, these reforms as the panacea for unemployment. 
At the same time he made clear that a broader social and political 
consensus was fundamental to implement such refonns and to avoid social 
conflicts (Clarin 20 Sept. 1996). Meanwhile FIAT's workers were 
occupYing the plant and resisting, among the first in big industrial 
enterprises, the so called labour flexibility. Once asked by a local 
newspaper about his opinion on the issue of flexibility, FIAT's 
mobilisation leader answered that he was still trying to understand if this 
99 means that those who work are giving a small piece of employment to 
other unemploYed or that what we are giving will never be recuperated 
and nothing will change? "(La voz del Intenor, 12 Oct. 1996) XXXII 
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This process of reforin was partly supported by the CGT which at the 
beginning remained, despite internal divisions, politically loyal to Menem, 
a Peronist president. But soon the unions became the target of Menem's 
strategy because they could easily mobilise workers especially against his 
economic policies which were producing social discontent. On the one 
hand, he tried to undermine unions' financial and organisational power 
and political centrality through an attack on their Obras Sociales (unions' 
social services) and a decentralisation of collective bargaining. On the 
other hand, he invited unions to participate in the privatisation of public 
companies and in the business of investing in the market of the funds 
collected for pensions and social services. 
For the first time in Argentinean history a Peronist president explicitly 
attacked the organisation and structure of trade unionism, one of the 
pillars of the Peronist movement, and workers' rights. This combined 
action provoked within the movement a crisis of identity and between 
central bureaucracy and shop floor delegates an increasing split 
(Fernandez 1997). On the one hand, trade unions were facing a direct 
attack on their autonomy and political power from a Peronist government 
that they contributed to support and put into power. On the other hand, 
labour reforms, consistently reducing workers' rights and benefits, were 
creating amongst ordinary workers a deep sense of dissatisfaction and 
anger against union bureaucrats and central confederations. 
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At the institutional level, the conflicting and contradictory relations 
between Menemism and traditional unionism generated a split in the CGT 
(ConfederaciOn General del Trabajo) between those unions (or union 
leaders) supporting Menem's reforms and aiming to participate in the 
business produced by the privatisation of social security and those 
promoting opposition both at political and work place level. In 1992, the 
CTA (Congreso de los Trabajadores Argentinos) was created mainly with 
the contribution of public workers' unions and former state-owned 
companies. This new confederation was thought of as a new experiment 
for unionism radically different from the traditional Argentinean one. In 
particular, the CTA aimed to collect both workers and unemployed 
struggles emerging in different parts of the country, promoted individual 
and not compulsory membership, independence from the state and the 
Movimiento Justicialista (Peronism), decentralisation and de- 
bureaucratisation. In 1994 from another split in the CGT the MTA 
(Movimiento de los Trabajadores Argentinos) was created with the aim of 
opposing labour refonns. After the creation of the CTA and the MTA, 
unions loyal to Menem and his reforms remained in the CGT. This group 
in July 1994 subscribed with the government and the entrepreneurs to a 
general agreement (Acuerdo Macro) that, while recognising CGT 
financial autonomy and maintaining collective bargaining at central level, 
allowed the flexibility of labour (reduction of labour rights) at workplace 
level. The last years of Menem's government showed a re-composition of 
unions' opposition. The CGT with support from CTA and MTA called 
four general strikes in an attempt to confront government intentions to 
144 
decentralise collective bargaining. The success of these demonstrations, 
while it saved the unions prerogatives, did not change flexibility at 
workplace level, already recognised""' 
by the Acuerdo Macro and translated by the government into law. 
This fragmentation of unionism shouldn't be a surprise since it confirms 
once more the multi-faceted nature of unionism as an institutional and 
organisational fonn of workers' representation whose historical 
development always occurred within capitalist economies. The analysis of 
unionism as an expression of sectional and corporate interests, even if 
unions were representing the working class, was expressed by Gramsci at 
a time when socio-political conditions could have favoured the idea of an 
imminent revolution led by the trade union movement. In his words: 
"Objectively the trade union is nothing other than a commercial 
company, of a purely capitalistic type, which aims to secure, in the 
interest of the proletariat, the maximum price for the commodity labour, 
and to establish a monopoly over this commodity in the national and 
internationalfield" (Gramsci 1969, p. 502). xxxiv 
It is true that in Argentina, as well as in the traditional forin of the so- 
called business unions, particularly under Menem, the natural character of 
the unions has produced a perversion. Perversion in the sense of 
'financial stabilisation of the unions ...... achieved 
by means of the 
legalisation of the instability of workers' lives" (Dinerstein 200 1, p. 122). 
This situation has been perceived at the workplace as a betrayal. A 
betrayal often symbolised by the contrast between the ascendancy and the 
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material benefits achieved by certain union delegates, previously 
colleagues at work, and the unemployment or the worsened labour 
conditions the majority of workers were suffering. This perception of 
unions, the anti-democratic internal style and the bad reputation that 
certain organisations had in the popular image have contributed to a 
further distancing of workers from their representative organisations. In 
particular, for workers who were still maintaining their jobs the constant 
state of insecurity generated by labour flexibility of led to individualism 
and to the impossibility of maintaining solidarity at the workplace and for 
collective action (in this sense see Dinerstein 200 1, p. 121 and for the car 
industry Battistim and Montes Cato 2000). These opinions seem to be 
confirmed by the data collected for this research. The combination of 
individualisation, insecurity and scepticism first created apathy among 
those not directly affected, at least at the beginning, by the loss of a job or 
by some form of labour flexibility and lack of awareness for the fate of 
other workers in the same plant or in similar sectors. This apathy and 
indifference, symbolically summansed in the expression "no te metas ", 
transformed itself, once changes in labour conditions or unemployment 
became a reality, for those who had not yet experienced it, into 
consciousness/militancy/mobilisation or 
consciousness/impotence/frustration. I will return to this issue and to the 
different outcome of workers' reactions in the empirical chapter of the 
research. 
In Argentina, the decade of the 1990'sdemonstrated, despite the internal 
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contradictions of the trade union movement, its fragmentation and the 
distance from the workforce, high levels of conflict and resistance. in the 
privatised state companies, the processes of rationalisation and the closure 
of productive sites created reductions in employment and strong 
opposition from workforce (Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 
ENTel, Aerolineas Argentinas, Gas del Estado). When company 
restructuring affected industrial areas of the country historically dependent 
and specialised in one productive sector (metallurgy, oil extraction, sugar 
cane plantations) resistance acquired a social character and the defence of 
the jobs mobilised together different parts of civil society: local unions, 
municipal governments, and religious organisations (this is for instance 
the case of ACINDAR's Villa Constitution workers). "'v 
Although resistance encountered strong company and government 
repression, it was nonetheless a characteristic of the entire decade even 
with the increasing scarcity of job opportunities and social 
marginalisation. 
These first experiences of mobilisation mainly affected formal 
employment, and even if they extended throughout the country, they 
remained basically isolated from each other, not finding the momentum or 
the political stance to express themselves as a unit. Although these 
mobilisations achieved very limited results in the short term, we could 
argue that they have represented a background for those fonns of 
resistance (roadblocks, factory occupations, popular assemblies,, solidarity 
alternatives) that the working class is currently trying to consolidate in the 
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social laboratory that is Argentina today. 
5. Conclusions. 
The chapter has explored several issues that could have affected the cases 
of mobilisation this research is considering. First, the effects of the last 
military dictatorship on workers' potential for collective actions have been 
analysed. A two-sided perspective has been proposed. On the one hand, a 
"culture of fear" has been created and a process of atomisation and de- 
politisation at the workplace could have emerged. On the other hand, these 
assumptions are contradicted by the waves of mobilisation that occurred 
before, during and after the last dictatorship and with both military and 
civil governments. These arguments and counter arguments are both true 
and do not allow for generalising: not all the workers have been affected 
by a "culture of fear" and its consequences. In the cases of FIAT and 
Renault the climate of fear produced by the last military rule, with its 
corollaries of apathy and asocial behaviours, has probably played an 
inhibitory role in workers' mobilisation capacity. But at the same time the 
fact that they did mobilise despite this heritage of fear invite us to look for 
and reflect on other potential factors of mobilisation. 
In this attempt bureaucratic unionism and internal union struggles have 
been identified. These characteristics emerge from an historical analysis 
of how trade union structure and function have been shaped by their 
relations with the state and how and why workers have reacted against the 
practices of their unions. Bureaucracy is certainly a natural phenomenon 
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that affects all forms of organisation. But in the case of the Argentine 
trade unions it has been shown how the legal system fostered bureaucratic 
tendencies to serve political purposes. Once trade unions became political 
actors and in such a legal context, a distancing of ordinary workers from 
central organisations often occurred. Moreover it has also been stressed 
that bureaucratisation could be seen as both an obstacle and/or an element 
that favoured mobilisation or a radicalisation of this latter. Since the 
political goals of the Peronist trade unions went hand in hand with the 
need to satisfy workers' demand in the plants, bureaucratic leaders have 
often assumed contradictory positions. The years 1973-1976 give a good 
example of how bureaucracy first tried to stop, then led the protest giving 
strength to the grassroots and finally was bypassed, but not defeated, by 
the big strike of June-July 1975. Considering all these contradictory 
elements , it 
has been argued that, in the cases analysed in this research, 
the combined action of bureaucracy and the culture of fear that the last 
military dictatorship produced, have certainly hampered workers 
collective action. This background could have favoured apathy for 
participation and a search for individual solutions. But, despite all these 
negative factors, a mobilisation happened and has to be explained. 
With this aim in mind the third section of the chapter has analysed the 
decade of the 1990's. Three elements have contributed to raise the level of 
social conflict and to a certain extent could have influenced the 
mobilisations that occurred in 1996 at FIAT and Renault. First, the 
pressure of multilateral financial agencies on the goven-iment became 
149 
influential as never before on political decisions. Second, the economic 
refornis implemented under IMF auspices produced unemployment, 
underemployment, increase of poverty and, with this, social unrest. Third, 
trade unions' contradictory position relating to the government and its 
economic policies distanced once more ordinary workers from 
bureaucratic leaderships and opened the space for a new anti -bureaucratic 
stance. This economic context and the opposition to bureaucracy have 
certainly represented a fertile soil for mobilisation because they offered to 
workers involved in industrial conflicts the base around which their 
demands could be formulated and solutions, eventually, provided. At the 
same time, examples of other mobilisations and the development of a 
sense of solidarity with the struggles of other groups could have offered 
both an example and a support. At least in the cases presented in this 
research, as will be more evident from the empirical analysis, these 
external conditions have not directly produced mobilisation but have 
constituted the moral background around which demands and conflict 
could be framed and the basis for workers' radicalisation and 
consciousness during mobilisation. This latter argument justifies the 
search for explanations based on a micro level analysis. 
The chapter has explored some issues considered as relevant for the cases 
of mobilisation this research is considering. At the same time, and for the 
historical perspective that the chapter offers, it could be considered as an 
attempt to highlight the overall mobilisation capacity of the Argentine 
labour movement. 
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This character seems to embrace a wide range of historical experiences 
and ideological positions. We have seen how workers in different times 
have mobilised in favour of Peron and of his return, against repressive 
military governments and anti-democratic unions, against privatisation, 
labour flexibility and marginalisation. These struggles have tended to 
support changes in the balance of power at different levels of society. 
Solidarity emerged at the workplace, at local, provincial and national 
political levels. Ideologies have ranged from Peronism and its class 
harmony society, to clasismo with its anti-imperialistic and socialistic 
orientation, to the recent cases of social mobilisation with their, 
ideologically heterogeneous, anti-system potential. At the same time these 
struggles have acquired different organisational dimensions, alliances and 
leadership. 
The study of a specific case of mobilisation has to be put within more 
general waves of mobilisation considering the international, especially for 
dependent economies, political economy and its effects on the country at 
the time of the conflict. This context represents the framework within 
which labour/capital relations at micro level can be understood and help to 
explain the different forms in which the labour/capital opposition asserts 
itself in the workplace. By looking historically, as Kelly (1998) does using 
the Kondratieff model, at the interdependence of market cycles with 
events of mobilisation, some trends can be certainly fixed and some 
generalisations made. Within this historical perspective could be 
explained for instance why companies that formerly successftilly 
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implemented schemes for "job satisfaction" or "identification with the 
company", experience mobilisation of their foriner human resources. 
In the case of Argentina, workplace mobilisation can be certainly 
explained in tem-is of labour/capital opposition. This can be argued, from 
one angle, looking at the structured antagonism (Edwards 1986) of the 
employment relationship as inserted in a broader socio- political context 
dominated by capitalist relations, from another angle, considering the 
conflicting interests between workers' social needs and capitalists' drive 
for profit (Lebowitz 2003). In particular, the analysis of mobilisation as a 
social process inserted into the logic of a capitalist society allows us to 
better understand how the same system produces rules, institutions, laws 
and prmciples that at different levels and with different outcomes 
influence mobilisation. But the sphere of subjective perceptions is 
fundamental as well. I am here referring to the way discourses, ideologies, 
cultures, social prejudices, customary opinions, external pressures are 
filtered by those who mobillse. In this sense, as far as Argentina is 
concerned, concepts of unionism and its role, of nationalism, of worker 
dignity, of the social function of workers in the family, of the tradition of 
workers' struggles, of individualiSM5 are all concepts with their 
background in the labour movement history of the country and have to be 
taken into consideration as the subjective level in the study of 
mobilisation. In other words, attention has to be put also on the cultural 
dimension and collective imagery that, for instance in the case of 
C6rdoba, have had big influence, during the 1960's and 1970's, in shaping 
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what has been called a "culture of resistance" (Gordillo 1999). 
Mobilisation has characterised Argentina so deeply that it is possible to 
argue it is part of the subjective experience of each worker, no matter 
what their opinions. The need to look at subjective perceptions while 
explaining mobilisation once more confirms the attention that has to be 
put on the analysis of social processes at the workplace. 
A second important consideration concerns the level of social conflict's 
radicalisation in Argentina. For an external, European, observer the study 
of Argentinean social history is undoubtedly an exciting, although 
dramatic, experience. Class counter-opposition, economic crisis, popular 
rebellions, military upheavals, charismatic leaders, have appeared in the 
last sixty years in Argentinean history in a much more dramatic and 
spectacular way, especially compared to Westem Europe. Both police 
repression and popular rebellions easily reach high levels of radicalisation 
as has been demonstrated, for instance, in December 2001. Repression is 
repression and rebellion is rebellion because no other alternatives are 
offered, because the system does not provide spaces for compromise or 
political agreement and far less for a better redistribution of wealth. In the 
societies of the rich world, social conflict is less evident, but has not 
certainly disappeared, because inequalities are controlled and frozen, to a 
certain extent by the intervention of the state. XXXV, 
In Argentina this is not the case and when not even the basic services are 
provided and people are abandoned to the vagaries of the market and 
starve, radicalisation comes more spontaneously. The music is the same 
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but in the case of Argentina it is heard at a much higher volume. 
The radicalisation of social conflict in Argentina is an historical trait that 
has certainly influenced subjective interpretations of collective actions. 
Workers have been empowered by Peronism and acquired a consciousness 
of their strength (it does not matter here if as "a class" or not) through 
mass mobilisation,, street marches, and factory occupation. During 
military rule they had to get used to obedience and rebellion, and even 
with Peron, it was forbidden. Subjective interpretations of the meaning of 
certain events, actions, behaviours could be extremely vaned and, 
especially for an external observer, the knowledge of historical events that 
have affected workers lives can help to understand their internal 
motivations. This is particularly important in cases of mobilisation. 
i The extracts from the interviews that are used in this and the following chapter have been left 
unchanged in their grammatical structure. Similarly, the translations provided have to be considered as 
a personal attempt to maintain unaltered the original discourse of the interviewees. "la gente realmente 
opositora y que teni .a peso o sefue, desapareci6, lo mataron, no estuvieron mas. Lamentablemente los 
que quedamos a posteriori por cobardia, por necesidad, por la jamilia, por lo que quiera, nunca 
pudimos tener la juerza, la capacidad, si el desconformismo pero no la acci6n .... estdbavamos disconformes pero termin6bamos haciendo los servicios y agachando la cabeza ... ... ..... ha pasado toda 
una generact . on intermedia que no ha tenido esos lideres con poder de hacer convocatorias de gente, 
con la opini6n s6lida que de ellos tenian los otros, entonces los nuevos que llegaron despuýs de 
nosotros nos 14eron continuando alli, pero como continuando? Haciendo siempre si con la 
cabcza ... ... ... .. (Renault white collar worker) ii When the Government decided to limit the withdrawal of cash from bank accounts. 
iii "La misma Argentina esta' ya asi el "no te metds", "vamos a luchar pero andd vos al frente", acd esta 
sociedad fue muy castigada en la 6poca de los militares entonces es como, que hay un miedo a 
exponerse. Viste lo que pas6 en Bs. As. el afio pasado a esta altura, que es cuando se arm6 la 
organizaci6n para el tema del corralito, reprimieron y mataron gente. Esa es la idea vieja que por el 
miedo qued6 alli. " (Renault production worker) 
iv "Siempre me mantuve con la capacidad de razonar que es lo que se le han quitado a la mayoria de la 
gente en estos afios ....... aci tenemos todavia recuerdo 
de lo que fae la dictadura militar y eso va a ser 
Muy dificil cambiarlo ......... acd no 
hay participaci6n" (Fiat production worker) 
v Traditionally workers benefited from a shortening of the working day on Saturdays. 
%, i The role of the CGTA (Confederac16n General de los Trabaiadores Argentinos) was in this sense 
crucial. The central was antagonistic to the traditional CGT (Confederac16n General del Trabajo) and 
offered, within its class and anti -bureaucratic discourse, a reference point for the establishment of 
workers alliances in the city. 
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vii This name from a speech of Uriburu, Governor of C6rdoba, who a few weeks before the uprising 
had promised to cut off the head of the poisonous snake (vibora), as he considered the C6rdoba labour 
movement at that time. 
vill In Argentina, due to the political role trade unions have historically achieved, especially during 
authoritarian regimes, executives in power have conu-nonly reduced unions' political and mobilisation 
potential by both removing former leaders and substituting them with government's functionaries 
and/or inhibiting by authority unions' normal functions of representation. This practice is known in 
Argentina as intervend . on, and the English translations with the words intervention or unions' 
intervention do not explain properly what intervenci6n means. This explicative note should clarify what 
frequently in the rest of the paper I mean by using the expression "occupation, takeover by authority". 
ix This was a para-military organisation created by Jose' Lopez Rega, former secretary of Peron and 
Ministry of Social Welfare in the government of Isabel Peron who took the Presidency of Argentina 
after the death of Juan Domingo Peron in July 1974. Lopez Rega represented the extreme right wing of 
the Peronist Movement and through the AAA he started a period of terror directed at the physical 
elirnmation of left wing and independent unions' leaders and political MIlitants. The AAA hit severely 
C6rdoba where a Marxist oriented leadership of the labour movement, the so called corriente clasista, 
emerged at the end of the 1960's. 
x At that time Peronist unions were an important part of the government. Although the CGT was 
controlling the Ministry of Labour and with it a developed apparatus of control on grassroots 
organisations and local branches, they could not impede workers mobilisations and the new forms of 
organisations that started to emerge, coordinadoras. 
xi The Army commander of C6rdoba, cynically, recognised the necessity to proceed to the killing of 
50.000 people divided in order of priority among guerrilla and political activists, collaborators and a 
certain unavoidable number of "Mistakes". Twenty-six years later these opinions were still valid. While 
interviewing people in the FIAT plant I had an informal chat with one of the foremen. I provoked him 
by saying that I was desperately looking for an activist, a militant but that no one was left in the plant 
after the conflict, they really had done a good job. "Yes", he said, "we did like the military did, first the 
activists, than the less activist, then their friends, then the people who knew them and sometimes we 
also did some "mistakes". 
xii "Al considerar el periodo 1976/1979 debe tenerse presente esta terrible hipoteca que pesaba sobre 
cualquier conflicto laboral: el trabajador que desafiaba la soberania patronal en un aspecto minimo o en 
uno decisivo, arriesgaba, cuando menos, su empleo y, con frecuencia, su libertad, su seguridad y su 
propia vida ........ 
la persecuci6n ideol6gica fue otra de las constantes de este periodo. El trabajador que 
tiiviera antecedentes politicos o sindicales era catalogado mmediatamente de subversivo y ello lo 
descalificaba para ingresar 
xiii From a first report commissioned by the US Government, the Vance commission (1976/1978), 
reported that 20% of physical disappearances were of workers or trade unionists. Gallittelli and 
Thompson (1982) argue that this percentage of workers probably increased after 1978 because at that 
time guerrilla organisations were already destroyed while the total number of people disappeared 
amounted to 30000 at the end of the dictatorship. 
xiv On workers opposition during the dictatorship see also: Pozzi (1988), Pion-Berlin (1989). 
xv The CGT, from the period between 1989 and 1996 which corresponds to the first and beginning of 
the second Menem's mandate, never called for a general strike, despite workers' worsened situation. 
All this explains why, in 1992, the CTA was formed, aggregating unions that were opposing labour 
flexibility and Menem's neoliberalism, and being one of its main alms to extend its control of an 
increasing number of unemployed and marginalised workers. 
xvi Despite the fact that voting in Argentina is compulsory, electoral tests previous to the last 
presidential elections showed low rates of participation, protests and spoiled ballots. 
xvii However, it is useful to reflect to what extent unions' political force was based on their capacities 
to mobilise or rather was based on their ability to control waves of protest and use this to gain political 
benefits. 
xvill During the last years of Peron, foreign investments were promoted in new industrial areas of the 
country. Particular relevance was put on the attraction of those productions, like motor vehicles, which 
were more technologically innovative. 
xlx As mentioned before, trade unions were a constituent part in this government until the big strikes of 
June/July 1975. The process of bureaucratisation to which we refer in the following lines during this 
period was particularly strengthened. As we will see in the follo-wing sub-section, trade union 
bureaucrats promoted, from the Government, intervention in local "rebel" branches. 
xx This does not want to deny those important trends that appeared within the same Peronist movement 
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to build an alternative "Peronism without Peron". In this sense the case of Vandor was very important. 
xxi This is the case of SMATA C6rdoba, for instance, were the same secretary has been in power since 
1976. 
xxii In the majority of cases, union membership fees are paid directly from the employer to the national 
or central federation of Buenos Aires. 
xxiii As the case of Renault and that of FIAT will show, in periods of enterprise crisis and massive 
layoffs secret negotiations are often held between management representatives and union leaders in 
order to "satisfactorily" arrange the situation. In these cases it is not uncommon that the union could 
accept the company plans in exchange for benefits and cash for individuals at the top of the 
organisation. 
xxiv This is for instance the case of Mc Donald's workers that, despite the anti-union practices globally 
adopted by the enterprise, affiliate to the union and to its Obras Sociales for the social security package 
provided (Ghigliam 2002). 
xxv "Para nosotros, la vuelta de Per6n era la vuelta de la decencia y la digmdad para los que 
trabajamos, sacarnos la pata del patr6n de encima, era la vuelta de la felicidad, era el final de tanta 
tristeza y tanta amargura que habia en los millones de hombres del pueblo, era el fin de la 
persecucl6n.... "(James 1990, p. 128). 
xxvi "El sindicalista debe luchar con todas sus convicciones, todas sus fuerzas para cambiar el sistema. 
El dirigente sindical debe saber que pese a una "buena economia" si no hay una justa distribuci6n de la 
riqueza la explotac16n prosigue. Y por lo tanto debe luchar por la liberac16n social. El dirigente debe 
saber que jamds habrd buenos convemos de trabajo con una economia del pais supeditada a los 
monopollos. Y por lo tanto debe luchar por la liberaci6n nacional"(In James 1990, p. 307) 
xxvii Fiat workers did not even participate in the C6rdobazo. 
xxvill It is interesting to note the similarities between C6rdoba and the C6rdobazo and that of Turin, 
approximately in the same period, during the so called "Hot Autumn". In both cases we have young 
migrant workers, living in new neighbourhoods near the plants and that were at their first experience of 
work in a car factory. These common backgrounds, among other factors, certainly produced a class 
conscious identity and the potential for rebellion and radicalisation. In the case of FIAT/Turin, in 
particular, the change of production system and working rhythms that occurred at that time contributed 
to unify the demands of the "old" skilled workers with those of the "new" unskilled migrants. See 
Castronovo (1999) and for a militant perspective Balestrini (1977). 
xxix It was not uncommon to work in a factory and study part-time. 
xxx "... cambio' totalmente la vida en la fabrica. Los delegados nos defendian de los jefes frente a 
todos los problemas que surgian en el trabaJo, controlamos los ritmos de producc16n que antes eran 
terribles. En fin, eliminamos el clima opresivo que se vivia en la fabrica y pudimos reivindicar 
nuestros derechos como seres humanos" (in James 1990, p. 306) 
xxxi See for instance the case of Aerolineas Argentinas in Thwaites Rey 1999. 
xxxii "... significa que los que tenemos trabajo estamos cediendo un pedacito de empleo para que otro lo 
tenga o que lo cedemos para no recuperarlo nunca irids y que nada ocurra? " (La voz del Interior, 12 
Oct. 1996) 
xxxiii SMATA, the biggest union in the automotive sector and supporter of the Acuerdo Macro, put 
flexibility into practice signing several collective agreements with the big multinationals of the sector 
and among these with FIAT. 
xxxiv In its original version: "ll sindacato & obiettivamente nient'altro che una societA commerciale, di 
tipo prettamente capitalistico, la quale tende a realiZzare, nell'interesse del proletariato, un prezzo 
massimo per la merce-lavoro ea realizzare il monopolio di questa merce nel campo nazionale e 
internazionale" ("Le masse ei capi", Ordine Nuovo 30 Ottobre 192 1) in Gramsci 1969, p. 501-504. 
xxxv A detailed analysis of this mobilisation in Cangiano (1998). 
xxx\, i At the same time the lowest levels in many of these societies have been occupied by an 
increasing number of immigrants that because of their illegal status or of their conditions of legality 
dependent on a formal "job" do not easily mobilise. 
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Chapter 4: Dynamics of mobilisation, injustice and 
solidarity 
1. Introduction. 
The cases presented in this research analyse two mobilisations that 
occurred in the city of C6rdoba, in Argentina during the period from 
September 1996 to May 1997. Three different factory occupations have 
represented workplace conflict, two in the FIAT Ferreyra plant and one in 
the Renault Santa Isabel industrial complex. These cases could probably 
be seen as examples of workers' resistance to the policies of labour 
flexibility introduced by the neo-liberal government at that time in power 
in the country. During the last decade Argentina has shown a consistent, 
popular opposition to the effects, in terms of job losses, unemployment, 
underemployment and social marginalisation, produced by the waves of 
privatisation of fonner public companies and by capital restructunng in a 
globallsed dependent economy. Within this context we have to place our 
analysis of these cases. 
At the same time, mobilisations cannot be explained just as the result of 
external influences on the workplaces. The change in the objective reality 
surrounding workers, corresponded to a change in workers' subjectivity 
and the ways in which they processed the new situations of precariousness 
and benefit reduction, included in the flexible contracts. This can explain 
differences in the process of mobilisation. As shown in the theoretical 
157 
chapter, there are certain circumstances in which macro changes in the 
external reality activate subjects, allowing them to contest the fluidity and 
inevitability of social relations forinerly taken for granted and reproduced. 
The research aims to shed more light into these complex relations. 
In the case of FIAT, we have a group of workers not used to conflict, with 
a high level of income, especially compared with the rest of workers in the 
country, with expectations of growth in their careers within the company 
and in society as well. The objective reality they were facing before the 
conflict was that of security and stability. But the unfavourable conditions 
included in the new collective agreement they were forced to accept faced 
them with a harsh and unexpected reality in which even the reference 
points, the company and the union, of their previous industrial relations 
environment were momentarily absent. Within this context of change and 
attack on their rights, workers found a powerful ally in solidarity. The 
same people that for years had maintained themselves in the comforts of 
the island of welfare their employment could offer, changed with the new 
conditions they had to face. The situation and the action that followed it, 
forged the process through which compaherismo (a fair relation with their 
fellows workers in the same line) became active solidarity. Company 
repression, government opposition and a bureaucratic union boycott 
pushed a conflict for better wages and defence of workers' dignity into a 
choice of passive acceptance or resistance. Conflict evolved in these 
circumstances and its intensity followed the level of radicalisation and 
socio-political consciousness workers developed in the context of local 
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and national labour struggles. One year after the conflict started, 1200 out 
of 1700 workers lost their jobs. 
In the case of Renault as well workers had to face the implementation of a 
set of "flexible" measures that negatively affected their previous working 
and salary conditions. But while in the case of FIAT these changes were 
introduced abruptly and unleashed strong mobilisation out of union and 
company control, in the case of Renault, workers experienced a prolonged 
deterioration of their conditions. The workforce was reduced selectively 
and with the use of incentive schemes, entire sections were outsourced to 
external companies with new employment conditions for those workers 
that could maintain their posts. In few years Renault, in complicity with 
the business union SMATA, effectively introduced all the organisational 
changes necessary to make the company more profitable. This strategy 
helped to keep conflict under control. Workers did mobilise to occupy the 
plant, and genuinely supported an oppositional and more militant stance 
within the union, but the divisions among them provoked by company 
strategy and the unsuccessful attempt to win control of the union, broke 
solidarity and any possibility of conflict radicalisation. 
The two cases are certainly asymmetrical, at least with regards to the 
outcome of conflict, with the case of Renault occupYing the negative (as 
the place where mobilisation not always happened in an open forin. and 
radicalisation did not occur) side in the analysis that will follow. Problems 
in companng the two cases may be expected because to explain what did 
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not happen is much more difficult than to establish differences among 
similar sets of events. However this thesis aims to provide empirical 
evidence for a critical evaluation of conceptual categories included in the 
mobilisation theory (injustice, solidarity, leadership) rather than to set 
differences in the types and models of possible mobilisations. Due to this, 
Renault has been considered and has to be seen as control rather than a 
classical comparative case. 
In the same line of argument and because of the asymmetry mentioned 
n, k auove, we may have been tempted to look at the case of FIAT as a sort of 
pure or authentic mobilisation and consequently to treat the other case as a 
deviation from an assumed rule. This interpretation has to be avoided. But 
undoubtedly the case of FIAT has the advantage of offering a perspective 
on an entire process of mobilisation and counter mobilisation and this 
broader view puts clearly the evidence for each period of conflict, the 
causes that generated it, the role played in it by solidarity and leadership, 
and the relations between repression and workers' radicalisation. Thus the 
point that should be made is not on the differences between pure and less 
pure cases of mobilisation but rather on those factors that hamper a 
process of mobilisation and whose presence or absence detennine 
different outcomes of the same process. This interpretation does not 
necessarily represent a "workenstli preference but is just the evidence that 
certain factors have had a profound influence on the possibility of workers 
mobilising in similar ways, in the two cases. 
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Following these considerations we can identify company and bureaucratic 
unionism as those factors whose material presence or absence has 
hampered or facilitated mobilisation. In this sense Renault is "presence" 
and FIAT "absence". In the first case, company strategy deliberately 
aimed to dilute the conflict introducing outsourcing, flexible working 
conditions and reduction of personnel during the years previous to the 
occupation of the plant. The bureaucratic union SMATA supported this 
strategy covertly and rode the wave of protests that workers at Renault 
were demonstrating since the beginning of the process of company 
restructuring. But as in other historical cases, official unionism co-opted 
internal opposition and maintained a strong control of grass roots 
movements. In the case of FIAT, the company and the bureaucratic union 
momentarily disappeared and left room for the process of workers' 
solidarity fon-nation and for an anti-bureaucratic leadership to emerge. 
The company, changing the contract so abruptly and so unfavourably, lost 
the value it had in the view of many workers. Union delegates in the plant 
were considered traitors. The foriner pillars of paternalistic industrial 
relations at FIAT, those factors that maintained workers' protests under 
control in the years before the conflict, collapsed simultaneously. The 
vacuum of power created, produced in turn a space for the process of 
solidarity formation to continue and, with it, an apparently inevitable 
system of beliefs and rules to be contested. This moment represented a 
watershed in workers' consciousness, they acknowledged that their 
struggle was part of a bigger movement resisting neo-liberalism, they 
regained a space for discussion, for decisions, and for politics. 
161 
In the case of Renault, the system to control workers' grievances and 
prevent any forms of open conflict with the company was always firmly in 
place. As explained earlier, opposition to labour flexibility started two 
years before the mobilisation here analysed occurred. Workers genuinely 
supported a renewal in the union leadership, at Renault and in 
Volkswagen the opposition slate won the elections, but their hopes for a 
more militant union changed to frustration and impotence when the 
bureaucracy co-opted the former opposition leader into the union 
apparatus. 
The emphasis on this "genetic" difference is also fundamental to 
understanding how mobilisations have occurred and the way we 
understand the role played by solidarity and leadership. These examples 
will show that mobilisation has emerged out of a process in which 
solidarity was a crucial element. While agreeing with a commonly 
accepted view that, almost by its very nature, collective action cannot be 
understood without a minimum level of solidarity, the emphasis on this 
latter helps us to understand how in the two cases the same factors have 
differently affected mobilisation, increasing or reducing the room for the 
process of solidarity fonnation. 
The chapter is organised as follow. The first part, introduced by the 
chronology of the conflict, describes the companies and the unions 
involved in the cases and looks for possible preconditions of mobilisation. 
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The second part, subdivided in four subsections, focuses on the processes 
of mobilisation trying to show from the analysis of their dynamics, how 
differently workers perceive injustice thus calling for a re-evaluation of 
the role of solidarity within mobilisations. Due also to the above 
mentioned asymmetry between the cases and at the way solidarity has 
been conceptualised, in the chapter the comparison is constructed around 
thematic areas rather than on fixed rules and strict parallels between the 
cases, this maintains a constant dialectic with the theory. A final 
comparative section concludes the chapter, that has been written fusing 
narrative descriptive accounts of what happened with in-depth analyses. 
This approach probably adapts better to the study of a social process, 
maintains stronger relations between facts and theories and also follows 
on to the way data has been collected. 
2. The context: 
a) The chronology of conflict 
Table one. - the chronology of conflict 
Sept. 1995: FIAT/SMATA collective agreement. 
18 th Sept. 1996: CORMEC's workers sign the new contract with FIAT 
AUTO 
19-25 Sept. 1996: First FIAT's plant occupation. 
26 Sept. 1996: National General Strike. 
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18-24 Nov. 1996: Renault's factory occupation. 
16 Jan. 1997: Creation of FIAT's independent union SITRAMF. 
22-25 Jan. 1997: Second FIAT's plant occupation. 
18 May 1997: FIAT's mobilisation leader is fired. 
The research embraces a period of industrial conflict of approximately one 
year, from September 1996 to 1997, during which three open 
mobilisations in the form of factory occupations occurred, two at FIAT 
and one at Renault. 
The FIAT Ferreyra industrial complex, historically the most important 
hub of company activities in Argentina, until 1994 hosted an engine 
factory employing almost 2000 workers. Following the decision of the 
company to increase its investments in Argentina, a new assembly plant 
was built in the same industnal area. This plant, a copy of the one existing 
in Melfi, Southern Italy, had to be at the forefront of technology and work 
organisation, including a full set of "flexible" employment practices. Due 
to the new production methods the company wanted to introduce (broadly 
speaking a lean production model that included kaizen, just in time and 
team working), an harmonisation, in terms of working time and salaries, 
between the old engine factory and the new assembly factory had to be 
achieved. With this objective in mind, on the 
181h of September 1996 
workers employed in the engine plant were forced to sign an agreement in 
which they accepted dismissal by CORMEC (the legal name of the engine 
plant owned by the FIAT group) and currently employed by FIAT AUTO, 
within the conditions of the new collective agreement subscribed one year 
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earlier by FIAT with SMATA, the biggest national union in the 
automotive sector. When workers the day after discovered that they were 
losing almost 50% of their previous salaries, they reacted spontaneously 
occupying the plant and at the same time derecognising the union intemal 
commission. 
After six days of occupation and with the risk that the case could become 
nation wide known example of labour flexibility (on the 261hof September 
FIAT's workers were among the protagonists of the local demonstrations 
organised for the national strike against Menem's labour reforins), the 
company, with the mediation of local Government, finally reached an 
agreement with its workers, who forinally accepted a reduction of their 
salary by approximately 10%. 
In the following months conflict remained simmered beneath the surface 
with the company trying to oppose the formation of a new workers' 
representation with any means possible. In January, a moment of low 
production in Argentina, a new factory occupation occurred, this time 
provoked by the decision of the company to fire a workers' delegate on the 
basis of its low productivity rate. The success of this mobilisation was 
partial, the local authority settled the dispute in favour of the company, 
and it signalled the decline of grassroots mobilisation. Conflicts did not 
disappear: there were acts of sabotage, disruption of production, and 
partial strikes. But the company was in the meanwhile undermining the 
material bases for collective action and this forced the majority of workers 
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to accept voluntary retirement and isolated the most militant of them. 
In November 1996, probably on the wave of FIAT's events, Renault's 
factory was occupied. The company implemented over two years a 
programme to reduce its labour force. Workers were first suspended (but 
remained employed with a reduced salary) due to scarcity of production 
and later on reincorporated. In this process hundreds lost their jobs with 
union complicity. Groups of suspended workers mobilised against the 
company and contested the union's leadership, oppositional leaders 
emerged. This situation represented the background for the mobilisation 
that occurred in November when the union, forced by its internal 
opposition, decided to occupy the plant as a protest against the decision of 
the company to outsource the entire section of maintenance to an external 
provider. After five days an agreement was reached, but soon started 
covert negotiations that left things unchanged. In the meanwhile the local 
union internal opposition, although successful in the big factories, lost the 
election for the renewal of charges within the organisation and settled an 
agreement with the former leadership. Opposition ended in the Renault 
factory and with it any possibility of alliances among the automobile 
workers of the city. 
b) The unions 
As previously mentioned, the Argentine labour law regulated the issue of 
trade unions' representation through the recognition of one trade union for 
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each industrial sector or economic activity. The ministry of labour is the 
only authority that can give the legal status of trade union to a free 
association of workers. People can freely associate but this is not a 
condition sufficient to defend their rights. In practice the legal system 
implies that despite the high degree of representation a certain 
organisation could have reached among a group of workers, the power to 
act as legitimate defendant (in court, arbitration, collective bargaining and 
at the workplace) of the same group against the employer is dependent on 
a political decision. In fact the ministry of labour, through the recognition 
of the so called personeria gremial, does not perform a purely 
administrative task since its decision is normally opposed to the national 
trade union that historically represented a certain category of workers. 
This regulation, which in practice denied the freedom of association, is 
part of the labour law system created by Peron. The aim was to support 
the institutionalisation of trade unions, both tightening their activities and 
demands to the political objectives of Peronism and subordinating unions' 
leadership to a personal loyalty to Peron. 
The Law that regulates trade unions' representation (Ley de Associaciones 
Professionales)', has been one of the most important pieces of legislation 
on the basis of which trade unions' political power has been alternately 
strengthened and weakened. Behind the decision of the ministry of labour 
to recognise or deny the personeria gremial there have often been national 
political struggles. This is the case with Frondizi's government's decision 
in 1958 to allow the creation of plant unions, for instance with FIAT's 
167 
SITRAC and SITRAM and later Perkins's SITRAP, as a way of 
weakening the financial power and numerical strength of SMATA and 
UOM in the key automotive sector. Another UCR (Union Civica Radical) 
goven-iment, that of Illia, in 1964 gave the personeria gremial to FIAT's 
plant unions. But in other cases government's decision has been targeted 
to balance the power between two existing unions competing for the same 
category of workers. Particularly in new and potentially expanding 
industrial activities, trade unions' competition over the issue of 
representation in the sector was fierce. Automotive production could not 
be easily and neatly classified since it included within the same factory 
many different activities and skills: from assembly to maintenance, from 
the work in the foundry and soldering to the construction of seats and 
internal instruments. When the first companies in the sector started to 
operate in the middle of the 1950's, two unions could potentially claim the 
representation, SMATA and UOM. SMATA at that time was a very small 
union whose members were mainly employed in garages and mechanical 
repair shops. UOM was one of the most important and powerful unions 
within the CGT and represented workers in the metallurgical sector which 
had increased in number as a consequence of the process of 
industrialisation promoted, in particular, during Peron's decade. After the 
military putsch overthrew Peron in 1955, one of the first decisions of the 
new minister of labour was to recognise SMATA as the union 
representative for the automotive sector and this as both a way to 
financially undermine UOM and to curd its influence and capacity to 
mobilise among automotive workers (at that time this latter union was one 
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of the leaders in the so called resistencia peronista). In 1971, under the 
presidency of Gen. Lanusse, the government decided, with pressure from 
the company, to de-recognise the personeria gremial of FIAT's SITRAC 
and SITRAM since their clasista and anti-bureaucratic leadership was an 
element of social instability in the city of Cordoba and a national, and 
potentially dangerous example of workers' self-determination (Duval 
2001). In 1974, with the union bureaucracy in the government, local 
clasista unions such was SMATA in Cordoba and UOM in Villa 
Constitution, despite their high level of representation among the workers, 
were de-legitimised and their executive committees substituted for more 
"in line" delegates (Brennan 1994). After the last military dictatorship, the 
Alfonsin government tried to introduce more democracy within the 
unions,, as we have mentioned before, but it did not challenge the 
monopoly each union had in its own "historical" sector. Menem, despite 
his partial success in the reform of the labour law system, did not 
substantially touch the Ley de Associaciones Professionales. He needed 
the traditional unions' political power as a support for his anti-labour 
social economic reforms, and the introduction of more democracy in the 
workplace would have meant reducing the influence of union bureaucrats 
on the labour force and with this increasing the chances of grassroots 
movements in opposition to the govemment's policies. 
These historical examples are important to understand workers' 
representation at FIAT and Renault in 1996 during the mobilisation that 
occurred in both plants. In the case of FIAT in particular, the historical 
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antagonism between UOM and SMATA created a vacuum of power in 
representation giving space to an anti-bureaucratic reaction. In the events 
following the first occupation of the plant, a new leadership was elected 
and was recognised by the workers as the only legitimate representative of 
their interests. After several attempts to obtain from SMATA legal 
recognition of the new representation as an independent part of the same 
union, workers massively voted for the constitution of an independent 
union, SITRAMF", which was never legitimised by the government 
through the personeria gremial. Based on this "non legitimacy" the union 
and its leaders were never accepted by the company who, although forced 
to deal with workers' delegates to maintain discipline in the plant, never 
officially recognised the new entity. 
After the experience with plant unions that transformed themselves in a 
few years from "yellow" to clasista and with SMATA under a clasista 
leadership, FIAT in 1974 supported UOM claims to workers' 
representation and until 1996 this latter union was the only legitimate one 
in FIAT's plants in Argentina. When the company planned to increase its 
investment in the country through the establishment of a new high 
technology plant, negotiation with the UOM started for a new collective 
agreement that had to implement flexible working conditions in the labour 
process and consistent reductions in salaries and benefits. An agreement 
was reached but the union general assembly decided not to ratify it. FIAT 
offered the same agreement to SMATA, who accepted becoming the 
legitimate partner of FIAT in one of the first flexible collective 
170 
agreements in the industrial sector in Argentina. Similar agreements were 
signed in the same year by the same union with other automotive 
producers. It is important to recall that in 1995 when the agreement was 
signed, UOM was starting to oppose Menem's labour policies. 
Nonetheless, the union supported his presidential campaign during the 
same year, but soon after the re-election the same union started to lead a 
critical opposition to the government from within the CGT. In the country 
as a whole a situation of social unrest was already emerging as a 
consequence of privatisation of state enterprises, the increase in 
unemployment and the precariousness of jobs, the flexible agreement with 
FIAT was in contradiction with the opposition of the union. At the same 
time SMATA was openly in favour of the govemment, and with the 
arrival of new investments in the automotive sector, its position in the 
CGT would increase with the potential of new jobs that the new plants 
would have generated. 
Before 1996, when the new plant was inaugurated, FIAT's presence in 
Argentina consisted of an engine factory employing almost 2000 workers 
with a contract, signed with UOM in 1975 and updated in the following 
years, which in ternis of benefits and salaries was considered among the 
best in the whole industrial sector. The new agreement signed by the 
company with SMATA was considerably worse than the previous one. 
The first obvious difference was in the salaries, reduced to half together 
with a general reduction or suppression of other benefits and allowances: 
holidays, extra time, study leave, and job categories. But most 
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importantly, and less obviously, the new agreement changed the working 
week reducing, by a decision of the company, the normal working day and 
imposing extra time on Saturdays and Sundays to make up for lost time. 
Although this agreement was signed with the aim of implementing it in 
the new plant with a new labour force, the company, because of the 
fabbrica integrata .. (integrated factory) production model, was clearly 
obliged to homogenise its workforce both in terms of salary conditions 
and production practices. This process was not so easy since workers in 
CORMEC, the engine plant FIAT owned in Cordoba, had to be convinced 
to accept the unfavourable conditions included in the new collective 
agreement. As far as the new union was concerned, workers really did not 
matter because it was imposed on them by the law, they had no possibility 
of changing it and FIAT's workers had no interest in the union as the low 
membership rate at UOM (10% of the workforce) showed. 
The change from CORMEC to FIAT AUTO with the new collective 
agreement is fundamental to understanding why workers mobilised and a 
new anti bureaucratic leadership emerged. In the case of Renault, a change 
of contract, company name and union were not at stake and SMATA has 
always been in charge of workers in the Renault plants. Also, in this case 
a mobilisation and an anti-bureaucratic reaction occurred but with 
different motivations, without the emergence of an independent form of 
unionism and these factors did not give space to further radicalize the 
conflict. 
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UOM and SMATA have often competed for the representation of workers 
in the automotive sector and for their influence in the CGT but interviews 
reveal that FIAT's and Renault's workers were not really interested in the 
way their unions were managing labour relations. This is particularly true 
for the case of FIAT , in which workers' exclusive claim was for better 
wages. Opposition to the internal commission was dangerous since those 
who were critics or wanted to raise the need for different union strategies 
could easily be fired with the company's complicity. The foremen were 
used to teaching new workers how to behave in case of trade union 
mobilisation: 
"Look, here people move in this way: if there is an assembly stay in the 
middle, don't be thefirst and don't be the last... you are new... and don't 
stay in the plant". The same foremen told you to go and not to stay to 
maintain good relations with the union "'(FIAT production worker 32). 
Workers did not participate easily in solidarity strikes, people working at 
FIAT were considered as individualist and even within the plant there was 
a general apathy for all that was somehow related with "hacer o meterse 
en el lio "' 
This apathy for direct participation in union affairs could be related to 
many factors. As previously stated the last military dictatorship could 
have played an important role in this sense. But it is also true that the way 
the union was managed, its complicity with the company and the 
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impossibility of changing the leadership, not even at plant level, have 
discouraged workers from participation. In addition to this, a consistent 
group of them over the years became increasingly more interested in their 
own salary and stability of their employment than in collective issues. 
Many workers who participated in the creation of the anti -bureaucratic 
SITRAC went, after that democratic experience was repressed, through 
many years of bureaucratic unionism, military repression and market 
crises that consistently affected their non-participation. In summary we 
could consider all this as apparent evidence that before mobilisation there 
was no solidarity but, as specified in the theoretical chapter, if we think of 
solidarity as a process there is no contradiction in considering it as the 
basis of collective action. 
At the time of the conflict, in September 1996, there was a generally 
discredited view of the union in the plant and at national level. UOM 
represented the paradigmatic example of the orthodox Peronist union and 
of its two contradictory positions, being both a national political actor as 
well as a counterpart to management in the workplace. Its permanent 
leader, Lorenzo Miguel, had been in charge of the union since 1970, and 
over all these years, he changed his political position many times 
depending on which government was in charge and his influence in the 
labour movement. The opinion Renault workers had of SMATA was no 
different as we can see from the following quotations: 
yyft "The union has been bought, it laid off more than the companY , they 
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seem lambs but are wolves " (Renault maintenance worker, n. 12), "1 could 
also tell you about the union but I don't know in what way this can be 
useful for you [ ... 
]we don't trust too much in the union, they are all 
bought off'. "the union on one side was defending us and on the other 
side was smashing our head" (Renault production worker, n. 10), "the 
union is a conniver and permanently in power", "is like the mafla, not 
more and not less". "the same people that were in the union with the 
military continue in the leadership of the union, it is the mafla "( Renault 
production worker n. 8). " 
SMATA national leader, Jose' Rodriguez, has been in charge of the union 
since 1972 and ha stands accused by a Gennan tribunal of the 
disappearance of workers in the Mercedes Benz plant during the last 
dictatorship. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the combination of the legal system and 
the bureaucratic style of unionism contributed to creating among workers 
in both plants a discredited image of the unions. Together with these 
factors, the inheritance from the last military dictatorship and the fear of 
losing a comparatively well-paid job, could have increased workers 
apathy for participation in collective issues. Other factors have certainly 
contributed to mobilise workers, too. If it is true that there was, at that 
time, a generalised apathy for participation, the fact that a strong 
mobilisation occurred, especially in the case of FLAT, invites us to look 
for other deten-nining factors as part of the same process of collective 
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action. It is possible to argue that a combination of relevant factors has 
both contributed to won workers' apathy for participation but also has 
mobilised them. Therefore, the next section is dedicated to an introduction 
to the companies object of the case studies, to look at the way 
management has historically established its relations with the workforce. 
c) The companies 
FIAT is the top Italian industrial group with its core business in car 
production. The same family has always owned the company and it 
represents a still successful model of early Italian industrial capitalism. 
Probably for these reasons FIAT directed its strategies to the global 
market later than other competitors, it has maintained a highly centrallsed 
and vertical chain of command and a rigorous managerial style. In the last 
decades FIAT's previous centralised structure, both in tenns of production 
factories and decision processes, has shifted toward a more geographically 
decentralised and intemally flexible organisation. During the 1980's the 
company opened new highly technologically advanced factories in the 
South of Italy that could be considered as sorts of laboratories, 
experiments in adapting Japanese practices (and the related work 
organisation) to the specific Italian reality (Camuffo and Volpato 1995). 
This process of innovation culminated in the 1990's with the Melfi plant, a 
new plant in the South of Italy, where technological innovation, 
flexibility, lean production, Japanese practices and a, consistently, new 
collective agreement, have been jointly implemented under the label of 
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fabbrica integrata (integrated factory). 
In this context of change, labour relations at FIAT seem to have moved, at 
least in the management rhetoric, from a conflictual to a more 
participative approach, at both national and local levels. The company has 
for decades followed anti- or non-union policies and this has certainly 
contributed to increasing the conflict at plant level within a general 
political instability at national level. Over the years, the company has 
been, to some extent, more oriented toward participation and co-operation 
with unions. "' But the economic and financial crisis that the company is 
currently suffering, and the need to reduce labour costs, has shifted labour 
relations once again toward forms of management unilateralism. 
Nonetheless two trade union federations (UILM and FIM) signed in 2003 
an agreement with the company and the government to soften job losses, 
while massive mobilisations opposed the company's plans in all the 
Italian factories. FIAT's readiness to recognise a more active role for 
unions and workers in the management of everyday life in the plant is 
debatable and this not just because economic crisis and job losses often 
increase the distance of rhetoric from reality. Huge differences between 
green-field and brown field sites, and between Italian and foreign 
operations still exist (Bonazzi 1994, Rieser 1997, Meardi 2000). 
FIAT is a company that has strong legacies from its past , its own "genetic 
code" and its peculiar characteristics. This is particularly evident in the 
case of labour relations. In the history of the company, management work 
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force relations have followed four main patterns: paternalist in the 1950's, 
adversarial during the 1970's and part of the 1960's, management 
unilateralism in the 1980's. oriented to participation. The strength of these 
historical models goes probably beyond their simple embeddedness in the 
company's culture or in some sort of "country of origin effect""" if it is 
true, as recognised by FIAT's top industrial relations manager, that they 
represent core competences of the company (Camufflo e Massone 2001). 
This logic allows FIAT and its labour relations specialists to flexibly use 
historical and Italian patterns of relations with organised labour, or a 
combination of them, within the particular local context of legislation and 
the unions' strength. FIAT is a company that has adapted quickly to 
organisational, technological and geographical changes but which 
constantly exploits labour relations codes of practice, prejudices, 
experiences, mentalities, profoundly related to the history of the company 
and, to a certain extent, to Italian industrial labour history. 
These specific characteristics of the company and its labour relations style 
seem confirmed in the Argentine case. FIAT established its presence in 
the country in 1954 by buying a state-owned tractor plant in Ferreyra, a 
suburb of Cordoba. The company gradually expanded its activities to the 
construction of industrial vehicles, cars, and railway equipment until, in 
1982, when, as a consequence of an economic crisis, it consistently 
reduced its investments in Argentina. In 1988, FIAT bought its former 
engine plant in Ferreyra from Sevel, an Argentine business group which 
was producing FIAT cars under a license agreement. In 1994 the company 
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started to build, with consistent financial support of local and national 
governments, a new highly automated plant to be integrated with the 
engine plant and in order to develop in Ferreyra and in South America its 
second production hub after Brazil. During all these years the company 
passed through different economic situations and market crises but it 
constantly maintained unchanged the paternalistic model of labour 
relations introduced since 1954. 
In 1996, was the pride of being part of the familia (FIAT family) the 
company's leit-motive. This was echoed in the social events organised for 
the workers during Christmas and other important holidays, or in the 
public speeches, or in the football competitions between different 
production lines of the plant. The Industrial Relations director was the 
president of a foundation that provided workers' children with 
scholarships and awards for advancement in their studies, the company 
had penneated workers' lives until the point that the majority of people 
were wearing the FIAT camiseta (shirt). There was a diffused sense of 
satisfaction among workers of being employed by FIAT and the 
expectation of further growth, as the construction of new plant 
demonstrated, also contributed to this feeling. People in the CORMEC 
plant were empowered, new courses were provided and career 
opportunities were offered for those who wanted to be leaders in the new 
production processes the new plant had to introduce. Workers were 
profoundly involved by the discourse of the company, they were feeling 
themselves to be part of a powerful company within which they could 
179 
develop professionally and socially. This "ideological" work was put 
forward through the foremen and in the local television channels, but was 
also part of more explicit activities that professional psychologists carried 
out among workers. In the years that preceded the introduction of the new 
FIAT/SMATA contract, workers were paid to attend group and individual 
psychological sessions set up to convince them that whatever the salaries 
they were going to receive, they should be satisfied with the possibility of 
maintaining employment in such a prestigious multinational company. 
Despite workers' suspicions about the psychologists, FIAT's ideological 
action was successful in building confidence in the future and the 
expectation of growth. On the one hand, workers had no other view of the 
reality than that offered by the company especially within a generallsed 
apathy against participation. On the other hand, people at FIAT were 
living in an island of peace and prosperity both in terms of employment 
conditions and of future expectations. 
"At FIAT we were enjoying the summer but it wasn't like this for the 
workers in the casting sector and people were not aware of this, like a 
person who stays in his island [ ... 
] he doesn't want people to 
move "(FIAT worker formerly employed in the casting sector). ix 
Renault workers, compared with those of FIAT, in the years before the 
conflict were living under rather unsatisfactory conditions. The company 
changed its name to CIADEA and the ownership was acquired by national 
investors at the beginning of the 1990's who started a process of 
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workforce reduction and outsourcing. In particular, the company adopted 
a strategy of outsourcing of production sections or of complementary 
services. The change of ownership produced a redefinition of the 
employment contract to worse terms with a consistent number of 
redundancies in each operation of outsourcing'. When Renault became 
again in 1998 the owner of the plant, people employed were now reduced 
by half and production was limited just to the assembly of vehicles whose 
parts were imported from Brazil. It is possible that Renault became 
CLkDEA just to implement employees' reductions. The development of 
events gives credibility to workers' opinions of this as recorded in the 
interviews. Renault has a long-established presence in Cordoba that dates 
back to 1954. First as IKA (Industrias Kaiser Argentina) and then as 
Renault in 1967, the company represented the biggest industrial complex 
of the city both in terms of the number of workers employed and the 
importance of automobile production. In the plants the union has always 
been SMATA and workers suspected a union/management pact for 
outsourcing activities and were not confident in the leadership. Despite the 
common opinion FIAT and Renault workers showed of the bureaucracy of 
their unions , in this 
latter case was an anti-bureaucratic reaction and an 
oppositional stance internal to the union emerged before the conflict. The 
two companies were experiencing two different periods in the 
development of their industrial activities. FIAT was able to create 
expectations and promote enthusiasm among its workers for the 
perspective new plant and Renault was clearly going In a direction of 
labour flexibility. 
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In conclusion, the two cases of mobilisation have to be seen as the result 
of two different situations in terms of the companies' labour flexibility 
policies. In the case of FIAT, management promoted a sense of workers' 
identification with the company by the ideological action of raising 
expectations of personal growth and career development as a consequence 
of the new investment. These ideas were put forward through the use of 
psychological interventions within a managerial plan structured well in 
advance to convince workers to accept the unfavourable conditions of the 
new FIAT/SMATA agreement. The success of this plan could be also 
attributed to workers' apathy for participation in union affairs the basis of 
which could be found in the inheritance from of the military dictatorship, 
in the bureaucratic style of unionism and in the impossibility, 
strengthened by the company during the years, of real and democratic 
unionism within the plant. In the case of Renault, the company's plans 
were evident well before the mobilisation and there was no expectation of 
growth. These circumstances were evident to workers who reacted 
defensively, supporting an anti-bureaucratic opposition internal to 
SMATA. But what they thought of as a new authentically representative 
leadership to defend their rights against the company and to defeat the 
weak and compromised leadership tumed out to be part of the same 
bureaucratic business system. 
Paradoxically, as can be seen from the table below, preconditions seemed 
to be much more favourable to mobilisation in the case of Renault, where 
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the signs of company restructuring were already evident and a militant 
opposition had already emerged, rather than in the case of FIAT, a 
paternalistic company whose workforce was dominated by apathy for 
collective action and individualism. Thus despite certain preconditions 
which may fertilise the soil for mobilisation, it seems clear that these are 
not sufficient to create the critical mass necessary for action. 
Table two: preconditions for mobilisation 
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3. The process: 
a) Dynamics of mobilisation and perceptions of injustice 
In this subsection is offered a detailed reconstruction of the mobilisations 
(factory occupations) occurring in the two cases analysed. The focus is on 
the way people collectively mobilised, the chronological sequence of the 
events, the reasons that may have justified each action, the role played in 
it by each actor and the differences between the cases, will offer empirical 
evidence to: 
0 Demonstrate the weaknesses of the concept of injustice in the theory 
of mobilisation. 
0 Show which factors have fostered and/or hampered mobilisation. 
0 Reconsider mobilisation as a collective response not always 
organised and lead by a trade union organisation. 
For the clarity of the exposition, the cases are treated separately but the 
preference is for a style mixing narrative descriptions with analytic 
accounts which has often imPlied cross references between the cases. A 
section at the end of the chapter more systematically compares the cases 
along the lines identified as objects of the study. 
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FIAT 
"FIAT signs the new collective agreement with SMA TA. We had a plant 
that had to pass to a new company with salary conditions inferior to the 
ones workers had before [ ... 
] it was very difficult" (FIAT Industnal 
Relations Director, fon-ner REPOV' 
It was really very difficult to convince 2000 workers to accept a reduction 
of their salaries by 50% and to be "flexibilised". This especially if we 
consider that the company had nurtured workers' involvement and had 
produced expectations among them. What to do if none of them signed the 
new agreement? FIAT could not lay off all these people without a bad 
image in the community and the risk of political pressure. The company 
was presenting itself in the media as the employer of 5000 new workers, 
FIAT signalled at that time, technology, innovation, welfare. The internal 
commission of (UOM) never informed workers of the company plans with 
details on the salaries they were going to receive with the new contract 
and always stressed that a reduction was coming but that it was only a cut 
of approximately 10% of their previous salaries. The day before the 
change to the new contract, union delegates invited workers to sign a 
paper in which they received the authorisation of their colleagues to 
negotiate with the company a reduction not more than 10%. The company 
used this paper as the proof of workers' desire to be employed by the new 
company, FIAT Auto. In a note for the press of 18/9/1996, the day of the 
change to the new contract, the emphasis put was on its voluntary 
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character and on the fact that the company valued and positively accepted 
workers' requests and that from that moment on an innovative project in 
the Argentine automotive industry would commence. But in reality the 
change to the new contract was compulsory, workers ignored the new 
conditions included in it, everything came as a surprise even to the day on 
which workers had to sign. 
"The day of the change to the new contract was a secret, we surprised the 
whole factory, everyone" (FIAT Industrial Relations Director, fortner 
REPO). xil 
At the end of each shift workers were called one by one into an office with 
two doors, one for entering and the other for exiting, and inside there were 
a lawyer, a representative from the personnel office (REPO) and two 
guards waiting. Two options were available: resign from CORMEC and 
accept the new flexible contract with FIAT or be laid off, in both cases 
with payment of legal compensation'iii . No time 
for reflection was 
allowed, the discussion with mates and colleagues at work was 
impossible, the workers who passed through the office were accompanied 
to the gate of the plant by the guards. Most people signed, convinced that 
something could be done in the days after, maybe talking with the union 
delegates, and that signing with FIAT could give them time to become 
aware what the labour market was offenng. In the words of a worker, the 
day of the change to the new contract is described as follows: 
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"One day you came in, they grabbed you, and the boss was telling you not 
to put the machine on and instead you had to go to talk with the REPO 
and he had your resignation and your new contract and you had to sign 
and a guard was standing beside him. Ifyou wanted time to think about it, 
they did not allow it, you had either to stay or to leave. Many in that 
situation signed thinking that after they eould ehange something and 
others did not acceptfrom the beginning and gave up thejob. Ifyou go to 
yourjob that has always been the same andfrom one day to the next they 
tell you that you have to resign and that they will reduce your salary by 
50% and that ifyou do not like it you are laid off [ ... 
j you fteeze, you do 
not have other perspectives, you do not even have the time to think about a 
different job or to invest money in something different" (FIAT worker 
32). x1v 
The day of the change to the new contract and the way it was 
implemented was the spark for the mobilisation that started next day. 
There were a number of factors associated with that compulsory signature 
whose combination produced the basis of mobilisation. Firstly there was a 
surprise: workers were convinced that the new contract did not imply to 
them any substantial reduction in the salary or a change in the working 
practices. Secondly they were feeling impotent and scared at the same 
time in relation to a decision that was against their interests and of which 
they did not know in advance. Thirdly, these feelings transforined 
themselves into a search for those responsible for their condition: the 
company and the union. 
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"We hated both the company and the union bureaucrats. The occupation 
was against the company but we also went to the delegate's houses, we 
wanted to beat them up and destroy their houses. All of them disappeared 
that nightfrom C6rdoba ... ... ... usually it's the bureaucracy that scares us, 
that beats us, but in that case it was the opposite " (FIAT activist 1). " 
The majority of workers were fans of the company, they were wearing the 
FIAT camiseta (shirt), there were people with many years working in the 
plant who were grateful to the company for what they had received in the 
previous years, the money representing just one aspect of the upward 
social mobility they acquired while employed by FIAT. 
"Yes, all of us were wearing it (the shirt). When I was ordered: "do this 
or do that", I have always executed the order, I have always complied 
with the obligations of my work. We were very happy with the situation we 
were living in, we were interested in the productivity of the plant. " (FIAT 
worker 3 1)"'. 
The confidence in the union was somehow compromised because of the 
opinion workers held on union representation. For the same reason, they 
were expecting from the company improvements and job security that 
FIAT had continuously stressed among them: they felt they were an 
essential part of a modernisation process, of an industrial adventure where 
they were among the protagonists. 
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"the company did not stress just aspects ofproduction but also involved 
workers' families in the whole productive process in the big FIAT 
family. We celebrated birthdays for all the children, there were gifts for 
Christmas and New Year, books, paper and stationery for the school, 
it was total involvement notjust in production, it was ideological, for 
me it was terrible because I could see what in reality all this meant and I 
wasfeeling isolated" (FIAT activist 1)". 
After the change to the new contract and in the nightly discussions with 
their families, workers were trying to define their feelings and to give an 
explanation to the situation in which they were living: 
"(the change of contract) broke an entire life project, it destroyed myse4f 
and my family, I could not accept that idea " (member of the independent 
union commission), "you were feeling as though someone had robbed 
you, it is like when you buy a toyfor a kid and when you are going to give 
him, and the kid with all the ex ectations ofplaying with it, you tell him 
"it was notfor you it wasfor someone else" (independent union delegate). 
"In that plant people always worked a lot, production rhythms were very 
high. People worked a lot but they were proud to be employed by that 
company. They did not want to accept this and people felt betrayed, 
assaulted (injured) " (FIAT mobilisation leader). ""i 
The reduction in salary was the most obvious change workers had to 
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accept but it was not the only reason and justification for their reactions. 
What they had earned was considered as an acknowledgement of their 
capacity to work and a sort of company respect for their human qualities. 
They could not tolerate thinking about a different life style, they could not 
accept the company's behaviour, they could not admit a limitation on 
what they saw as their legitimate rights: the wage-effort relationship was 
now unbalanced. 
"We did not like the idea (of the change of contract), because we already 
had a living standard that we did not want to change, moreover, as it is 
for all people, we were aiming to have much more and not to go 
backwards " (FIAT independent union delegate). 
But to focus just on economic relations and consider the violation of rules 
(as in the case of a change of the contract) as a perception of injustice and 
thus the basis of mobilisation is part of a more complex reality. As we will 
see in the case of Renault, workers mobilised against the move of 
maintenance workers to another company with the same salary and 
working conditions. Their definition and perception of injustice was in 
this sense much "milder" than that of FIAT workers? If this is the case we 
should then consider that there are different levels of injustice? These 
questions certainly seem to confirm what was argued in the theoretical 
chapter about the subjective nature of injustice and the impossibility of 
considening it as a central element in a theory of mobilisation. Injustice 
does not exist on its own, it does not have any objective dimension, but it 
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is rather the result of individual perceptions framed within specific social 
and cultural models. 
Problems in the analysis of data considering injustice as the basis of 
mobilisation, appear again while interviewing people who were still 
working in the FIAT plant and who experienced those moments of 
mobilisation. I approached those kinds of people who maintained the 
strongest affection for the company. In their view, there was no injustice 
in the decision of the company to cut their salaries. Nobody was of course 
happy about the changed situation but individually they came to accept 
and justify the new labour conditions. 
"You have to be realist and always stay with the company. You have to be 
fully aware that a company pays a salaryfor the work that a person does 
and you have to agree with those working conditions. I have always been 
on that side, if I do not like it I will not stay. But if at that moment I was 
behind a machine, doing the same thing and earning less than before, I 
could not tell you what I could have done " (FIAT REPO, former 
production worker). "' 
Others stressed the view that their sacrifice was justified by the fact that 
young workers were now entenng the plant and that was an important 
social development for the entire community. The majority of them 
accepted because of the responsibility they had for their families, they 
dared not even think if it was unjust to cut their salaries with a group of 
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people was depending on them. 
"I have a family, I cannot say "well, I give up the job " if there is no other 
option. The point is that I am not alone, depending on me there is a group 
ofpeople. Unfortunately that's the way it is " (FIAT worker 1)". 
Generally it appeared that working in the plant was somehow "addictive" 
for those people who had already spent a number of years in the factory, 
this applied both to FIAT and Renault workers. The rhythms of the 
factory, a certain stability and social recognition during the years, the 
repetitiveness of a life structured around the plant, the development of 
inflexible skills adapted specifically to the production of parts of cars, 
created in many people, including those who initially mobilised, a 
dependency on the factory. 
"The point is that those people that have passed, in practice, a life inside 
the factory maybe do not see things as one who has thought to leave the 
factory. A person that lived inside there, when he goes from the plant to 
the street lookingfor ajob, does not even know how to sell something. He 
structured his life working there and ifyou send him to the corner to sell a 
"Mantecol ", (popular biscuit frequently sold in street kiosks) he does not 
know how to do it " (member of the independent union commission). "' 
In this sense we could say that working in the factory is in itself a 
mechanism that inhibits the possibility for mobilisation and that could 
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explain why people accept reductions of their nghts/salanes. Despite the 
fact that individual workers may perceive a specific situation as unjust, 
their sense of injustice and their possible reactions tend to remain blocked 
by structural constraints (they simply need to maintain the job because no 
alternative options are offered, for the responsibilities of the family, for 
the inadaptability to a working life outside the factory) and the 
impossibility to identify a collective agent. 
The day of the factory occupation, which also corresponded to the 
beginning of mobilisation, workers did not know what to do. They were of 
course feeling uncomfortable with the new situation but action and 
collective solidarity were needed to make explicit their feelings. The 
union delegates disappeared, for the company a non-nal day of work was 
starting, there were no recognised leaders, no organisation, nobody knew 
what to do. People started to work but only for a few hours. 
"The day after we entered the plant and wefound a very strange situation. 
I entered a little bit later, the quality department entered later than others, 
and we had to pass through the plant, there was a very strange 
atmosphere there. People meeting together in all corners, everybody was 
meeting, it was as though the day could not start. We reached the 
changing room but we did not even change, "a mate is saying that we 
have to gather". And it was something spontaneous. We went forward to 
the small square in front of the plant, none of the union delegates was 
there, "this is not what they had told us... someboýv should explain 
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let's go to askfor explanations, let's go and demand some explanations " 
And people went out of the plant in an orderly manner, I think everybody 
was there and they went walking forward, " What is happening? " (FIAT 
worker, Quality Control Department)"" 
The factory occupation was spontaneous, unplanned, and not organised. 
FIAT workers were not used to mobilisation and in the previous years 
they just participated in a few national strikes because were forced to by 
the union. People were used to solve working problems directly with the 
foreman and individually each of them had already accepted the 
conditions of the new contract. Even if the majority did not like it, 
nonetheless they had to accept it. It is just when they met again at work 
that mobilisation started and with it their perceptions of injustice became 
explicit. Workers started to talk, became conscious of what was 
happening, and solidarity emerged within the workplace, and natural 
leaders unified individual feelings. From individual rebellion and 
discussions among groups of workers the wave grew and people occupied 
the plant not knowing what they were doing apart from the fact that they 
needed to understand what was happening. Somebody closed the fence of 
the factory gate violently and mobilisation became occupation, at that 
moment, 
it we were lost, we had no direction, they had hit us very hard, so hard that 
we got crazy, we reached a moment in which we were not thinking, people 
did not want to believe, but it was very resolute " (member of the 
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independent union commission). ""' 
Workers felt violently attacked for many reasons. The reduction of their 
salaries was very large, the change to the new contract was compulsory, 
the company was responsible because it had created expectations among 
them and "old" workers were particularly critical of FIAT because after so 
many years in the plant they should have received more respect. 
"The "old" were maybe more militant because we perceived what was 
happening as unjust. After so many years of work we felt marginalised, 
and that we had no value anymore " (FIAT "old" worker 1)"'. 
The internal union commission had worked against them, the delegates 
were considered as traitors, and there was no organisation through which 
to express their protests. They were feeling abandoned, their dignity as 
human beings damaged and alone and somehow they had to react, to hit 
back. 
it we went directly to fight and it wasn't. They forced you because a 
different solution was not available, theyforcedyou tofight. They make it 
(the change of contract) so compulsory and the salary reduction so drastic 
that it resulted in a very strong blow and you had to repay it with another 
strong blow, no alternative was left" (FIAT worker 32). " 
These conclusions became clear just when they met together and could 
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talk of what they were feeling with the other colleagues. Injustice 
appeared in action, there became explicit. 
Renault 
The dynamics of mobilisation at FIAT were very different from than that 
at Renault and this was somehow connected with the violence of the blow 
perceived by FIAT workers. In the words of one of them: 
"it was a terrible blow and in a very short time. Maybe if we were in the 
situation of Renault which was more gradual ... .... 
but in our case it 
wasn't. They broke us in the middle, they didn't dissolve us, they hit us 
directly and strongly and they broke us in the middle " (delegate of the 
independent union). "" 
In the case of Renault, the mobilisation and the factory occupation that 
occurred a few months after that of FIAT, has to be seen as part of a 
process of company restructuring and workers' protests that had started in 
June 1995. In that month, CLADEA (at that time the Renault plants were 
nominally in the hands of an Argentine investor) decided to suspend 2500 
workers as a measure to reduce costs at a time of market crisis. Within one 
year the company gradually recalled the suspended workers but at the end 
of the process a large number of them was not reintegrated""'. It is in this 
period, that among the suspended workers emerged a militant group who 
opposed the leadership of SMATA, who had been accused of supporting 
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the interests of the company. This militant slate won the union elections in 
the Renault and Volkswagen plants but it was not successful in other 
workplaces. It nonetheless remained an active group with strong support, 
opposed to the SMATA Cordoba pennanent leadership. Under pressure of 
internal opposition and after the events at FIAT, where an anti- 
bureaucratic stance emerged against UOM and SMATA as well, the 
SMATA secretary was forced to mobilise workers through a factory 
occupation. This as a way to oppose the company's decision to outsource 
the maintenance sector and to support workers' claims to remain employed 
by CIADEA. But after the occupation ended and the provincial ministry 
of labour interposed between the union and the company, an agreement 
was reached that in practice opened the doors for the outsourcing of the 
section. 
In the case of FIAT mobilisation was massively supported, it was not 
organised, anti bureaucratic and it was opposed by the company, while in 
the case of Renault people reported the mobilisation as a joda (a joke), 
something not to be taken seriously. Many workers were initially 
sincerely convinced about the reasons for their mobilisation' .., but the 
way the factory occupation was managed by the union and the absence of 
real opposition by the company, produced a diffused scepticism. In the 
opinion of a Renault worker the factory occupation turned to be "a 
politicallunionist agreement both of the union and the company that was 
in some ways arranged, in this sense we, the workers, always have to 
pay " (Renault worker 8). xxix 
198 
The opinion Renault workers had of their union has been discussed 
before, and the occupation of the plant represented another indication of 
the bureaucratic style of SMATA Cordoba at the time of the conflict. 
Another worker, on the basis of his experience in the plant, identified the 
existence of a "union thought or philosophy" (pensamiento sindical), a 
sort of message circulating in the plant and referring to the way people 
had to relate with collective issues , in the following way: 
"the union philosophy (the idea about the collective matters), was not to 
concern yourse4f with the problems of the others, "you take care o your !f 
business and nothing more than this andforget about the others " (Renault 
worker 9). "' 
Here again we can find that apathy and individualism many Renault 
workers alluded to as a consequence of the last military dictatorship in 
their vision of the union. But this point of view was based on the SMATA 
union style which even before the 1996 occupation acted as if it was 
Renault's business partner. Another worker: 
"Many people say that in reality the union and the company arrange 
things among themselves but then say to people different things. It seems 
that it is like this because we didn't gain a thing. We were feeling 
impotent and we couldn't even look for another different solution, with 
diffierent people representing us because the union didn't allow us to do 
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i. t" (Renault Worker 7). "" 
In the case of Renault, the union bureaucracy was pushed to mobilise by 
the pressures of the internal opposition, by the emergence of an anti- 
bureaucratic unionism at FIAT (whose workforce was legally represented 
by SMATA) and by a situation of generalised social unrest in the city and 
in the country. SMATA had to show a certain degree of militancy if it 
wanted to avoid the risk of being bypassed by the rank and file and this 
could explain why mobilisation was provoked. We have seen how union 
bureaucracy in Argentina has often acted in such a way, trying to ride the 
wave of mobilisation and taking advantage of workers' protests to win 
support for its action. 
In the case of Renault , injustice did not emerge because action did not 
take place within the frame of a renewed workers' self-deten-nination. 
Workers were aggrieved by the company's policies but first scepticism 
and then reality showed that a mobilisation led by a bureaucratic union 
was not possible. The sense of injustice did not become explicit. Injustice 
meant the acceptance of an unchangeable situation and transfonned itself 
into impotence, frustration: 
id we were all aware, all ..... unfortunately 
how many "broncas" (anger, 
regrets, sorrow) we had to accept? Thousands and thousands of 
"broncas ". You have to resist and accept it for the family, you have to 
tolerate many things " (Renault worker 12). ""' 
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b) Mobilisation and solidarity: a necessary introduction. 
This subsection, moving on from the evidence provided by the dynamics 
of mobilisation , is concemed with solidarity. First a point should be made 
for a reconsideration of this in the theory of mobilisation. Secondly, 
following what was argued in the theoretical chapter, it reinforces by the 
view of solidarity as a dynamic process. This, in particular, implies 
avoiding a fixed perspective on the concept and consequently the need to 
look for necessary preconditions of it. Solidarity has its basis in human 
cooperation, and its influence on collective action may be best perceived 
by searching for those factors/elements that have altered the process of its 
formation. This search is thus detailed in subsection C. 
The issue of solidarity represents the central point in the understanding of 
a process of mobilisation but, notwithstanding, its importance it does not 
appear explicitly in the theory of mobilisation. Solidarity, contributes to 
strengthening collective identity, is the basis of any collective action and 
is the crucial point in the analysis of the social processes around which a 
mobilisation is constituted and for three main reasons. 
First, solidarity is one of the appearances in the workplace of the basic 
antagonism that confronts capital and labour and often contributes to the 
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identification of two opposed groups, "them" and "us""". While making 
explicit this latter opposition, solidarity is at the same time the first 
evidence of workers' collective interests and the first step in the 
acquisition of a class consciousness, independently of whether it is 
revolutionary or not. Secondly, solidarity, as a manifestation of the 
"them" and "us"' opposition, is the conditio sine qua non collective action 
cannot be produced and/or maintained. The importance of leaders and 
representative organisations in framing workers' protests and in mobilising 
them cannot be understood without a reference to the way solidarity is 
built in the same micro contexts where collective action can be generated. 
Thirdly, the importance of solidarity in the study of collective action lies 
in the analysis of how government and company repression and counter- 
mobilisation breaks, stressing competition and individualism, those 
solidarity links that spontaneously emerge in the workplace among 
workers. 
In the case of Argentina, workers' recognition of the opposition between 
"them" and "us" has been very evident. The important place in society 
that workers, before that as citizens, achieved through Peronism and the 
mobilisation capacities acquired as a result of their role in the Peronist 
political project, certainly contributed to strength the basic, although 
classless in the Peronist ideology, opposition between "them" and "us". 
The historical development of capitalism in Argentina has produced a 
workers' culture, based on a constant identification with previous 
successful mobilisations (as with the Cordobazo) or with previous 
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unsuccessful but milestone struggles (as with the UOM Villa Constituti6n 
and the 1975 strikes). This has contributed to build a certain pride in being 
a worker, to constitute that particular class and a firm belief to be counter- 
posed to the employer in the workplace (Camarero-Pozzi-Schnelder 
2000). But in addition to the workerist heritage of the Peronist era, there is 
also proof, as we have seen (Raimundo 2000), that a culturally clear 
recognition of workers with solidarity and class consciousness, the "us" of 
the opposition, did not have just a direct relation with Peronist culture but 
were also the results of the objective contradiction between this latter, 
with its classless ideology, and the production process. 
Although these historical trends have to be taken into consideration, as 
well as the level of social conflict and radicalisation in Argentina, and 
have certainly influenced the way workers understand themselves within 
the society, they do not say much about the way solidarity is generated in 
the workplace and then transforined into collective action. 
As a general frame for analysis we could look at solidarity from a two- 
stage perspective. On the one hand, we have all those situations that are 
directly related to the production process and to the way companies 
exercise their control of the workforce: for instance, the mutual help of 
workers or groups of them in the achieving the daily production output or 
the sharing of common problems related to authority in the plant. In all 
these cases solidanty seems to emerge spontaneously because people need 
to socialise and to find support for individual problems among those 
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working in the same workplace and under the same conditions. On the 
other hand, solidarity needs to be reinforced and confirmed when and if, a 
stronger action of protest needs to be implemented or strengthened. This 
stage is often the breaking point for workers' solidarity and what emerged 
as a spontaneous consequence of the production process becomes 
insufficient and impossible to maintain against the action of the company 
and of the labour market. The same concept put in the words of an old 
SITRAC activist: 
"solidarity always exists, it is spontaneous. What happens is that 
repression, today the flexibility of labour and yesterday the army, and 
insufficient organisation breaks it up 
This provocative declaration, with its limitations, can be considered as a 
good starting point for the analysis for the following reasons. First, it 
offers a controversial vision based on two opposed extremes: the 
spontaneity of solidarity and an almost natural intervention of repressive 
factors. Second, the alternation of these two extremes and the various 
situations that can emerge in between, introduce a dynamic view of 
solidarity. Third, it also focuses our attention on repressive conditions 
external to the workplace (labour flexibility and the an-ny). Fourth, it gives 
importance to aspects related to organisation and, we could add, 
leadership. The cases of FIAT and Renault help to define more clearly the 
limits to this perspective on solidarity. From the analysis of the 
interviews, questions could be raised both whether solidarity always 
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emerges as a spontaneous product of the social relations within the plant 
and on the factors that help to hamper and/or trigger it. But these 
differences emerge if we look at solidarity in a static way without an 
investigation of the cause/effect nexus. In this sense, we could show that 
in those cases where solidarity did not explicitly appear, the combined 
action of the company, of the labour market, of a bureaucratic union and 
of the economic and political situation has been fundamental. There is in 
other words a set of factors that could be the cause of the 
ineffectiveness/limitation of the action of solidarity which gives the 
impression that, in certain workplaces, there is no solidarity at all. At the 
same time and for the same reasons, there could be situations in which the 
existence of (active) solidarity among a group of workers is overestimated 
and this despite evidence of its pre-existence. Mobilisations do not always 
achieve what unions expected and conversely workers can show 
unexpected levels of cohesion and be able to organise a protest. On the 
basis of the above considerations, looking at solidarity as something 
whose pre-existence has to be somehow proven does not help us to 
understand its role in a case of collective action. The point we should 
stress is that of the dynamic nature of solidarity and the consequence of 
what was stated in the theoretical chapter, we have to analyse it as a 
process whose formation can be differently influenced by internal and 
external factors. Following this, the next section will focus on the various 
moments that have constituted the process of solidarity formation and 
look at the situation before the conflict, at the role played by leadership, at 
the external situation and at people's feelings/justification for collective 
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action. 
c) The process of solidarity formation 
The differences are particularly evident between the cases in the analysis 
of solidarity. By considering the concept as a "process", we have to accept 
that despite there being conditions more favourable in one to the 
emergence of solidarity (for instance previous organisation, class 
consciousness), this may not determine whether people will mobilise. 
Thus in the following analysis attention is put on the process of solidarity 
forination rather than on the search for preconditions. The issue of 
solidarity most explicitly appeared in the interviews with FIAT workers. 
If in this case workers have experienced a sort of "progressive", 
"increasing" sense of the strength of their solidarity, Renault workers 
have , in contrast, experienced a "regression". This negative perception has 
profoundly influenced their accounts which as a result appear less intense 
and full of scepticism, but not less interesting, than those of FIAT 
workers. 
In the case of FIAT we have an heterogeneous group of workers ... v who 
in the last 20 years before the conflict never had a confrontation with the 
company, and were proud of the quality of their job, they were totally 
identified with the company, and were part of the workers' aristocracy 
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who already had a place in society and future plans for a social and 
professional advancement: 
"People were not so much concerned with solidarity ... ... nobody wanted 
to lose anything because we had, compared with workers nationally, a 
good salary and a com rtable position. Those people that were involved Ifo 
in this history, put themselves ......... didn't see that they were losing some 
common interests " (FIAT worker quality department) 
For a worker who entered the plant in 1992: 
"At CORMEC there were no reasons for conflict and not even union 
politics, the assemblies that we did werefoolish, we sat there to smoke a 
joint " (FIAT worker n. 3 1). xxxvil 
In the plant it was even difficult to organise a small protest for better food 
in the cafeteria and solidarity did not emerge because workers had no 
significant complaints about the company. They were well paid, 
production in 93/94 was high, and the company had no interest in raising 
conflict. 
91 there was a high production level, we had to work extra time, the 
company needed workers because it was a moment of high demand in the 
automobile production in Argentina. There was a continuous and strong 
growth and exports to Brazil. This meant that workers were working on 
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three shifts to satisfy that demand. There was no pressure from the 
company, they rather always tried to respect the rules of the collective 
agreement that we had at that time " (FIAT activist 1) 
In addition, the new factory was creating even more expectations. 
Solidarity was at that time compaherismo, nothing more and nothing less 
than a fair relation with the majority of colleagues at work, friendship with 
some of them, and sharing of common social activities outside the factory. 
But this forin of solidarity never gave space for collective action. 
It at that time everything was quiet, we were earning very well and the rest 
was not important. Among us there was companerismo, there were always 
parties, there were always peoplefor this but notfor the struggle " (FIAT 
activist 
The composition of the workforce was also a matter of division among 
workers. A consistent number of them had passed through periods of 
rebellion with the SITRAC, repression from the military government and 
economic instability. This group in particular was a bit sceptical and tired 
of many years of confrontation and was much more oriented to the 
satisfaction of personal and individual goals than to collective 
achievements. These people, in particular, after the 1970's were 
11 a bit tired and at the end we didn't see the objectives that we had as 
workers. Eveo, thing was done or could be obtained. In 1983 people were 
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entering a time of democracy andfreedom, we were at that time in a time 
of transition. There were not too many things to fightfor" (FIAT worker, 
Quality Control Department). " 
In the case of Renault solidanty was compaherismo too and the 
composition of the labour force was similar. The union was more 
approved of than at FIAT and this was true at least at the beginning for 
some of the plant delegates, initial opposition to the SMATA Cordoba 
leadership was from a Renault delegate. Nevertheless, the general opinion 
was that of the no te metas, haces lo tuyo (do not get yourself into trouble, 
mind your own business). As previously seen, this was the "old" attitude 
over collective matters and new workers had no other options than to 
follow that way: 
"Those who recently entered the factory didn't have any examples 
because the only thing that they found was a lot ofpeople nodding their 
II heads and saying si senor, si senor" (Renault worker 12). 
"' 
But a difference with FIAT was that the company managed to generate a 
sense of competition and division among the workers and it often found 
the union available to negotiate on these issues: 
"The politics of the company has always been to divide us if they 
suspected that we would gather and build solidarity amongst us. They 
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tried to create conflict and divisions among us ........ I tell you once again, 
the one who loses is always the worker, I do not know if because of our 
lack of activity or because of their plans "(Renault worker 8). xl" 
ti the company contributes to the break in solidarity, I think. This was or it 
is what the company normally does, to break unity among colleagues, we 
lived all this down there, I'm sure " (Renault worker 4). ""' 
From this a first conclusion could be reached, that is that solidarity was 
present at FIAT and Renault just in the forrn of compaherismo, people 
helping each other in the daily production activities, but workers tended to 
look first at their own business and collective protests were the last issues 
in their discussions. If we conceptualise solidarity in a static way we have 
to accept that before the conflict there was no pre-existence of it and that 
individualism was, to a certain extent, the dominant attitude in the plants. 
Thus we may think that mobilisations occurred as the result of leadership 
persuasive action (giving credibility to the fact that an individual may gain 
over diffused individualism). At least is what a detailed internal report, 
prepared by FIAT's representatives a few weeks after the conflict and 
based on the opinions of a group of Journalists, seems to argue. In the 
document there is no reference to the reasons why people mobilised, some 
possible causes are outlined (bad communication, unions' intemal 
struggles), but an extended part is dedicated to the leader, his political 
affiliation, his life style, his acquaintances. Even in informal conversations 
the time of the conflict is identified with the name of the leader: el tema de 
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Gallo, la cuestion de Gallo (the issue, the theme of Gallo). It is not in 
doubt that leadership is important to mobilisation and that leaders are 
fundamental in strengthening it. But in our case collective action, as 
previously seen, started spontaneously as people gathered in solidarity to 
discuss and try to solve common problems. Leadership emerged after 
mobilisation not before. 
Thus a question remains: how a gToup of workers that for years have lived 
within an individualistic environment could have generated, from one day 
to the other, a solidarity movement? Is it credible that just in one night 
they could have passed from corderos (lambs) to lobos (wolves)? But the 
opposite is the case with Renault, despite the negative culture about 
collective issues (el pensamiento sindicao an opposition and a leadership 
emerged, internal conditions may have favoured mobilisation but conflict 
did not reach the level of FIAT and soon after the factory occupation, 
workers' activism dissolved. 
In search for an answer we could first look at those external conditions 
that could have favoured solidarity. In September 1996, when CORMEC 
was occupied there was in Argentina a situation of social mobilisation, 
although not-articulated and fragmented, and opposition to the neo-liberal 
policies of the govemment coming both firom the organised side of the 
labour movement (traditional unions in the CGT and alternative central 
confederations CTA and MTA) and from the early actions of the 
unemployed movement. Unemployment was around 20% nationally and 
211 
in certain de-industrialised areas social conflict was becoming 
unsustainable. But if we think that, this situation could have transformed 
workers' individualistic attitudes and strengthened solidarity links we are 
probably wrong. In the case of FIAT we have seen how mobilisation was 
spontaneous and not externally directed or motivated, workers did not 
know precisely about the day of the change to the new contract and the 
amount of the salary reduction, they were "like on an island enjoying 
summer"), to use the expression of one of the interviewed. The fact that 
FIAT had decided to increase its investment with the construction of the 
new plant was another sign of confidence in the future and this 
independently of what was happening in the country. Of course not all the 
people were unaware of the world outside the factory and not all of them 
had a low level of education and absolute apathy for politics, but 
discussions at the workplace were limited to a few arguments related to 
production and working conditions. The fact that the union, generally a 
channel for infonnation exchange with the external world, was discredited 
among the workers increased their isolation and many people in a certain 
way wanted to maintain it. In addition, the high level of unemployment, 
an important external condition at that time, should have invited a fierce 
and individualistic defence of the job and not a mobilisation. As 
previously observed, due to the existing preconditions, we may have 
expected mobilisation at Renault and not at FIAT. But despite workers' 
identification of a collective agent, a mix of structural determinants had 
hampered the possibility for workers solidarity being expressed by 
collective action. 
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On the contrary, in the case of the FIAT mobilisation, taking advantage of 
the free space that the change of contract produced, a solidarity movement 
explicitly emerged, born out of a situation specific to the plant,. In the 25 
years before the occupation, 
It there was compaherismo and nothing else. That is why on the day of the 
factory occupation people were crying ....... I was crying, every half an 
hour I was crying. It was a situation for crying because solidarity, 
everything was unexpected, it was like something was set free, was 
released and this was positivefor the people. It was positive notjust in the 
economic sense but also as a way to feel realised as a person. They were 
feeling worthy persons and today everybody remembers that struggle and 
that they did well, well because they were feeling well " (FIAT 
mobilisation leader). "" 
What happened with the change to the new contract affected the majority 
of workers in their dignity"'. The reduction of the salary was one factor 
but a combination of many others contributed to create that particular 
emotional situation which represented the spark for the mobilisation. 
"it wasn'tjust a salary reduction, it was compulsory, it was an agreement 
among alk governments, trade unions, company, all together ......... at that 
time, I tell you what it was for me, Ifelt and even today Ifeel ashamed to 
have to say to myJamily that I cannot have the possibility of supporting 
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them. I was passingfrom a certain salary to earn half of it and with manY 
conditions of slavery and without having moved a finger ... ..... I believe 
that each of us can react very, very violently when you are touched in 
something that you love more than yourseýf and if no other possibility is 
left " (FIAT maintenance worker). "" 
Many people at FIAT felt completely abandoned not just by the fact that 
the union did not act as it promised to do but also by the action of the 
company to which they had dedicated an entire working life. 
"I felt deceived and in that moment the relation that I had with the 
company broke down " (FIAT quality worker 3), "'i' "Peoplefelt betrayed 
by the union and abandoned and cheated by the company " (CPI 
FIAT) I 
The combination of all these factors was a shock for the workers. When 
they had the opportunity to get together, they gave expression to their 
feelings, knowing that the others could understand and support. Solidanty 
was emerging spontaneously even among a group of people not used to 
conflict because there was no basis any more for individualism. The 
paternalistic style used for decades by the company to control the labour 
force, the "golden splendour" of their isolation from the rest of the 
working class, bureaucratic unionism, disappeared from one day to the 
next. In this new situation, without those elements that had maintained 
workers outside conflict for decades, solidarity became the basis of their 
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strength. An that moment people started to achieve a deeper consciousness 
of their position within the more general social unrest of the country and 
this contributed to the radicalisation of their fights. As bitterly a worker 
summed it up: 
ti you were living like a chicken for the slaughter house: you went to work, 
you ate from your little plate, you got fat and then you finished on the 
barbecue. It was like this. Later on, they showed you that they were going 
to make your cage smaller, that they were going to give you less water 
and food but in any case you had to go to the slaughter house" (FIAT 
activist 
In the case of FIAT, those factors that for years had maintained the plant 
without conflict and had made solidarity unnecessary, changed from one 
day to the next and were all summed up by the new contract. The 
identification with the company became disaffection, union delegates 
were traitors, people felt damaged in their dignity and reacted emotionally 
and spontaneously. Solidarity emerged as the only resource available to 
workers' mobilisation. 
The case of Renault is similar to FIAT with respect to workers' 
individualistic attitudes and the discredited image they had of the union. 
From the interviews a sense of strong identification with the company 
does not appear, because it was clearly moving towards a reduction of 
costs and the number of its employees, well before the mobilisation. As 
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we have seen, the outsourcing of the maintenance sector had been 
preceded by massive suspensions and selective reintegration of some of 
those suspended. Renault never, and especially after FIAT workers 
mobilised in September, implemented changes in the labour conditions or 
cut costs of its labour force so drastically and without a negotiated 
agreement with the union bureaucracy. 
"Here the company doesn't lay off, they suspend you, they drown you, 
they drown you until you say "well here they are choking me ". But they 
never laid off anybody, they suspend you. They don't have to hurry, the 
one who has to hurry up is you because you have bills to pay and you 
cannot" (Renault worker 12). 1 
A hidden negotiation between the company and the bureaucracy resolved 
the conflict "positively". Officially the factory occupation was justified by 
the fact that the company wanted to transfer all its maintenance workers to 
an external company, Polymont, with the guarantee of salaries and labour 
conditions. Workers supported in solidarity the mobilisation promoted by 
the union because they saw the decision of the company as a first step in 
the outsourcing of the entire plant. But a few weeks after the end of the 
occupation, the union agreed with the company a plan that, dividing 
workers and breaking their solidarity, opened the doors for the flexibility 
of working conditions and for a reduction in employees, which even today 
is not yet finished. The dilution of conflict is one of the factors that have 
to be taken into consideration in the understanding of solidarity and 
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mobilisation at Renault. Workers did not face a drastic and generalised 
reduction of their salaries,, flexibility was implemented gradually, 
competition among workers was fierce because of the real possibility of 
being suspended and never again being re-employed. 
Solidarity did not reach the level of collective action because of a clear 
strategy by the company to dilute the conflict, and the union bureaucracy 
also played a fundamental role. This happened not just through secret 
negotiations with the management but also through the co-option of the 
fonner internal opposition at the top of the organisation. With the 
company subtly reducing labour costs and with no alternative of a more 
efficient and honest union representation, solidarity could not emerge. 
"You were surrounded with no possibility to move, you had to stay in the 
middle. Everybody felt fear, fear to lose the job, fear of the government, 
fear of the company, fear of the union. Fear, fear, fear, and the "elderly " 
that were there could arrange with the company and ciao " (Renault 
worker 1). " 
d) Conclusion: a comparison between the two cases. 
In the previous sections we have analysed the dynamics of mobilisation, 
the role played by injustice and the concept and function of solidarity 
within the process. The cases may be considered asymmetrical with 
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Renault being the "negative" (as the place where things did not happen) 
side of the comparison. But it is exactly because of this "genetic" 
difference and its consequences that it is possible to address important 
issues regarding the theoretical approach to mobilisation. The two cases 
show how the alternate presence or absence of bureaucratic unions and 
specific companies' corporate strategies influenced the way in which 
mobilisation processes occurred, how and when injustice was perceived, 
the centrality of solidarity and the process of its formation. 
In the case of Fiat, the managerial strategy adopted proved to be a failure 
in containing conflict. On the one hand, workers were first empowered 
and their expectations rose, letting them understand that the opening of the 
new plant would mean new possibilities for all of them. On the other 
hand, psychologists and the internal commission tried to convince workers 
to accept the future changes as unavoidable and at the same time not so 
negative. The contradictions of the strategy appeared when the company, 
to maintain its intemational competitiveness, changed from one day to the 
next conditions of employment by drastically reducing salaries. This 
unexpectedly hit workers who were mostly identified with the company 
and were confident in a future of further growth. The new contract was 
compulsory, consistently worse, and ignored for the big majority of 
workers. The combination of these elements produced first a shock, then 
incredulity and the day after the change of contract a solidarity movement 
emerged in the workplace. In the absence of a union bureaucracy, a 
vacuum of power in workers' representation was created giving space to 
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the emergence of an anti -bureaucratic and independent form of unionism. 
This type of organisation could collect workers' grievances and lead in the 
following months, but solidarity produced mobilisation before a 
leadership and an organisation could emerge to strengthen it. 
In the case of Renault, the action of a bureaucratic union, and the 
company's successftil strategy in diluting conflict, has been effective in 
breaking solidarity and eliminating natural leaders. Workers had been 
betrayed by their union who first called for a factory occupation as a 
solidanty response to company's plans and then reached an agreement 
that in practice divided workers. Furthermore the union also eliminated 
any possibility of internal opposition through the co-option of the former 
opposition leader into the bureaucratic structure. Workers' expectation of 
change to the situation through the factory occupation became 
disillusionment and then impotence. With the union not assisting and 
defending, and with no possibility of a different and more effective 
representation of their interests and with the company diluting the conflict 
by use of massive suspensions and selective offers of work, workers had 
to look for individual solutions. Solidarity broke, individualism returned 
and fear started to work in a context of increasing unemployment. 
The analysis of the dynamics of mobilisation also demonstrates the 
inadequacy of injustice as a central tenet in the theory of mobilisation. 
Certainly injustice is not the basis around which a mobilisation can be 
produced, it is rather a subjective perception that vanes when considering 
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the specific case and the moral/ethical values of certain epochs. The 
comparison provides various examples of how injustice can be differently 
perceived even within the same plant, as for instance in the case of those 
FIAT's workers that remained loyal to the company. Renault's workers 
after the failure of the mobilisation and the impossibility to change their 
situation were certainly uncomfortable and feeling their situation as 
unjust. But mobilisation did not occur. 
The evidence from the cases seems to suggest that solidarity is a 
spontaneous phenomenon that can be best perceived and its function in a 
mobilisation understood if considered as a process (hence it is a concept 
best understood by considering the cause/effect nexus). This does not 
mean that we have to think of solidanty as something that always 
emerges, as an abstract, theoretical proposition that always has to be 
present in the employment relationship. The combination of specific 
circumstances in some cases may and in others may not allow solidanty to 
emerge. We have seen that in the case of FIAT, with the change of 
contract, there was a mixture of surprise, betrayal and shock that broke the 
(. 4 golden splendour" in which workers had been living and brought them 
back to a harsh reality. In this context, with either support to the company 
or to the union, solidarity emerged spontaneously as the only resource 
available to workers to defend their interests. In the case of Renault, 
solidarity developed along similar lines but with conditions specific to the 
case. At first, workers tried to avoid the traditional and ineffective union, 
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voting for the opposition slate. They participated as an act of solidarity 
with other colleagues and as a fonn of protection of their threatened 
rights, in the mobilisation called by the union. But later on, those 
solidarity links and expectations for a new leader and a new union 
direction were frustrated by the co-option of the former opposition and the 
dilution of conflict negotiated by the company and the union bureaucracy. 
Given the context of unemployment, this produced fear and divisions and 
broke the solidarity. 
The two cases analysed also seem to agree in that mobilisation has to be 
seen as the result of the combination of specific internal conditions. This 
is true with reference to the causes of the conflict that we have just 
mentioned. In both cases mobilisation appeared as something specific to 
the factory and to its working situation and labour relations. But the stress 
on the intemal conditions does not mean that the extemal situation did not 
play any role. It is what produced the foundation on which internal 
conditions could be created. The FIAT/SMATA agreement received the 
support of the national political power as it represented the first step to 
introducing labour flexibility in the industrial sector. FIAT received 
consistent support also from the local political power that expected 20000 
jobs (including direct and indirect) from the establishment of the company 
in the industrial area of Cordoba. Moreover, the mobIlisation led by the 
bureaucratic union at Renault was a reaction imposed by a generalised 
social protest present in the country at that moment and by the anti- 
bureaucratic FIAT mobilisation. As will be more evident in the next 
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chapter, external conditions will play a fundamental role first in the 
establishment, consolidation and radicalisation of FIAT's mobilisation 
and later on company counter-mobilisation and workers' divisions. 
Generalising these findings, the impression is of complex interactions 
between structural detenninants and the space they leave for strategy and 
agency. We certainly have a set of unchangeable external features 
influencing these cases: international market pressure, labour flexibility 
and political will to fully implement it, and unions' bureaucracy. In this 
situation, the two companies adopted different strategies: management- 
imposed changes in the case of FIAT, dilution of conflict with 
bureaucracy complacency in the case of Renault. Against this background 
and despite the dominating apathy against collective action, workers in 
both cases mobilised. The fonns were different due to the obstacles 
encountered in their actions, and the intensity and length of conflict was 
variable depending on the effective interaction of the company strategies, 
the union's control and the natural exhaustion of mobilisation. Yet people 
mobilised and this is probably the most important lesson we can draw 
from these cases. 
Do people always mobilise? Certainly yes, although in different fon-ns and 
times as we have seen. We believe that conflict is inevitable but there is 
also a material basis for people's mobilisation and that is solidarity. These 
cases have shown how the interaction of structural and agency factors 
have acted to reduce or increase the space for its formation. 
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Acknowledgment of this turns up-side down taken- for-granted 
assumptions about the role of solidarity in collective action, and invites us 
to reconsider this latter not merely as the sum of individual choices. Thus, 
overall the above findings help a reconsideration of the theory of 
mobilisation as a whole. 
The next chapter takes into account the emergence of the leadership, the 
evolution and the radicalisation of conflict in the FIAT plant. 
'Act of Professional Association. 
" SITRAMF is the acronym for Sindicato de Trabajadores Mecdnicos de Ferreyra. The name 
voluntarily recalled the anti-bureaucratic experience and the militancy of the historic clasista union 
SITRAC. 
iii Fabbrica integrata can be approximatively understood as a model of lean production and just in time. 
The name, in particular, comes from the fact that suppliers operate 'in the same industrial area and 
provide the parts to be assembled directly to the lines. 
` Wirý ac6 se mueve la gente de esta forma: si hay una asamblea metete en el medio, ni salgas 
primero ni salgas 0timo que vos sos nuevo y no te quedes. 0 sea, ellos mismos te decian que tefueras 
de irte y de no quedarte para hacer buena letra con el sindicato "(Fiat production worker 3 2) 
v Make or create troubles. 
Vi " El gremio estti vendido, nos ech6 m6s que la f6brica ", "estdn disfrazados de corderos pero son 
lobos ", (Renault maintenance worker, n. 12) "despuýs te podria hablar del gremio pero no se' en que te 
sime ... .... no con amos mucho en el gremio, son todos unos vendidos", 
"el gremio por un lado nos If, 
defendia y por el otro nos pisaba la cabeza ", (Renault production worker, n. 10) "el sindicato es 
connivente y perpetuo en el poder ", "es como una mafia, ni m6s ni menos ". "La misma gente que 
estaba en el gremio con los militares sigue en la dirigencia del sindicato, es la mafia Renault 
production worker, n. 8). 
In 1998 the company also participated in a European sponsored project on trade union/company 
c9mmittees for participation and joint training. 
""' It should also be noted that Flat represents a pattern-setting outstanding case rather than a model 
representative of Italian Industrial Relations. 
" "Nosotros dentro de FIAT gozdbamos de un verano, no asi los trabajadores de la siderurgia, y de 
esto la gente no se daba cuenta, como uno que queda en su isla ..... no quiere que se 
la 
initevan ... ... 
.. (Fiat worker formerly employed in the casting sector) 
' Due to the method used to reduce its personnel and the extension in terms of time this took, it is not 
easy to provide exact figures of Renault's restructuring. In addition to this it was company practice not 
to use layoffs but rather suspensions. In these cases each employee received a salary whose value was 
inversely proportional to the time he/she was suspended. The mechanism was a bit perverted because 
on the one hand it nurtured hopes and illusions of a future full re-employment, freezing conflict, on the 
other hand the constant reduction of salaries and incentives from the company forced many workers to 
renounce theirjob "voluntarily". 
714 T cierra el nuevo convenio con SAIA TA. Teniamos una planta que tenia que pasar a una nueva 
enipresa con condiciones salariales inferiores a las que tenian ... .... era muy 
dificil "(FIAT Industrial 
Relations Director, former REPO)" 
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"El dia del pase era un dia secreto, se sorprendi6 a la Planta, a todo el mundo (FIAT Industrial 
Relations Director, former REPO)" 
x... Under the Argentine law, workers, when a company ceases to exist, have to receive a sum of money 
which is calculated on the basis of one month salary per years of employment. 
xiv "Vos entrabas un dia, te agarraban y e1jefe te decia de no prender la mdquina de andar a hablar 
con el REPO y el tipo estaba con tu renuncia y tu nuevo contracto y vos tenias que firmar con un 
guardia parado al costado. Si vos decias que lo queria pensar no te daban tiempo, o estabas o te ibas. 
Muchos en esa situaci6n firmaron pensando que despuýs las cosas se podian cambiar y otros no 
aceptaron desde el principio y se jueron. Si vos vas a tu trabajo que todos los dias ha sido igual y de 
un dia para otro te dicen que tenýs que renunciar y que te bajan el salario de un 50 %y que si no te 
despiden ... ..... te agarra 
frio, no tenýs otras perspectivas, no tenýs tiempo ni de pensar en otro trabajo 
o de invertir la plata en otra cosa " (FIAT worker 32). 
" "El odiojue a los dos. Unajue la toma en contra de lafabrica, la otrajue la de ir a las casas de los 
delegados para reventarlos, romperle la casa, no quedo' uno, desaparecieron esa noche de 
C6rdoba ........ normalmente 
la burocracia nos pone miedo a nosotros, nos pega a nosotros, esta vezJue 
al revýs " (FIAT activist 1). 
xv' "Si'', todos la teniamos (7a camiseta). Si a mi me decian, "hace esto "I yo lo hacia, cumplia con las 
cosas de mi trabajo, est6bamos muy a gusto con esto, teniamos interis en que se produjera " (Fiat 
worker 3 1). 
"" "la empresa toma otra postura que no es solo la producci6n si no como involucra la jamilia del 
traba . adoren elprocesoproductivo, en lagrandejamilia FIAT Haciamos fiestas de cumpleahospara V 
todos los chicos, regalos para Navidad, ano Nuevo . ... ........ un involucramiento total no solamente 
productivo, ideol6gico, para mijue terrible porque yo veia al revýs todo lo que era y me sentia muY 
solo " (FIAT activist 1). 
""' "Me rompi6 todo un proyecto de vida, me destruy6 a mi ya mijamilia, yo no podia aceptar esa 
idea" (member of the independent union commission). "Te sentias estafado, es como cuando a un 
chico le compras unjuguete y cuando se lo estds por dar, el chico con toda la ilusi6n dejugar, le decis 
"no era para vos era para el otro - (independent union delegate). En esa f6brica siempre se trabqJ6 
mucho, los ritmos de producc16n eran elevados. La gente trabajaba mucho y estaba orgullosa de 
trabaj'ar por esa empresa. Ellos no quisieron reconocer eso Y la gente se sinti6 traicionada y bueno si 
entonces no tengo ningýn valor yo me siento agredido " (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
x'\ "uno es realista, siempre esta'del lado de la empresa. En todo aspecto uno tiene que ser conciente 
que una empresa paga el sueldo por el trabajo que uno hace y vos tenes que estar de acuerdo con ese 
traba o. Yo siempre estuve de ese lado, si no me gusta me voy. Si yo en ese momento estaba detr6s de Y 
la maquina haciendo lo mismo y ganando meno no te podria decir lo que hubiera hecho " (FIAT 
REPO, former production worker) 
" "Yo tengo unafamilia, no es cuesti6n de decir: "bueno me voy", si despuýs no tengo nada. No es 
que estoy yo solo, atrds mio hay un grupo de gente. Lamentablemente es asi "( FIATworker 1). 
\x' "Lo que pasa es que esa gente que tiene prticticamente una vida alli adentro de esa fýbrica a lo 
mejor no ve las cosas como uno pensando que se iba de laf6brica. Un tipo que vivi6 alli adentro, sale 
de una f6brica a la calle a buscar trabajo y no sabe que hacer, no sabe vender nada porque el orden6 
su vida trabajando alli y si vos lo mandds en la esquina a vender un mantecol no sabe como hacerlo 
(Member of the independent union commission). 
xvii Al otro dia entramos yfue una cosa rarisima. Yo entraba mcis tarde, el drea de calidad entraba 
mas tarde, y teniamos que pasar por toda la planta, un ambiente raro... la gente reunida en todos los 
rinconcitos, todo el mundo reunido, era como que el dia no arrancaba... llegamos al vestuario pero ni 
nos cambiamos, ache, ahi dice un muchacho que hay quejuntarnos>ý y todo el mundo, jue una cosa 
instant6nea. Vamos para adelante, a la placita que est6 ftente a la planta, los delegados ninguno, 
nadie estaba, esto no es lo que se nos dyo... a1guien que explique... que es lo que habian dicho a todo 
el mundo no solo a mi... vamos a pedir explicaciones, vamos a pedir explicaciones. Y la gente 
ordenada sali6, _vo creo que no 
jalt6 nadie j, jueron caminando para adelante ache, que pasa? )) 
(FIAT worker, Quality Control Department). 
xviii "Estdbamos perdidos, no teniamos rumbo, nos habian pegado juerte, tan juerte que nos 
enloqueci6, lleg6' un momento que no pens6bamos, la gente no queria creer pero estaba dispuesta a 
cýalquier cosa " (member of the independent union commission). 
'crll' "Los i, iejos teniamos tal ve-- mas espiritu de lucha porque veiamos la injusticia despuýs de tantos 
anos de trabajar. Sentiamos que nos habian marginados, que ya no valiamos nada - (FIAT "old" 
worker 1). 
XV1, " Fuimos al choque de entrada. v no era pero te obligaban porque tampoco habia otra salida, te 
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obligaban a dar ese choque. A1 hacerlo tan compulsivo y tan drdstica la rebaia de sueldo Jue un golpe 
duro y tenias que responderlo con otro golpe duro no habia otra. "(FIAT worker 32). 
"' 'Jue un golpe muy Juerte y en muy poco tiempo. Por alli si nos hubi&amos encontrado en la 
situaci6n de la Renault que se vino mds gradualmente ... ... ... pero en el caso de nosotros no. Nos 
quebraron en el medio, no nos Jueron disolviendo, directamente nos pegaron un golpe y nos partieron 
en la mitad " (delegate of the independent union). 
"' See note 10 for the problems of indicating precisely the number, forms and time of redundancies at 
Renault. 
, Llrv.. Of the same opinion were all the unions/ grassroots leaders that joined Renault's workers durin g the 
days of the occupation. SMATA never allowed them to have an influence in what was happening at 
Renault and considered the case as an exclusive internal affair. 
"t "Una charla politico gremial tanto del gremio como de la empresa que de a1guna forma 
arreglaron, en este sentido siempre salimos perjudicados los operarios "(Renault worker 8) 
' "El pensamiento sindical era de no mezclarte con los problemas de los otros, -vos metete en lo tuyo 
y nada m6s y quien sejodi6, sejodi6 " (Renault worker 9). 
"`-Muchos comentan que, en realidad, el gremio y la empresa arreglan ya la gente le dicen otras 
cosas. Pero aparentemente es asiporque no se consi . gul .o nada. Nos sentiamos impotentes y tampoco 
podiamos buscar otra salida con otros representantes, el gremio te lo impedia (Renault Worker 7). 
"""Todos somos concientes, todos.... Iamentablemente por dentro cuantas broncas hemos tenido? 
Pero miles y broncas, broncas. Te lo tenes que aguantar por la Jamilia, tenýs que aguantar muchas 
cosas (Renault worker 12). 
cx"' It is worth mentioning that by saying that solidarity is the manifestation of the 'them" and "us" 
opposition I am not arguing that it is always the base of conflict and that this latter is the rule. For 
instance, Social Christian movements have always stressed solidarity but have often tried to maintain 
hidden and have denied open conflict and in this way recognised implicitly the importance of it in 
labour/capital relations. However, solidarity even in these cases, working as a catalyst of workers' 
identities and framing the "us" of the employment relation, is also implicitly indicating the "them" of 
the same relation. Social partnership unionism is not incompatible with a class identification (Hyman 
2001). 
-rrlc'v "La solidaridad siempre existe, es espontcinea. Lo que pasa es que la represi6n, hoy son las leyes 
de trabajoflexible ayer era m6s el ejercito, y lafalta de organizaci6n la rompen ". 
'""' At the time of conflict the workforce could be divided into three main groups. The first one 
included those people that entered the company between 1970 and 1976. In the second were those in 
the middle of their careers already having 15 years of experience. The last group was represented by 
workers with just few years of employment. 
"la gente no era tan solidaria ... ... ... (por) el hecho de tener un 
buen sueldo o una situaci6n 
c6moda adentro del ambiente obrero nacional, nadie queria perder nada. La gente que estaba metida 
en esta historia, viste, entonces se ponia ......... perdia 
de vista unos intereses comunes " (Flat worker 
Quality Control Department) 
xtrvii "En Corniec no habia razones para el conflicto y tampoco habia politicas sindicales, las 
asambleas que se hacian eran por boludeses te sentabas alli para Jumarte un Jaso ........ (Fiat worker 
n. 3 1) 
v""' "habia alta producci6n en primer lugar, habia horas extras, necesitaban a los trabajadores 
porque era 6poca record en la producci6n automotor de la Argentina, en crecimiento continuo y 
Juertc y de exportaci6n hacia Brasil. Eso significaba que los trabajadores trabajaban un tercer turno 
para satisfacer esa Juerte demanda. Por lo tanto no habia presi6n por parte de la fabrica, mas bien 
tentaba cumplir siempre con las reglas del convenio que teniamos - (FIAT activist 1). 
V . Lrviv " en ese entonces todo estaba tranquilo, se ganaba bien y el resto no importaba. Siempre se hacian 
fiestas, siempre habia gente por eso pero no para la lucha - (FIA T activist 4). 
X1 " Un poco cansados y al final perdimos de vista los objetivos que teniamos nosotros como 
trabajadores. Todo estaba dado o iba d6ndose. Reciýn se iba incorporando en el 83 la gente a la 
democracia a la libertad, est6bamos todavia en un momento de transici6n. No habia muchas cosas 
para pelear ... ... 
.. (Fiat worker, Quality Control Department). 
'T" "los nuevos no tuvieron ejemplos porque' lo iinico que encontraron Jue un mont6n de gente 
agachando la cabeza 1, diciendo si sehor, si sepior". (Renault worker, 12). 
x1ii .. Sic inpre la politica de la empresa ha sido la de dividirnos y de separarnos si tenia sospecha de 
que nos podiamos agrupar y ser solidarios entre nosotros. Trataban de crear discordia ...... te vuelvo a 
repetir que el perjudicado siempre es el operario, no sý si porfalta de actividad nuestra o por c6lculo 
de ellos" (Renault worker, n 8). 
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x"" "la empresa contribuy6 en romper la solidaridad, yo creo. Ese fue o es donde mas apunta la 
jabrica, a romper la uni6n entre los companeros, lo hemos vivido alli adentro, estoy seguro - (Renault 
worker 4). 
xfiv 4, Lo que habia era companerismo y nada mcis. Por eso la gente el dia de la toma 11oraba ...... Yo 
11oraba, cada media hora estaba 11orando. Era para 11orar porque la solidaridad, todo esto naci6 de 
golpe, fue como algo que se liber6 y eso le hacia bien a la gente. Ya no bien en el sentido econ6mico, 
bien en el sentido de realizarse como persona. Se sentian dignos y hoy cualquier persona se acuerda 
de esa lucha y que hizo bien, porque se sinti6 bien " (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
`1vHere dignity is understood as the level of workers' tolerance beyond which a reaction is considered 
necessary to maintain respectability. For references on the concept, in particular Hodson 200 1. 
-'rlv' "No s6lo nos redujeron el sueldo, fue compulsivo, fue un arreglo entre todos: Gobiernos, 
sindicatos, patronal, todosjuntos ... ... .... en ese momento, te 
digo lo quefue para mi, me daba y todavia 
me da vergiienza venir a decirle a mi jamilia que yo no la iba a poder mantener. Yo de un sueldo 
pasaba a ganar la mitad con muchas condiciones esclavizantes y sin haber levantado un 
dedo ... .... pienso que todos nosotros podemos reaccionar muy, muy violentemente cuando te tocan algo 
que querýs mucho mds que a vos y que no tenia otra posibilidad' (FIAT maintenance worker). 
`lv" "Me senti engahado y en ese momento se me rompi .o la relaci6n con la f6brica " (FIAT Quality 
Control Department, worker 3). 
t1v"' "La gente se sinti6 traicionada por el gremio y defraudada y abandonada por la empresa " (CPI 
FIAT). 
"ý' Vivias como un pollo para el matadero: ibas a trabajar, comias de tu platito, te engordaban y al 
asador. Era asi. Despuýs te mostraron que te iban a engordar meno, te achicamos lajaula, te sacamos 
mucha agua de la comida pero de todaforma vas al matadero " (FIAT activist 5). 
1 "Acý laf6brica no te echa, te suspende, te va ahogando, ahogando hasta que vos decis "bueno acti 
me est6n ahorcando ". Pero nunca ech6 a nadie, te suspenden. Ellos no tienen apuro, el que tiene 
apuro sos vos que tenýs cuentas para pagar y no podýs " (Renault worker 12). 
" "Estabas rodeado sin poder arrancar, te tenias que quedar en el medio. Eso es lo que pas6. Todos 
tenian miedo a perder el trabajo, miedo al Gobierno, a laf6brica, al sindicato. Miedo, miedo, miedo y 
los viejos que estaban de antes arreglaban con lafdbrica y chau ". (Renault worker 1). 
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Chapter 5: Conflict evolution and radicalisation at FIAT 
1. Introduction. 
This chapter follows the evolution and radicalisation of conflict at FIAT 
looking at the effects produced by the mobilisation, previously analysed, 
with particular focus on the emergence of leaders and the establishment of 
representative organisations, workers' change of consciousness and 
company repression. The particular way in which mobilisation emerged, 
the momentary absence of hampering factors, profoundly influenced 
workplace relations in the year following the first plant occupation. The 
abrupt change of contract turned up-side down workers' vision of the 
social reality surrounding them and opened their minds to the world 
outside the factory, creating a new field for consciousness fonnation. 
Those workers, the majority who were wearing the company's shirt and 
were not used to conflict, started to question a formerly taken- for- granted 
reality and became rebellious. The company was forced to re-establish 
managerial order. Mobilisation developed following the radicalisation of 
conflict. 
2. Leadership, activism and collective action. 
As previously seen, in the two cases analysed, the dynamics of 
mobilisation and the issue of solidarity have been differently shaped, 
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among other factors, by the presence or the absence of a bureaucratic 
union. In the case of FIAT and because of the Argentine law on trade 
union representation, the change to the FIAT/SMATA collective 
agreement implied, with the new unfavourable conditions, a change in the 
legitimate organisation representing workers, from UOM to SMATA. 
Once the conflict exploded, workers went first to the union office in the 
plant, to question delegates and derecognise' the negotiation they had with 
the company about the conditions of the new contract. The office was 
empty, the delegates had physically disappeared from the plant and from 
their personal addresses for weeks, fearing the ferocious reaction of their 
former colleagues. At the same time, SMATA had not yet entered the 
plant, it had no organisation within the workplace to frame workers' 
protests. In fact, by an agreement with the company, the new SMATA 
intemal commission had to be fonned from the same people who had 
represented workers in the UOM. This situation of change and 
mobilisation created a vacuum of power, filled by workers' anti- 
bureaucratic reaction , in the institutional representation of the workforce 
and thus the impossibility of channelling and controlling their grievances 
through the union bureaucratic apparatus. It is in this context that a new 
leadership and a new democratic and anti-bureaucratic organisation could 
emerge. 
These fundamental events profoundly shaped the evolution of struggle at 
FIAT in the year after the factory occupation, and at the same time have 
set differences compared to the case of Renault. In this latter company an 
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anti -bureaucratic stance emerged, workers spontaneously sustained it but 
it was later co-opted by the SMATA Co II 'rdoba leadership and since then 
further radicalisation in the Renault plants and interplant anti -bureaucratic 
alliances in the city of Cordoba could not be developed. In the two cases 
analysed, we could see, using analogies, the union bureaucracy as "the 
dyke"' and workers' mobilisation as "the water" contained by the dyke. In 
one case (FIAT) the dyke could not resist the pressure, a new leadership 
and a democratic organisation emerged and conflict could radicalise. In 
the other case the dyke resisted and mobilisation could be contained. It is 
very important to stress, once more, this "genetic" difference in the two 
mobilisation processes because it had a big influence on the ways other 
issues of the collective action were shaped. 
In the previous chapter it has been argued that leaders at FIAT emerged as 
a result of the mobilisation status created by the fact that specific 
conditions of the moment (a new unfavourable and unexpected contract, 
company's and union's absence) had allowed solidarity to be expressed 
and workers to question the inevitability of the objective reality. If in this 
sense solidarity could be considered as the basis for mobilisation, leaders, 
then on this basis, acted as a catalyst for workers' grievances, proposed 
solutions and provided a first boost for organisation. All this by trying to 
frame a discourse which the majority of people could recognise. But how 
did these leaders emerge? 
The following is a reconstruction of the events from a management 
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perspective: 
it a debate started, in the whole plant there were discussions. After this a 
movement started to grow, they started to mobilise. They had no idea of 
where to go and what to do but nonetheless they started to gather, they 
were many, and then an internal mobilisation of the plant, without 
leaders, started to emerge. In this situation from the same mobilisation 
natural leaders started to appear, these latter were the people with more 
character, the biggest, the most wicked, the ones who could raise their 
voices and say let's go. This type of people were those who led the 
mobilisation. Natural and spontaneous leaders started to emerge. " (FIAT 
Industrial Relations Director, foriner REPO). ` 
Natural leaders started to emerge from the same mobilisation, from the 
debate in the plant, and this seems to confirm that leadership appeared 
after solidarity. People did not go to work with the idea of occupying the 
plant or to protest, there was a general collective feeling that both the 
company and the union were responsible for their situation but there was 
no organisation, no leadership able to transfon-n individual grievances into 
a collective action. Not even those who later led the process of 
mobilisation had clearly in mind what to do. A couple of them did not 
even sign the new contract and went to the plant the day of the occupation 
to receive the allowance for the end of contract, while others wanted to 
resign. Nothing was planned but the same situation of uncertainty, 
impotence and desperation was affecting the majority of workers. "' 
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"The day after (after the change to the new contract) the guys went to the 
plant ... ... that night nobody slept. They went home, they calculated what 
they were going to receive, they discovered that they were going to earn 
ha4f of their previous salary for doing the same job, they got depressed, 
they cried, they didn't sleep. The day after they reached the plantfeeling 
bad, a collective badjeeling and without anybody suggesting anything to 
them, they got together. What should we do? (FIAT mobilisation leader). " 
Solidarity emerged in this context and on the basis of the mobilisation 
status it produced, leaders could find space. 
Those people who led the mobilisation certainly had some personal 
characteristics or experiences useful at the time of collective action. 
Recognition among a group of a few colleagues on the production line, 
some political activity or experience in social organisations, but almost 
none of them had a relation of friendship with other leaders and before the 
conflict they never had any union activity. But three weeks before the 
factory occupation, some of those who later were recognised by their 
colleagues as leaders, abandoned their workplaces, convinced a consistent 
number of workers to do the same and went to the union office in the 
plant. Despite union opposition, an assembly decided to abandon work for 
the day. The protest was spontaneous and was justified by the 
goven-iment's decision to cut the financial assistance each worker was 
receiving which was in proportion to the number of his/her children. This 
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action could have alerted management to the possibility that spontaneous 
protest could emerge again and that the internal commission, in the 
control of workers, was largely ineffective. But the company was 
probably confident of the fact that no organisation was available to 
channel these protests, that workers at CORMEC were not used to conflict 
and that many of those wearing the FIAT camiseta (shirt) would have 
promoted their interests better through institutional channels, without 
open conflict. 
The company read the situation correctly at least as far as the issue of 
organisation was concemed. Just three weeks passed after this 
spontaneous demonstration and before the factory was occupied. Workers 
could not organise any solid alliance, and the day of the change to the new 
contract came as a surprise and a shock for all and it did not leave any 
chance of organising collective action. Even those who later would lead 
the mobilisation, reacted to the change of contract differently, some of 
them refusing the new contract, the majority accepting it temporarily, but 
nobody went to the plant the day after with the idea of mobilising people 
and, far from this, the possibility to occupy the plant. 
"I was planning to renounce to myjob andfor this, I think, workers could 
trust me, I was going to leave " (FIAT mobilisation leader). ' 
But despite the absence of any fonn of organisation and mutual 
agreement, natural leaders emerged spontaneously from the micro context 
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of their department or production line where discussions among workers 
had already started. In the morning shift, when the factory was occupied, 
four leaders emerged and two of them had participated in the mobilisation 
that had occurred three weeks earlier. Each of them moved his own line or 
a part of it, often with fierce company opposition, and walked with the 
group of those who followed to other lines where workers were still 
undecided whether to abandon or not. The reconstruction of those 
moments and the function of the leader are best described by one of those 
who led the mobilisation: 
"That day we were all discussing this and suddenly there was just silence 
[] because the feeling was generalised and I became very nervous. In 
that moment I was [ ... 
jI started to punch a keyboard of the machine, I 
asn eeling pain it was just to release my anger. In that moment the w 't f 
foreman passed and sought me, but people were copying me and everyone 
started hitting and then in all the production lines. In the sector where the 
engines were tested, people started to remove the silencers. The more I 
was hitting the keyboards the more the rest were following me". " The 
foreman invited all the workers of the line to his office and there he 
threatened them with the consequences this act could have had on their 
jobs, they were now workers of Fiat Auto, they had accepted all the 
conditions of the new contract and had to obey him. "I stood up and I 
turned the table on him and said to him "here we are going to do what the 
mass decides and if the mass decides not to work we are not going to 
work, is that clear? " "You are nothing" " Yes we are many, we are 
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workers ", "You don't talk to me in such a way, I am your boss ", "Now 
you are nothing and I am going to stand up, I am going out and those who 
want tofollow come with me ". I stood up and everybody followed me. " 
In this brief reconstruction of the events we can see how the leader says 
that he transformed solidarity into mobilisation. He first gave voice to 
workers' collective sentiments, making them real through the use of 
physical violence on the machine, and people followed suit. He then 
defended his position, and that of the people who were supporting him, 
against the action of the foreman. In doing this he further framed the 
workers' grievances, identifying the "enemy" and the strength and identity 
of the group (somos muchos, somos trabajadores, we are many, we are 
workers) and then he completed the process of transformation to solidanty 
by calling for mobilisation, and people followed. The construction and the 
role of leaders in framing workers' grievances and transforming solidarity 
into collective action echoes that of Fantasia's wildcat strike (Fantasia 
1988). As in this latter case, individual leaders from different departments 
met in the courtyard of the plant. At this time a situation of conftision, 
fear, and indecision was uppermost dominating among people. "Que 
hacemos? " (what can we do? ). Once again it was the leadership who 
offered a solution in a rather fortuitous way, very similar to what 
happened at the plant described by Fantasia. One of those four who were 
at that moment leading the mobilisation, violently closed the main gate as 
a way of sharing his anger, it was like a detonation: glasses broke in 
hundred of pieces, all the people reached the gate and simultaneously the 
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word went out. The plant was occupied. 
Here started a new and more challenging situation for the original leaders. 
All the workers were now concentrated within a few hundred meters and 
were waiting for some sort of information, some direction to action, and 
they needed to understand the situation more clearly. The internal 
commission was not there, it had disappeared, the company, being issued 
the new contract, was not to be believed any more. People started to talk, 
each one expressing his own point of view, each one identifying those 
responsible for that situation, then more workers fTom the other shifts 
entered the plant. In this context the leadership grew and nine people were 
elected. Since a permanent assembly came to be the dominant part of the 
process of mobilisation, a qualitative step in leadership had to be made. 
Now the problem was to offer, together with a clear understanding of the 
situation (the frame), a solution to confront the firm effectively. In this 
context of democratic decisions and opposition to bureaucracy, leaders 
had to convince people not just to mobilise,, this was already a fact, but 
also to maintain and organise collective action that was originally 
spontaneous. At the same time the anti bureaucratic stance promoted by 
the grassroots bulk of the assembly was so strong that leaders never acted 
autonomously (although the company pressed for this: with the plant 
occupied, one of the conditions for the start of negotiations was for the 
commission to take decisions independently and later submit them to the 
assembly for ratification), they were delegates and had the power to 
negotiate certain issues with the company just on the basis of a clear 
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mandate from the assembly. This process of democratic decisions making 
remained a dominant organisational character in the later radicalisation of 
the mobilisation and at the same time was what strengthened it, this will 
become more evident in the following section. But it is important to stress 
at this stage that the democratic process established by the status, at least 
initially, of permanent assembly, from the beginning gave a peculiar 
character to the function of leadership. Leaders coordinated, organised and 
proposed solutions through constant contact with the grassroots. 
"they thought I was a powerful leader because I could transform that 
mass of lambs, wearing the shirt, into exemplary fighters. But they did 
this!!! They did it. The only thing I did was to clarify the situation, nothing 
more than that" (Fiat mobilisation leader). 'i" 
While democracy remained as the pattern of the relationship, people 
massively followed en masse. 
The last quotation and the reference to the fact that management looked at 
the leaders as the "heart" of mobilisation it seems confin-ned by the 
internal document, which we mentioned analysing the causes of the 
conflict and in which contained abundant information on the political 
background and the private life of the leader were abundant. The same 
point, in the words of a former foreman: 
"I know that, at that moment, they were upset, people in the personnel 
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office were disappointed by thefact that that person, who could have been 
on the side of the company, was in reality against it ". 'x 
The fact that the company during the phase of counter mobilisation 
focused on weakening and repressing the leadership and in considenng it, 
as the core of mobilisation, is an element that invites further reflections on 
the function of leadership. We have argued that, at least in this case, 
solidarity emerged out of workers' interactions in the particular situation 
created by the change of contract. In this context, leadership should be 
seen as the element that, born out of a solidarity movement, transformed 
the same into a solid mobilisation making explicit workers' grievances. 
But once collective action solidifies into organisational fonns, we could 
argue that leadership becomes a constituent element of solidarity rather 
than just a product of it. In this transforination the function of leadership 
changes and assumes the role of a cohesive element unifying individual 
perceptions into collective thinking/actions. In a way, we could say that 
leaders can represent an ideological continuation of the same mobilisation 
that had produced them. In this process, as the next section will show, a 
certain separation from the rank and file is in part inevitable and in part 
provoked by counter mobilisation. 
,, In the secondfactory occupation, activism took a leading role and this 
broke democratic relations with the rank andfile, it was a mistake. Maii: v 
times the role of activism is to give voice to the anger that each one has in 
itseý" (Independent union member). ' 
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3. Mobilisation in progress: evolution and radicalisation. 
"After thefactory occupation I met a different type ofpeople, together we 
become politicized [ ... 
], before we were an "island"" (Fiat worker 4, 
Quality Control Department). x' 
The shock produced by the change to a new flexible contract and the 
company's and union's betrayals brought FIAT workers back, following 
the imagery of an "island", to the "mainland" of labour relations. At that 
time, Argentina, the country that had represented the ideal model of the 
implementation of neo-liberal policies, started to decline in terms of 
industrial production and GDP, while social cohesion was becoming 
unsustainable in a context of rising unemployment and underemployment. 
In this process of decline, the automobile industry represented, as it often 
did, the centre around which industrial development could be fostered, 
employment increased and the Government's power strengthened. The 
FIAT/SMATA agreement was very important because it was the contract 
whose implementation would have opened the way to the labour 
flexibility of the entire industrial sector. In 1995/1996, SMATA signed 
similar agreements with other big companies of the automobile industry 
and a cascade effect was to be expected in related sectors. 
FIAT workers mobilised through the occupation of the plant when the 
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external social climate was certainly favourable to labour conflict. In 
another section reference has already been made to this as far as the 
national level was concerned. In the city of Cordoba, in particular, street 
demonstrations against the reforms of the education system of the 
province had, before FIAT's mobilisation, gathered together thousands of 
people. This situation was fundamental in shaping the outcome of the first 
conflict and labour management relations in the plant in the next nine 
months. 
For the local newspaper, the conciliation dictated by the provincial 
ministry of labour, which suspended the plant occupation and restored the 
situation previous to the change to the new contract , was clearly a 
recognition of the repercussions the conflict could have had on the entire 
labour movement in the city. 
"There was a risk that the conflict could extend to other plants and that 
the central act of the protest could have been carried out in front of 
CORMEC" (La Voz del Interior, 24/9). "' 
The factory was still occupied and a general strike against labour 
flexibility has called for the 26th of September, there was the risk that the 
conflict at FIAT could have been transfortned into the epicentre and 
symbol of labour protests in the city of Cordoba. Television and radio 
channels also gave space in their news programmes to what was 
happening at FIAT. FIAT workers were recuperating a major role in the 
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local labour movement after decades of passivity, the majority of the 
population was supportive of their struggles. 
Despite this acquired role among the public and to a certain extent within 
the Cordobean working class, we do not have to think that FIAT's 
workers developed, once in contact with the reality around them, a 
revolutionary character, as reports of the conflict from radical sectors of 
the Argentine left seem to show or to hope (as in the case of La Verdad 
Obrera/Partido Obrero). Nevertheless, at the same time, they did not use 
the power acquired from the mobilisation in that particular social situation 
exclusively for economic demands. They constantly mixed "bread and 
butter" issues with more radical objectives, both in terms of representation 
in the workplace and of their position in society. In the months following 
the first plant occupation, conflict was mainly generated by the company's 
refusal to fonnally recognise the new workers' organisation. This created a 
constant push and pull of management with workers. The new leaders 
promoted a campaign of solidarity with others plants and neighbourhoods 
looking for a way to export the conflict out of the gate of the plant. This 
strategy necessanly involved discussions of the reasons for such actions 
and this implied questioning the socio-political system as a whole. 
The evolution of struggle in the FIAT factory is the evolution of workers' 
socio-political consciousness. Struggle against the company, symbolised 
by its foreign ownership and the new working practises and salary 
conditions introduced, went together with a development of a socio- 
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political consciousness, unexpected in a group of workers who were not 
very familiar with conflict. In this process, mobilisation removed 
obstacles that for years had hampered the possibility of conflict. As in the 
case of solidarity and leadership, that emerged spontaneously once the 
obstacles to their full development disappeared, workers' consciousness 
too could be seen as a spontaneous outcome of the situation created with 
the mobilisation. The pressure of market competition outdated and 
bypassed the paternalistic policies of the company and overcame the 
bureaucratic union's possibilities of controlling the labour force. The 
factors that had inhibited conflict for decades weakened. These elements 
were not useful to contain workers' protest any more, solidarity and 
leadership emerged as the most natural bases around which workers' 
strength could be built. 
The opposition to union bureaucracy and company labour flexibility was 
led from the beginning by an independent and democratic organisation 
which was a direct consequence of workers' renewed freedom and 
autonomy. In this context, radicalisation has to be seen as a natural 
element in the evolution of workers' struggles, just as solidarity was 
spontaneous the day of the factory occupation. 
"I will never forget when Gallo said: "we recovered our power to make 
decision, the possibility to take decisions". We recovered the power of 
struggle, of debate, before nothing was discussed. And the group was so 
strong ........ was great 
" (FIAT worker production line, La Morenita). 'i" 
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It is important to stress that once we refer to radicalisation as a natural 
outcome of a process of mobilisation, we are not saying that in all cases 
conflict radicalises workers. There are particular situations, like the one at 
FIAT, in which a combination of factors has been so explosive as to 
overcome and momentarily break those elements of inhibition of workers' 
protests that in the past had worked very well to control of collective 
action. In this context of weakened control and Increased exploitation, a 
vacuum was created that allowed workers' solidarity to be strengthened 
and alternative forms of organisation to be implemented. In the case of 
Renault, changes were introduced smoothly, workers were divided, the 
bureaucratic union maintained control and no space for radicalisation was 
left, this despite extemal conditions that could have favoured it. 
In the months after FIAT's occupation, the mobilisation's leaders tried to 
foster, despite company opposition, the structure of their organisation and 
in January 1997, after several unsuccessful attempts to be recognised as an 
independent local branch of SMATA, they fom-led an independent union 
(SITRAMF). This signalled the highest level of their anti-bureaucratic 
opposition and at the same time the point of no return in their conflict with 
the company. Independently of the support that the majority of workers 
gave to the new organisation, and continuous attempts to establish 
solidarity links outside the factory, company counter mobilisation 
weakened the possibility of maintaining workers actively mobilised. As 
admitted by the Industrial Relations Director: 
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I( people started to be really identified with the team work and we could 
recover the plant. Leaders lost support and left the plant ... .... we fired 
them " (FIAT Industrial Relations Director, fom-ler REPO)x'v. 
Divisions emerged regarding the strategies to be used in the conflict, the 
fear of losing a job and company pressure pushed many to retire from 
active conflict, but divisions apart, a change in workers' consciousness had 
already produced a constant incompatibility and non-confon-nity with the 
work in the factory. One year after the first factory occupation, 1200 out 
of 1700 workers that signed the new agreement with FIAT were laid off or 
forced to abandon the plant. At that time, after a year of struggle and the 
elimination of leaders and activists , it was 
it 1- mpossible to regain control of the people. Many of them had to leave, 
there was no more possibility of their identification with the compromise. 
They were laid off or they voluntarily left " (FIAT Industrial Relations, 
fonner REPO). 'v 
There are several factors, both internal and external, that could explain the 
resilience of workers' resistance and opposition. The socio-political 
conditions at the time of the conflict offered a set of examples of other 
mobilisations and the forins through which a more effective response 
could be offered. FIAT workers received solidarity from organisations 
already involved in a process of opposition to labour flexibility and 
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privatisation. Political parties and public opinion as well, offered support 
to their struggle because this contributed to discredit the overall political 
project promoted by Menem. In general, the situation at the time of the 
conflict represented the context in which workers at FIAT could place 
their struggle and provided a fertile soil to extend it out of the factory. 
Solidarity developed with anti-bureaucratic movements in other plants, as 
was the case of Renault before the internal opposition was co-opted, 
actions in defence of poor neighbourhoods and establishment of relations 
with union organisations in other FIAT factories worldwide. But although 
this scenario could have influenced a radicalisation of conflict positively, 
the majority of those interviewed agreed with the view that they were 
basically struggling alone. Many workers and their organisations openly 
supported the struggle at FIAT, but government and the union 
bureaucracy boycotted it and the fear of losing your job hampered 
extensive solidarity ftom other factories. In the country as a whole there 
were many acts of resistance but they were scattered, with no central 
representation, and without a political party willing or able to act in 
defence of the same struggles. 
"I believe that with more experience and if we would have been in the 
social situation the country is living in today (FIAT worker 4, quality 
department), "' 
We were feeling, and it was in reality like this, that we were alone, we 
were thefirst - (independent union delegate), "" 
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"We told other workers: "they are going to cut your salary" they replied 
"no I don't think so ". In the Chevrolet plant, workers had to go outfrom 
the back door but nobody appeared, or came in solidarity" (FIAT worker 
32, quality department). XVIII 
The sense of abandonment that emerges from the interviews and the fact 
that FIAT's workers were basically alone in their conflict, indicates that 
we should not underestimate the internal conditions which have generated 
mobilisation as a possible basis and explanation of radicalisation. 
Nonetheless external conditions presented a social scenario in which 
labour conflict was certainly favoured, these conditions found a fertile soil 
and the way and under which circumstances mobilisation was generated. 
The same elements that helped the emergence of solidarity and then 
leadership also created the conditions in which a more radical opposition 
could be developed. In this sense the shock provoked by the change of 
contract and the anger against the company and the unions were both the 
bases of the first mobilisation and of the radicalisation and establishment 
of it. Workers were now free to express their opinions and to channel their 
demands through an organisation that was really defending them, they 
could stand up with dignity and refuse the foremen's impositions, they 
were feeling proud to have defended themselves after years of passivity. 
"The compan. v couldn't control us any more. Everything was a batucada, 
hitting the machine, we did batucadafor everv type of reason. The will of 
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the people wasn't the same. The "elderly" that were used to set the 
machine didn't want to do it any morefor that amount of money. People 
gradually became rebels " (FIAT worker 32). "' 
"The plant was really out of control, it was as I am telling you, workers 
could do what they wanted, they worked as they liked and these people(the 
leaders) really had the pulse ofpeople, because people were really angry. 
They didn't want these nine leaders but rather they were disappointed and 
angry and were showing it through this action " (FIAT Industnal 
Relations Director, fonner REPO)" 
Internal and external conditions, with reference to their effects on 
radicalisation, are probably not mutually exclusive and for what it has 
been argued until now could be seen as complementary. In an attempt to 
put together the pieces, that make up a process of mobilisation, it may be 
useful to think of solidarity and consciousness as two succeeding points in 
a continuous line of evolution/radicalisation in which leadership and 
organisation have filtered, framed and established a connection between 
the intemal and the extemal world. If the process of mobilisation is 
positioned in this temporanly widened perspective, the role and 
importance of leadership and organisation in the same process appears 
much clearer than through a narrow focus on a single mobilisation event. 
At the same time, as the case of Renault shows, less successful cases of 
mobilisation/radicalisation can be explained as well. In this company, in 
the particular situation previously described, leadership and organisation 
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did not play any important role in framing workers' consciousness, rather 
they contained it. In other words radicalisation, as far as the case of FIAT 
is concerned, seems to constitute that level of the process of mobIlisation 
in which solidarity has been already transformed, through action, into 
consciousness. The following quotations put in evidence how this process 
of transformation occurred contemporarily with the evolution of the 
struggle: 
" When we occupied the plant for the first time we really didn't have a 
clear consciousness of what we were doing " (FIAT worker, production 
line La Morenita). "' 
"Peo le were now different, the same person was not the same as before, P 
he could see the world in a different way, he had 'Jumped" and this 
happened to all of us, to all of us. The same struggle changed us, all of us, 
it changed us, it shaped us, it changed me and all of us. Emotion, I could 
say, in our case, was an essential element in our struggle " (FIAT 
mobilisation leader)"li 
"We were part of it, we were in the middle of it. In that moment we 
started to realise what labour flexibility was and what was going to 
happen in the country " (FIAT worker 4 Quality Control Department)""' 
"During this process that lasted one, one and haýf years, a very big 
change in consciousness occurred, and this despite the different posi Won 
each one took at the moment of struggle" (FIAT worker 1, production 
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1ine). 1" 
The above quotations seem to confin-n that radicalisation and a change of 
consciousness were part of an evolution in the process of mobilisation. At 
the same time, this evolution was not perceived by the actors as a clear 
and unequivocal perspective. People radicallsed In and through the 
struggle, became activists because, day by day, they had to defend 
themselves and what they had achieved. The rhythm and the time of the 
conflict set the quality and the level of workers' consciousness. Company 
repression, forced part of the workers to retire ftom activism, and 
contributed to increase a sense of group identification in both those who 
continued the open confrontation and those who did not. The conditions in 
which mobilisation emerged favoured radicalisation as an evolution in 
workers' collective consciousness detached from clear cost and benefit 
calculations. 
The case of FIAT and its outcomes is far from any Olsoman rational 
choice theory or approach, as this was discussed in the theoretical chapter. 
Is there any-thing rational in the decision to occupy the plant and provoke 
so openly the company when less costly actions could have been 
implemented instead (for instance a strike or a union negotiation)? Is there 
any self-interested individual decision that could be detected from the 
dynamic of workers' mobilisation? Have they individually reflected on the 
costs and benefits of their action before this was put into practice? People 
that in the last two decades were used to think for themselves, were 
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identified with the company, and had no confidence in collective action, 
did then act, in the case of mobilisation, irrationally (understood in 
Goldman's terms as realistic goals within a market economy)? 
As previously shown, internal and external conditions have influenced the 
process of mobilisation differently. A particular combination of factors 
has created a fertile soil for workers' collective action and this was not the 
product of picket lines, the union's coercion or any other form of 
instrumentalisation of workers' individual will. The evidence in our case 
pointed to the fact that collective action emerged spontaneously. 
Solidarity appeared as the natural basis around which a group of people, 
angered and betrayed by the union and the company, found its strength, 
leadership filtered and framed the grievances, activism maintained people 
mobilised and the conflict radicalised. People's solidanty changed into 
socio-political consciousness evolving through and in action. 
It is particularly important to stress this point because it shows once more 
the inadequacy of cost and benefits calculations as valid elements in the 
analysis of mobilisation. The change in consciousness is fundamental to 
understand why, despite the adverse conditions of the struggle, FIAT 
workers continued in their action although aware that there were high 
probabilities of loosing the conflict and theirjobs. 
After the first factory occupation, the group of leaders who were elected 
during the mobilisation kept representing the workers with the company, 
249 
despite management never officially recognising the new organisation. 
"the company never recognised them (the elected leaders) from a legal 
point of view, we always treated them as a fact, as a factual 
representation. In other words, if they were those with whom we had to 
discuss that's fine, we talked. But we never recognised them as trade 
union. They always demanded such recognition but the company always 
denied it. For us the trade union was SMATA " (FIAT Industrial Relations 
Director, foriner REPO)"'. 
In the three months that followed the first conflict a semi -clandestine 
union was formed and relations with the company were of daily 
confrontation. Apart from the struggle for formal recognition, with 
SMATA opposing it, the labour conditions of the new contract that after 
the conciliation"" workers agreed to sign, were the main reasons for the 
constant state of conflict. This situation favoured more political debate 
among workers through small assemblies, and small discussions organised 
by the group of nine who led the first mobilisation and another 70 
delegates. During these meetings the possibility of defeat was taken into 
consideration: 
it we never said we were going to lose, of course nobody struggles if he 
doesn't see a possibility of winning, but we debated, and we voted in an 
assembly that losing was a possibility and that if we lost the conflict they 
were oing to fire all of us. And we had to opt and this was very 9 
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1. mportant. We gave people the possibility of resigning. We looked around 
and we considered that resignation was one possibility and that the other 
was to struggle. If we wanted to struggle we had to do it well, if we 
wanted to resign as well. Nothing in the middle. In that situation resign 
meant shake your head [ ... I not just to accept Menem. Menem came 
together with other losses. The company was gradually trying to introduce 
new conditions, after the occupation it wanted to recover the space it had 
lost. We had to consider thatfact " (FIAT mobilisation leader). xxv" 
A similar discussion preceded the second factory occupation, which was 
justified as a reaction to the lay off of one of the commission's members. 
Many opposed it, but the majonty voted in favour because it was the only 
way to show the company the strength of the union and to defend its 
future existence. In the second factory occupation too, the risk was 
calculated but the decision was certainly not based on individual gains. At 
least for those who actively participated, the issue was to defend a 
collective interest, and the future existence of the union. The company 
was clearly trying to weaken the new union and workers were individually 
under pressure from foremen not to participate, job advancements were 
proposed to those who were not involved in any action, the possibility of 
being fired was constant. 
........ foremen used to call me activist. "y are you calling me activist? 
Because I'm saying the truth? Because I'm fighting to protect what is my 
right" They tried to smash you so to push you to resign toYourjob. They 
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called me in their offices many time but I didn't want to leave so theyfired 
me " (FIAT worker La Morenita)""" 
'foremen used to tell you that they had seen you talking with the guys of 
the union and that this was going to create problems for you, that it was 
better not to do it anymore" (FIAT mobilisation leader and FIAT worker 
La Morenita)"". 
Despite of this strategy by the enterprise of dividing workers in action, 
half of them occupied the plant and defied the company. The conflict 
ended with 42 new layoffs. 
4. Repression and counter mobilisation. 
The role of repression as the main instrument available to the company in 
the counter mobilisation is very well documented and represented by the 
case of FIAT. "' There is evidence of this not just in the interviews with 
workers who directly experienced repression, but also in what was stated 
by management representatives in Argentina, and also in articles 
published by FIAT's top management. In one of these, co-authored by the 
industrial relations director of the company, reference to the high level of 
conflict shown in the Argentine case is confinned and that the strategy 
adopted was similar to the one used in Italy during the 1970's (in the so 
called conflittivitti permanente, continuous conflict): "The dismissals of 
the most violent activists have had a symbolic character and have re- 
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established internal order and management prerogatives" (Camuffo e 
Massone 2001, p. 68)"" 
The respect for internal order and management prerogatives in the control 
of the labour process has been and is the principle and the leitmotif always 
stressed by companies all over the world. Workplace case studies have 
frequently shown, even if not always directly, the centrality of the control 
of labour and the use of coercion, in the study and understanding of the 
dynamics of industrial relations and collective action (see for instance 
Fantasia 1988, Beynon 1984, Milkman 1997). It is true that there is a 
certain level of workers' consent in the exploitation of labour, as Burawoy 
discovered, but this co-exists with coercion. At the same time , it is 
important to stress that companies are not alone in the use of repression to 
control workers' protests and that states are often willing participants. The 
historical perspective presented in the previous chapter could show how, 
for instance in the case of Argentina, state repression has been widely 
used. 
In addition, looking at repression and considering its role in the 
mobilisation process, it is necessary to specify the different meanings that 
the same concept can adopt. The cases analysed seem to suggest that 
repression can assume a more direct, explicit and violent form or can be 
used in a less evident way, through more camouflaged action, without 
explicit acts of violence. This distinction corresponds to the use of 
repression used directly against mobilisation events or as an instrument 
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for the prevention of conflict. The difference is particularly important in 
understanding how it influenced solidarity and the evolution of workers' 
consciousness. 
FIAT, as well as Renault, has used all the methods available, legal or not, 
to break workers' solidarity, to divide them, to make them again loyal and 
obedient (lafamilia FIAY). Direct repression, as far as the case of FIAT is 
concerned, has been fundamental as an obstacle to further mobIllsation. 
But at the same time, it produced radicalisation of the conflict and 
encouraged a faster development of workers consciousness. In the case of 
Renault, repression did not operate explicitly because the traditional union 
(SMATA) control of rank and file opposition, provided the company with 
the best instrument to control the labour force and to continue in the 
implementation of flexibility and outsourcing. Renault, probably also on 
the basis of FIAT's experience, avoided direct confrontation, implemented 
changes slowly and with union complicity. 
In the case of FIAT, many elements (how the abrupt changes of salary and 
working conditions impacted on workers' sense of loyalty to the 
enterprise, union betrayal, the negation of the social development that 
many identified with work in the company) contributed to reinforce 
solidarity directly through action without an established organisation and 
leadership. These two components stabilised in the first three months after 
the first mobilisation when workers' solidarity transfonued itself, under 
the action of organisation and leadership, into a new and a deeper socio- 
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political consciousness. Also, for this reason company repression had to 
be far more radical than the simple elimination of the leaders. One year 
after the first plant occupation, 1200 out of 1700 workers who signed the 
new contract with FIAT had been made redundant. A change in 
consciousness had already happened. In the case of Renault, where an 
active and challenging rank and file movement came under the control of 
the traditional union, workers did not progress in their socio-political 
consciousness. They felt impotent regarding the company, the union, the 
political power. In the years after the mobilisation they lived under the 
fear of losing their jobs and with a pervasive sense of impotence and 
frustration knowing that almost every day colleagues at work were fired 
(suspended) and that could be probably their turn next. Similarly some of 
the FIAT workers that remained in the plant after the "cleansing" now 
blame themselves for not having participated in mobilisations much more 
then they did; after this process of consciousness raising, their lives in the 
plant and their relation with the company changed completely. 
These two different fonns of repression, one "direct" to counter-mobilise 
and one "indirect" for preventing, could work effectively within a legal 
context that was not protective of workers' independent union action. We 
have already referred to the system for union recognition, its dependency 
on political decisions and how powerful the influence of traditional 
bureaucratic unions in such matters can be. The intervention of the 
provincial government as mediator of the two sides is also questionable. 
Especially in the case of FIAT, a company that had a plan to hire 5000 
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new workers, power relations have to be taken into consideration even if 
we believe that all the rules have been respected and no doubts are raised 
llllý about the honesty of govenunent executives. In the case of the second 
factory occupation, the intervention of the provincial ministry of labour, 
nullifying the effects of all the actions taken during the conflict, should 
have produced the ineffectiveness of the 41 lays off used by the company 
to repress activism. Through an interpretation open to debate, the conflict 
was not considered as collective and the firings acted as individual 
sanctions to be resolved in front of a tribunal. This action in practice 
supported company repression. 
Last, but not least, the case of FIAT, as already mentioned, coincided with 
the introduction of flexible contracts in the industrial sector. The 
implementation of the contract was considered as a kind of test both for 
the other multinationals of the sector and for the government of Menem 
who put lots of stress on labour flexibility, as a panacea for 
unemployment and for his own credibility. Menem was expected in 
Cordoba for the opening of the new plant, but according to the local 
newspaper his decision not to participate in the events was not dependent 
on his health conditions but rather for fear of public protests in the 
province and in the same FIAT's plant (La Voz del Interior, 19/12/1996). 
Workers were not willing to receive the person they saw as responsible for 
their situation and threatened management to mobilise on the day of the 
opening if the President was there. According to several interviews, 
during the days of the first occupation voices were saying in the plant that 
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police repression was imminent. 
The interviews also show samples of different forms of repression. The 
firing of activists was the most obvious way used by the company and 
aimed to weaken workers' resistance through the elimination of leaders. A 
more subtle way was to overcharge or move to the worst section of the 
production line those workers that had participated in mobilisation 
This action served to create conditions of severe stress and isolation which 
acted psychologically on the capacity for resistance of the person. People 
were forced in this way to renounce to their jobs and the company could 
use this "voluntary decision" as proof that no firings were under way and 
that in reality workers were freely abandoning their jobs. Foremen and 
REPO introduced a climate of fear, suspicion, and threats in the factory 
for all those who maintained friendship and support with the people 
outside the plant""". Being a former CORMEC worker meant being 
considered a rebel and workers at the new plant were kept at a distance 
from the possibility of "perversion". At the same time the action of the 
company was inflexible in its recognition of SMATA as the only 
legitimate representation of its employees and the use of this form of 
legalised repression gave no chance to the recently fornied independent 
union. 
Repression can assume different meanings, forms and be promoted by the 
company, the state, the legal system, alone or in combination, and this 
through more or less direct intervention. In all these cases 
its fundamental 
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role is to break solidarity, to divide workers through an individual isation 
of the employment relation and of certain benefits, and to prevent 
collective action. Repression is a natural instrument available to 
companies not just to counter-mobilise and eliminate activists and leaders 
but also to impose managerial decisions, the respect of internal order and 
managerial prerogatives, to use the words of FIAT's Industrial Relations 
Director. This kind of repression is the most subtle and difficult to grasp, 
because the logic of the management "right to manage" is the centre of the 
social system in which we are living. To challenge this "right" means to 
question the entire system. The decision of the company, and its right to 
impose it, will be always justified by the logic of the market, by 
international competition, and by trade agreements. Since no other 
alternative is offered, the impersonal action of the market, the need to be 
competitive will always provide a valid reason to legitimise management 
"'nght" to manage. 
The cases of FIAT and Renault have to be seen in this light. Both 
companies implemented labour flexibility because international 
competition was pressing them to reduce the cost of labour. Workers had 
to be somehow convinced to accept a reduction of their salaries or 
precariousness in their employment. It was natural (for, as we have seen, 
the gap between the social needs constantly created by the system and the 
possibility to physically satisfy them always exist) and that people used to 
have a certain standard of living, oppose any decision that could have 
affected them. In both cases, workers mobilised for the same reasons 
but 
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specific conditions in the plants (companies' strategies, the action of union 
bureaucracy) produced different type of mobilisation and, consequently, 
different types of repression: direct as a counter mobilisation in the case of 
FIAT and indirect, more subtle, but nonetheless effective, in the case of 
Renault. 
5. Conclusions. 
In this chapter, three issues concerning the effects of moblllsatlon at FIAT 
have been considered: the emergence of leaders and the establishment of a 
representative organisation, the evolution of workers' consciousness, the 
radicalisation of conflict and company repression. 
As far as the issue of leadership is concerned, at least in the case of FIAT, 
spontaneous and natural leaders emerged in the process of mobilisation 
basing their action on the solidarity produced by workers' interactions in 
the particular situation created by the change of contract. In this context 
leadership should be seen as the element that strengthened solidarity, and 
made explicit workers' grievances. But once collective action consolidates 
into organisational forms, leadership may become a constitutive element 
of solidarity rather than a product of it and this could explain the 
managerial tendency to eliminate leaders. In this transformation, the 
function of leadership also changes and assumes the role of a cohesive 
element unifying those individual perceptions into collective 
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thinking/actions 
The specific conditions that created the basis on which mobilisation 
occurred, an external situation favouring labour conflict and the repressive 
action of the company could explain how the conflict was at first 
radicalised and was later dissolved. Once the first occupation ended, 
workers realised that they were part of a much more complex reality and 
were forced to face this everyday in the constant confrontation with the 
company. This situation created a new deeper socio- political 
consciousness that strengthened itself in and through action. The analysis 
of events shows that workers' participation in the whole conflict, whatever 
the forms in which each person acted concretely, was certainly more 
conscious and possibly because of this, far from any Olsonian rational 
choice theory of collective action. 
It may be argued that a characteristic of spontaneity is common to 
solidarity, as well as leadership and workers' consciousness and these can 
be seen as different points on the same continuous line of 
evolution/radicalisation. In this perspective a mutual influence is 
detectable, with leadership in particular filtering and framing the external 
and internal reality. 
Repression, with its different fonus and origins, intervenes on this line of 
evolution/radicalisation, breaking solidarity links and dismantling 
adversarial organisations through the elimination of leaders. This is true 
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also when repression does not assume a directly violent aspect as in the 
case of FIAT. At Renault the combined repressive action of the company 
and the union, even if apparently less violent, prevented conflict Erom 
emerging. 
For analytical reasons I have looked at the process of mobIlisation, 
focusing on its different phases. But it should already be evident that a full 
understanding of the same process and of the interests and power relations 
involved in it cannot be obtained by focusing on single events or sections. 
have argued that the cases analysed could be characterised by the 
"presence" or "absence" of certain factors and that in this sense company 
strategies and bureaucratic unionism have been a deten-ninant on the shape 
of the cases of mobilisation. A single model of collective action probably 
does not exist and this is not unexpected, as the first conclusion we can 
reach, but understanding differences helps to set directions in the 
development of social processes. Objective reality has been challenged 
many times, in different ways and fon-ns. What the cases presented in the 
research can add might be new detailed examples of how concretely 
collective action has been put into practice, of its dynamics, of the role 
played in it by the different actors involved and which are the conceptual 
categories that can better define mobilisation. Overall, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, what can be generalised is the complex interaction 
between structural determinants and agency factors. But other cases might 
have proved that instead of company strategies and union bureaucracy, 
other factors as well, may have hampered or facilitated mobilisation and 
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that the way in which internal and external situations influence each other 
is different to the one I have considered as the usual pattern. However, the 
point is not just to put labels and find possible connections because there 
is always in this a risk of extreme empin iI ite icism and a potentially 
number of equally valid cases and conclusions may emerge. Thus, 
maintaining the need for empirical evidence, what research like the 
present one can stress, is that mobilisation is, once more and 
fundamentally, the result of the interplay of two contradictory forces 
operating within market economies. Capital and labour, for all the reasons 
we have mentioned in the theoretical chapter, are intrinsically antithetical, 
physically counter opposed and cyclically produce events in which 
objective realities forinerly taken for granted are collectively challenged. 
The research has certainly added new insights into the processes of 
struggle and in particular has investigated the ways and under which 
conditions, subjects collectively organise, react and change their 
consciousness. There are always areas that remain undiscovered or 
underestimated but whatever the accuracy we may use, the black hole of 
knowledge that all social research can hardly penetrate is that of 
generalisation. Tendencies can be established, similarities can be 
underlined and all the process of collective action clearly investigated but 
we will be always offering a partial view of a more complex and 
articulated reality. 
'As mentioned in another section, workers had signed, the day before the change to the new contract, a 
paper supposed to authorise the union to negotiate a salary reduction of no more than 10%. 
"Se estableci6 tin debate, era todo un debate en la planta. Despuýs de eso se comienza todo tin 
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movimiento, empiezan a movilizarse. No sabian 
bien para donde ir ni que hacer pero empiezan a 
juntarse, era mucha gente y comienza una movilizaci6n interna defibrica sin lideres que la siguieran. 
Cuando se da esta situaci6n ya en la propia movilizaci6n comienzan a aparecer los lideres naturales, 
propios, la gente de mds carticter, mcis tamaflo, el mcis malo, el que levantaba a voz y decia vamos. Ese 
que decia vamos era lo que encaminaba la movilizaci6n. Empiezan a perfilarse a1gunos representantes 
espont6neos, naturales " (Fiat, Industrial Relations Director, former REPO). 
iii With reference to this general sensation, one of the interviewed argued that the occupation was in a 
certain way a reflexive act, not in the sense that it was planned before, but that many had reflected, 
during the night and in the discussions with their families and with other colleagues, on the 
consequences of the change to the new contract. Solidarity was already working. 
'v "Al otro dia los muchachos entraron en lafabrica ....... esa noche no durmi6 nadie. Sefueron a sus 
casas hicieron las cuentas, se dieron cuenta que iban a ganar la mitad de la plata por el mismo 
trabajo. Se deprimieron, lloraron, no durmieron. Al otro dia llegaron mal, colectivamente mal a la 
f6brica y sin que nadie les dyera nada sejuntaron. Que hacemos? " (Fiat mobilisation leader). 
"yo me iba a ir por lo tanto los traba adores podian tener confanza en mi, yo no me iba a que r Y da 
(FIAT mobilisation leader). 
" "Ese dia est6bamos conversando al y hubo un momento en que l1eg6 un silencio ...... porque fue 
generalizado el sentimiento ya mi me agarr6 nervios Vos sabýs que yo en ese momento .... 
habia una 
tablera de la mdquina que yo empecý'a pegar de puflos, no me dolia, por sacarme la bronca. Pasa el 
jefie en ese momento y me ve y en esos momentos toda la gente a mi me seguia y los dem6s tambiýn 
empezaron a golpear y asi todas las lineas. Donde probaban los motores a los motores empezaron a 
sacarle los silenciadores, m6s yo golpeaba mds los demds me seguian " 
"' "Me levantý y le di vuelta a la mesa y le dije "ac6 nosotros vamos a hacer lo que la masa decida y 
si la masa decide no trabajar, no vamos a trabajar, est6? ". "Ustedes no son nada ". "Si somos 
muchos, somos trabajadores ". " Vos de esta manera no me habMs, soy tu jefe! ". " Vos ahora no sos 
nada y yo me voy a levantar y me voy a ir afuera y quien me quiera seguir que me siga ". 
"Ellos pensaban que yo era maravilloso como lider porque' habia logrado de transformar esa masa 
de corderos con la camiseta puesta en luchadores ejemplares. Pero fueron ellos a lograrlo!! Ellos lo 
lograron. Lo ýnico que yo hicefue de explicitar esa situaci6n nada mds - (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
" "Yo sý que en esos momentos hubo una tirada de bronca, le llam6 la atenci6n a la gente de 
personal porque no estaba esa persona en otro lado y no en contra de la empresa " (former CPI FIAT). 
" "En la segunda toma con el activismo tomando un papel protag6nico se rompe al vinculo 
democrdtico con la base, esofue un error. Muchas veces el activismo toma en sus manos el veneno que 
eada uno tiene encima ". (Independent union member). 
\' "Despuýs de la toma conoci a otro tipo de gente con la cual llegamos a la politica ... antes 
&amos 
una isla " (Fiat worker 4, Quality Control Department). 
xii , 'Aumentaban los temores de que el conflicto se extendiera a otras plantas y que frente a la ex 
Cormec se realizara el acto central de la protesta del Jueves - (La Voz del Interior, 24/9). 
Xiii " Yo no me olvidarý nunca cuando Gallo decia: 'hemos recuperado elpoder de decisi6n nuestro, de 
tomar decisiones'. Nosotros recuperamos el poder de lucha, de discusi6n, antes no se discutia nada. Y 
era tan fuerte el grupo ... .... era 
lindo " (FIAT worker production line, La Morenita). 
"N' "La gente empez6 a identificarse muchisimo con los equipos de trabajo y se recuper6 6 la planta. 
Los i, oceros fueron abandonados y se empezaron a ir ... ..... 
los echamos" (FIAT Industrial Relations 
former REPO). 
"' "Imposible recuperar a la gente. Se tubo que ir mucha gente que no habia posibilidad de que 
volviera a identificarse con el compromiso. Fueron despedidos se fueron solos" (FIAT Industrial 
Relations, former REPO). 
""' "Yo creo que nosotros si hubi&amos tenido un poco m6s de experiencia 6 si nos hubi&amos 
cricontrado en la situaci6n social del pais de hoy ----" (FIAT worker 
4, Quality Control Department) - 
""' "Nosotros sentimos, y realmente era asi, que est6bamos solos, fuimos los primeros. "(Independent 
union delegate) 
wiii " Vos ibasY le avisabas a los vagos "che loco, les van a bajar el sueldo "y los tipos 11 no, no creo 
Hasta que no te tocan no te metes. En la Chevrolet lo hacian salir de la puerta trasera y ninguno se 
acerc6 a nosotros "(FIAT worker 32, Quality Control Department) 
, \IX "la fýbrica no nos podia manejar. Clialquier cosa era batucada, golpear la m6quina, se 
hacia 
batucada por cualquier cosa. La voluntad de la gente no era la misma. Los viejos que estaban 
acostumbrado a poner a punto las m6quinas ya no lo hacian inds por esa plata. La gente se 
fue 
haciendo rebelde" (FIAT Nvorker 32). 
'" "La planta era reahnente un desmanejo, no se tenia control, tal como te digo, el operario 
hacia lo 
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que queria, trabajaba como queria y esta gente tenia realmente toda la sensaci6n de la gente, porque 
la gente estaba realmente enojada. No que los querian a estos nueves? si no que estaban enojados y lo 
representaban de estaforma - (FIAT Industrial Relations Director, former REPO). 
"' "Cuando se tom6 la ftibrica por primera vez, no teniamos mucha conciencia de los que estdbamos 
haciendo " (FIAT worker, production line La Morenita). 
xx" "ahora habian cambiado, esa misma persona ya no era la de antes, ya veia el mundo diferente, 
habia pegado un salto y esto le sucedi6 a todos, a todos. La lucha misma nos cambio' a todos, nos fue 
cambiando, modelando, a mi ya todos. Entonces lo emotivo en lo nuestro yo te diria fue un elemento 
esencial en nuestra lucha - (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
""' "Eramos parte de eso, estdbamos en el medio de eso. Vos sabes que nosotros empezamos en ese 
momento a darnos cuenta de todo lo que era la flexibilizaci6n y de todo lo que iba a venir en el pais " 
(FIAT worker 4 Quality Control Department). 
xx'v "hubo en todo el proceso que duro' un aflo, un aho y medio una toma de conciencia muy grande 
por parte de todos, independientemente de la posici6n que asumieron en los momentos de lucha " 
(FIAT worker 1, production line). 
xxv "la empresa nunca los reconoci6 legalmente, siempre se los trat6 como un hecho concreto, una 
representaci6n de hecho, es decir si es con ustedes que tengo que hablar, hablo pero no les vo 
-va reconocer ningýn cardcter sindical. Para nosotros el sindicato era SMATA " (FIAT Industrial 
Relations Director, former REPO). 
" The conciliation allowed workers 90 % of their CORMEC salaries, plus other minor benefits and 
allowances and the possibility to discuss in two years the terms of their contracts. On the basis of this 
agreement workers subscribed the new contract with FIAT Auto. 
"' "En ningýn momento nosotros dijimos vamos a perder, por supuesto nadie pelea si no tiene a1guna 
posibilidad de ganar pero nosotros discutimos y votamos en asamblea que habia posibilidad de perder 
y que si perdiamos nos iban a despedir a todos. Y que teniamos que optar, esto fue muy importante. 
Dimos a la gente la posibilidad de resignar. Nos miramos alrededor y nos dimos cuenta que la 
resignaci6n era una posibilidad y la otra era pelear. Si peleamos bien y si resignamos bien. A media 
no. En esos t&minos, resignar significaba agachar la cabeza ............. no solamente que venga Menem 
eso seria lo de meno. Que venga Menem traia emparejado la perdida de otras cosas. La empresa de a 
poco te queria meter imposiciones, pasada la toma de a poco queria recuperar terreno. Y ese 
recuperar terreno nosotros lo teniamos que tener en cuenta - (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
xxv"' "los mismos jefes me decian activista y yo les decia, porque activista 9 Para decir la verdad? 
Para pelear, para reclamar lo que esjusto? Ellos trataban de aplastarte, de que vos renunciara. Me 
llamaron muchas veces, yo no quise renunciar hasta que me despidieron " (FIAT worker, La 
Morenita). 
"" "Los jefes te decian que te habian visto hablar con los muchachos del sindicato y que esto te iba a 
dar problemas, que era mejor dejar de hacer esto " (FIAT mobilisation leader and FIAT worker La 
Morenita). 
"' Nearly all the interviews pointed to the company's repression. Cases of physical aggression have not 
been recorded, but the use of psychological methods occurred daily. According to those interviewed, 
the mobilisation leaders and their families were shadowed by company security agents, activists were 
moved to the night shifts, and promotion was given to those who wanted to abandon the "rebels". The 
company could also influence the media, just threatening television and newspapers with the 
suspension of adverts. During the first plant occupation that occurred in the Austral equinox, a local 
radio suggested workers' wives, with their husbands in the plant day and night, find a different way to 
celebrate the new season. The company could also influence the institutions. A video tape for the 
University television proved that during the general strike of the 26th of September, a group of the 
company security service was video recording the protest from the roof of the government building. 
""' "l licenziamenti degli attivisti piý facinorosi hanno avuto carattere simbolico e segnato la 
riaffermazione dell'ordine interno e delle prerogative manageriali " (Camuffo e Massone, 200 1, p. 68). 
""" The majority of the videos produced by the internal surveillance in all these years refer to the time 
of. c. onflict. Workers were identified through the video and put on a blacklist. 
Those who were fired after the second occupation, built a tent in front of the plant to receive 
solidarity from other colleagues and to maintain links with the inside of the plant. 
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Chapter 6: The two dimensions of mobilisation. 
1. Causes and dynamics. 
In academic books, conclusions sometimes appear as nothing more than a 
good exercise in revisiting the essence of previous chapters and in 
expressing their outcomes in a clearer and sharper way. But this simple 
consideration, looking at conclusions as a sort of folder within which all 
research material is collected and summed up, could underestimate the 
creative process that the writing of a concluding chapter can represent. A 
reflection on specific issues raised at other periods of the investigation and 
the need to synthesise them in a few pages, potentially constitute the 
conditions for a reformulation of previous concepts and opinions in a 
much more original and creative way. This does not mean to reach 
conclusions not consistent with the rest of the thesis and the empirical 
evidence provided but, while writing the last chapter, there is an empty 
space that can be filled with a higher level of abstraction. 
In the light of the above, this chapter will review the main findings of the 
research and while doing this it will develop some final postulations. 
The research started as an empirical investigation into the causes and 
effects of two workers' mobilisations occurring in two automobile plants 
in the city of Cordoba, Argentina, during 1996/1997. The aim of the 
research was to study the social processes that operate at the Nvorkplace 
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level in the formation and evolution of collective action, following Kelly's 
mobilisation theory as a main framework in the analysis. 
In the first chapter, the hypothesis was advanced that a refonnulation of 
the concept of injustice, namely that Injustice acquires a meaning in 
action, is justified for both theoretical and empirical reasons. The cases 
have shown that mobilisation is not always a process that finds its origins 
in a perceived sense of injustice, because the meanings and the limits of it 
appear to workers once the action has already started. It is then that 
injustice, while framed by and within action, acquires significance and so 
doing strengthens the whole process of mobilisation, offering to workers 
and leaders an imaginary flag under which the continuation of struggle 
can be represented. Thus the point is not to argue that injustice does not 
exist at all before the mobilisation, but rather to underline that the 
category has a meaning and a function within collective action just if this 
latter has started already. Injustice has to be detached from the individual 
sphere and reconsidered as a category that while it could be useful to 
interpret collective actions, is not the basis of mobilisation. Historical 
examples of the relation between national politics and workplace conflict 
have been used to show how injustice is rather a volatile and subjective 
concept whose meaning vanes considerably with the ideology, the power 
relations,, the social enviromnent and the material situation of the people 
considered. With reference to the history of Argentina's labour movement, 
we have seen how, even in apparently similar conditions and settings, 
mobilisation can follow different patterns. In the first months of the last 
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period of military rule, for instance, Ford and Mercedes workers 
spontaneously mobilised despite the risk to their security, while at FIAT 
this did not happen. At the same time, and for its subjective nature, the 
concept can be used either to refer to radically different situations that 
have nothing in common with mobilisation. Contextualisation it is a 
necessary and obvious condition to avoid emptying the concept of 
meaning and in the case of mobilisation, it is action that offers the context 
within which injustice acquires significance. 
Considenng the weakness of the concept of injustice, the attempt has been 
to address mobilisation by looking at it from a more objective point of 
view. In market economies labour is treated first as a commodity that can 
be bought and sold and, as a consequence of this, as a cost that firms, in 
particular under international competition, have to reduce and use flexibly 
in relation to business requirements. Workers live constantly in a situation 
of "inevitability" of their conditions, not having the individual possibility 
of influencing the law of supply and demand in the labour market, their 
living depends both on the salaries they can earn selling their labour and 
their subordination to the employer, and ratified by a supposedly free 
contract. Within this context, acutely defined as that of "structural 
unfreedom of the proletariat" (Cohen 1986), workers develop a set of 
interests objectively conflicting with that of the employers. These interests 
vary in relation to the level of social development that a given society in a 
given time has been able to achieve. It is the placing of workers in specific 
historical and social context that detennines their interests as structured 
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around the existing level of material, necessary and social needs. 
However, due to the existing gap between capitalist development and 
workers' access to the material possession of those commodities 
considered at a time in question as needs, a struggle between two groups 
going in opposite directions is always to be expected. The differences 
between what is promised or expected and the harsh reality of the law of 
the mar et, increases in te production rhythms, fragmentation of working 
time, stress on the job, can all be seen as si I that generate the 
impossibility of satisfying (in terms of lack of money, time and freedom 
of enjoyment) those social needs regularly produced in our societies. 
The identification of these objective trends and the definition of workers' 
needs could better frame the context within which mobilisation occurs. 
However , it is the analysis of micro contexts that offers the possibility of 
understanding how at certain times, subjects collectively contest the status 
quo. Consequently, a second issue treated extensively in both the 
theoretical and empirical chapters is solidarity. The concept and the role 
of solidarity in mobilisation are highly debatable and can undoubtedly 
raise concerns. Firstly, it is common sense for those who study conflict 
and collective action, to consider at least a minimum level of solidarity as 
a rather obvious and natural condition of any mobilisation and 
consequently most of the time it is taken for granted or considered 
implicitly. Secondly, and related to this latter point, there is a problem 
with the definition of the concept that vanes with different groups and 
historical situations. Thirdly, the difficulty to provide a fixed, static 
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understanding of solidarity is shown by the fact that often the methods 
used to investigate it do not produce entirely reliable results. Quantitative, 
survey analysis has been criticised because it is considered inappropriate 
to study concepts, like solidarity and class consciousness, that cannot 
easily be framed into the structure of a questionnaire (Fantasia 1995, 
Portelli 1991). Nevertheless interviews or participant observation, 
although more suitable, have their limitations because the concept is in 
itself difficult to grasp. In addition, solidarity has often been studied 
together with issues related to the labour process (for instance Beynon 
1984, Edwards and Scullion 1982), and to class consciousness (Rosendhal 
1985, Fantasia 1988), within cultural accounts of the working class 
(Bruno 1999) or in historical perspective (Hanagan 1980). The fact that, 
directly or indirectly, solidarity has influenced studies of labour and the 
nu abuse of the concept in the internationalist literature and political 
propaganda, have added to the confusion even more. 
The data collected during the fieldwork for this research showed, once 
again, evidence of the problems that the concept of solidarity can create, 
both as a theoretical formulation and as a valid category in investigating 
the causes of mobilisation. In all the interviews I have conducted, the 
word "solidarity" does not appear very frequently and when this happens 
it is, most of the time, as an answer to a question in which I first drew the 
problem of solidarity to the attention of the interviewee. Before the 
conflict, at least in the discourse of workers, solidarity was to a large 
extent absent ftorn both workplaces and in this a combination of 
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unfavourable conditions probably played a major role. The inheritance of 
the repressive climate introduced by the last military dictatorship, the 
instability of the labour market, the fear of loosing comparatively well 
paid employment, the desire to maintain unaltered the social status 
achieved, union bureaucracy, dIffuse company paternalism, restricted the 
room for solidarity. In particular, these conditions played a fundamental 
role in fragmenting and individualising the workforce and in creating 
selfishness, and the reproduction of these attItudes provided, to the new 
employed workers, fundamentally individualistic examples and behaviour. 
We can certainly argue that within this unfavourable background, 
solidarity could not easily appear to workers as a resource for their 
mobilisation. But, if this is true, how can we explain two factory 
occupations that lasted for one week carried out by a workforce defined as 
scared, passive and not used to conflict? In the case of FIAT in particular, 
the mobilisation was unexpected and inexplicable for the majority of 
workers, and was not planned. They felt uncomfortable with the 
conditions introduced by the new contract but at the same time they 
accepted it and did not dispute the decision of the company. The day after 
the change to the new contract they went to the factory not thinking about 
a mobilisation but rather about how to manage, how to rearrange their 
lives, to the new situation of reduced rights and salaries, they were 
continuing to think in terins of individual interests. Social unrest and 
mobilisations were appearing frequently in the country since the process 
of privatisation and workforce reduction created a new mass of 
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unemployed and marginalised people. But our cases show that external 
conditions, at least at the beginning, did not play any role and the 
mobilisations can be explained on the basis of internal factors. With this 
background what was the cause of mobilisation then, if injustice appeared 
in action and the leadership was a not formed at first? 
The fact that workers found their own mobilisation inexplicable and 
unbelievable and could not clearly express which internal motivation 
pushed them to abandon their machines and group together and talk about 
their situation, is evidence of both the difficulty to give names and precise 
meanings to what they were collectively feeling and, at the same time, of 
the spontaneity of their action. This element of spontaneity emerges as 
well in the interviews with managers, and this is very strange for people 
that , in other occasions, understood mobilisations and collective action as 
basically the product of a charismatic leader. It is useful to reproduce part 
of the interview with the industrial relations director, the fonner 
representative of the personnel office in the plant: 
"a debate started, in the whole plant there were discussions. After this a 
movement started to grow, they started to mobilise. They had no idea of 
where to go and what to do but nonetheless they started to gather, they 
were many, and then an internal mobilisation of the plant, without 
leaders, started to emerge" 
The person who later on was elected as workers' representative and leader 
in the mobilisation also points to it as something spontaneous and 
unexpected, as something emotional for many of them: 
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"it was a situation for crying because of solidarity ......... everything was 
unexpected, it was as though something got free, it was released and this 
was positivefor the people". 
In the words of the manager there is just a reference to what 
spontaneously happened: first a debate, then discussions, then a 
movement, a mobilisation. No leaders, just an "internal mobilisation of 
the plant". What is the relation between an internal mobilisation and a 
spontaneous action? Is solidarity an emotion as the second interview 
suggests? 
Thus far, it has been shown that if we want to assume solidarity as being 
central to the understanding of mobilisation, a further reflection on 
theoretical aspects is necessary. The notion of solidarity adopted in the 
thesis on the one hand assumes that, particularly when talking about 
collective actions, a minimum of mutual help has to be identified among 
those people jointly involved in production activities. On the other hand 
and based on this latter consideration, the emphasis is on the need for a 
dynamic view of the concept. Solidarity, as something static and precise, 
probably does not exist because it is in itself fluid and it operates in the 
fluidity of social relations. This means that many factors at different times 
can shape the forms solidarity takes, the periods in which it appears, and if 
it appears. This imposes us a look at solidarity as a social phenomenon 
whose boundaries are defined by the same process in which it appears. 
Interviews collected for this research, suggest interpreting the concept in 
this way. Thus, the emphasis on processes also invites us to look at those 
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elements/factors whose presence and absence could have altered the forms 
solidarity takes in specific occasions, which then influence the 
mobilisation. 
The validity of the analysis and arguments put forward concerning 
solidarity is not in antithesis with the role played by leaders in 
mobilisation. Their importance in the understanding of collective action 
has been stressed many times from different academic schools and within 
different historical and political contexts. Workplace case studies that 
flourished in the 1970's and beginning of 1980's, have directly or 
indirectly recognised the role of leaders in shaping and framing workers' 
grievances. Researchers of social movement have devoted to the issue a 
wide coverage. More recently a new wave of studies inspired by Kelly's 
work on mobilisation has contributed to enrich and give detail to our 
knowledge of the function of leadership. But the importance of this latter 
in industrial relations and social mobilisation is best represented by a 
simple search in a library catalogue. Under the terin "leadership" and 
under that of "leadership and management", approximately 3000 and 200 
titles respectively appear on the screen. The extensive work on this subject 
speaks for itself 
This research underlines the role that leaders play in the organisation, 
stimulation and cohesion of workers' protests and at the same time tries to 
reflect on the social processes that support the emergence of leadership. 
The cases have shown how companies, as well as union bureaucracy, tend 
to weaken, prevent and, eventually repress, the emergence of people 
from 
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below. Moreover the fact that leaders are often considered the cause of 
mobilisation and become a target of managerial strategies, are elements 
that invite further reflections on the function of leadership. 
have argued that, in particular with reference to the case of FIAT, 
solidarity emerged out of workers' interactions in the particular situation 
created by the change of contract. In this context, leadership should be 
seen as the element that, born out of a solidarity movement, transfon-ned it 
into a more solid mobilisation making explicit workers' grievances. 
Nevertheless, once collective action consolidates into organisational 
forms, leadership may become a constitutive element of solidarity rather 
than just a product of it. In this transfonnation the function of leadership 
changes and assumes the role of a cohesive element which unifies 
individual perceptions into collective thinking/actions. In a way, leaders 
represent an ideological continuation of the same mobilisation that had 
produced them. 
2. Effects. 
Until now I have drawn some conclusions by reviewing the 
dynamics/causes of the mobilisations analysed and the role played in them 
by the conceptual categories of injustice, solidarity and leadership. This 
can be considered as the first dimension of the study. I did not directly 
mention those contingent factors that, in the specific cases, produced 
different outcomes in ten-ns of collective action and this is an intended, 
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voluntary decision. I could here repeat, by summarizing, that at FIAT the 
au abrupt change of contract left workers first astonished, then perplexed and 
finally angry. They felt betrayed by the union that had promised to 
maintain the salary reduction within the 10%, they felt abandoned by the 
company whose paternalistic policies could not resist the pressure of 
international competition. They spontaneously occupied the plant and 
soon established their own representation and organisation within the 
vacuum of power created by the contemporary absence of both the union 
and the company. In the case of Renault, conflict was diluted through 
clear managerial strategies of gradual workforce reduction and 
externalisation of production sections. The bureaucratic union SMATA 
supported covertly the decisions of the company and maintained unaltered 
its leadership, first controlling and then co-opting internal opposition. The 
mobilisation at FIAT, whose workforce was legally with SMATA, and the 
Renault workers' protests put pressures on the union leadership and a 
factory occupation took place. 
Of course it is fundamental to know what concretely provoked a particular 
mobilisation, the subjects involved, the external and internal influences on 
the process, the role played in it by the conceptual categories mentioned 
before. The use of companson can help to establish a set of rules, or 
tendencies towards mobilisation. This latter point in particular has to be 
treated cautiously. Historical evidence, at least in what concerns 
Argentina, shows that mobilisation does not always respond to 
predetennined criteria and, thinking in tenns of process, fluidity in the 
interpretation has to be maintained. In this sense by saying that company 
276 
strategies and union bureaucracy are the factors that can explain 
mobilisation does not necessarily mean arguing that their presence, as in 
the case of Renault, prevented open conflict, as if this latter one was the 
norm. But the comparison provides evidence that in the case of the 
absence of both, a certain type of mobilisation happened and in the other 
case it did not. Without the elements mentioned above, conflict does not 
necessarily explode, but is certainly possible to argue that the same factors 
could hamper or influence mobilisation outcomes. 
Putting it in another way, as far as the cases of this research are 
concemed, on the one hand, we cannot easily generalise and establish 
secure patterns of the origin and development of mobilisation, but just 
tendencies. On the other hand, we can certainly affirm that the absence or 
presence of a specific company strategy and of a bureaucratic union have 
hampered and/or influenced the mobilisations considered in this research. 
The alternation of "absence" and "presence" is the second, but not the less 
important, dimension in the analysis and explains the title of the chapter. 
By looking at mobilisation with the aid of this second dimension, allows 
us to understand how the alternation mentioned above has influenced not 
just the dynamics and causes of mobilisation but also the effects of it. In 
the case of FIAT it is possible to observe how these particular conditions, 
that we have defined as "absence", have provided a fertile soil for a 
radicalisation of workers' consciousness and of their behaviour and for a 
repressive action from the company. 
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These two effects often come together and it is not a surprise that they 
mutually influence. Green (1990), for instance, from the perspective of 
criminal sociology, shows the effects of policing on miners consciousness 
during the 1984/1985 strike in Britain. Although in the case of FIAT 
direct police repression was not used, psychological violence by means of 
threats and discrimination for all those involved in the conflict was non-nal 
and put consistent pressure on workers. Green's analysis goes very close 
to what I have argued on the issue of repression and consciousness in the 
empirical chapter. In particular she refers, following Brecher (1972), to 
mobilisation (stnke in her case) as a process based on solidarity that 
transforms the people involved, changing their passivity and 
individualism into collective action. She also argues that mobilisation can 
create consciousness and politicisation, pointing at policing as a potential 
amplifier of this and at the action of the union bureaucracy as an element 
that, on the contrary, contributes to lessen the conflict. 
The case of FIAT shows a direct dependency of workers' reactions with 
the repressive measures adopted by the company. On the one hand, the 
elimination of leaders and activists weakened the organisational structure, 
rendering increasingly difficult any form of possible resistance. On the 
other hand, those who did not refuse to abandon the conflict, strengthened 
their solidarity links and accepted the risk of a protracted confrontation. 
The internal struggles with the company and the rhythms and the times of 
the conflict set the quality and the level of workers' consciousness. 
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This latter changed in and throughout the entire mobilisation, affecting the 
majority of workers who, even if they gradually abandoned open 
confrontation and activism, had already "jumped" into a different vision of 
their reality with regard to both the workplace and the society as a whole. 
One year after the factory occupation 1200 out of 1700 lost their jobs 
because, as a manager said, they could not accept the compromise 
anymore. 
The radicalisation of conflict has then to be seen as a process of evolution 
of workers' socio-political consciousness that the 'absence" of union 
bureaucracy and the strategy adopted by the company facilitated. Without 
those elements that for many years maintained conflict at a low level and 
controlled workers' protests, the introduction of the new and worse 
contract (read also as the impossibility to satisfy social needs) represented 
the spark for the mobilisation. This unleashed a chain reaction and, as in a 
line of continuous evolution/radicalisation, solidarity transfortned and 
evolved dunng the conflict to become socio-political consciousness within 
a context filtered and framed by leadership and organisation and in which 
the connection between the extemal situation of labour conflict and the 
internal struggles appeared as fonns of the same reality. 
A process of mobilisation should be seen in a temporarily wide 
perspective because in this way the importance of each conceptual 
category can be perceived entirely. The nexus of cause/effect, the 
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alternation of "absence" and "presence", will become more clearly 
understandable and can explain other cases of less open 
mob i li sation/radicali sation. Although probably the topic of another piece 
of research, if it is true that there is a component of absence/presence that 
can explain different dynamics, causes and effects of mobilisation, the 
question could be then to know on what the absence/presence dynamic 
depends. Historical examples of mobilisations have shown how people 
challenge the objective reality surrounding them in many different ways 
and forms. With other empirical data, the thesis might have concluded that 
other factors,, different from union bureaucracy and company strategy, 
were the causes of mobilisation and this not necessarily within the 
nlý ausence/presence dynamic. But these different conclusions would not 
have changed the whole picture within which mobilisation has to be 
placed since the logic dominating collective action remains that of two 
opposed groups with different objective interests in contrast to each other. 
The absence or presence of bureaucratic unionism and company strategies 
are some of the possible forms through which this counter opposition is 
expressed. 
3. Lessons from Argentina? 
The historical analysis of workers' and social mobilisation in Argentina is 
very rich for cases and experiences that do not leave room for doubts as to 
the importance the country has for all those who study events of collective 
action and popular uprisings. Whatever the government, the party in 
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power, the ideological framework, the temporal dimension, the level of 
organisation. or the charisma of leaders, Argentineans have always, and 
stubbornly, I am tempted to say, mobilised. This heterogeneity of 
examples puts under severe scrutiny the validity of any static formulation 
of the mobilisation theory both in micro and macro perspective. Certain 
conceptual categories and their interrelations may be questioned, 
assumptions tested and the evidence of new cases considered. 
As far as this research is concerned there are elements that may be useful 
to evaluate in a different light: the role of traditional unions as organisers 
of protest and the existence of a set of necessary conditions for workers' 
mobilisations. Especially when we compare the Argentinean case with 
that of Western Europe, the image of trade unions as responsible and 
"rational" institutions part of a system of industrial relations becomes less 
clear and precise. Peronism empowered these organisations, transforming 
them into political and electoral machines, but at the same time workers 
always maintained a strong pressure on leaders for the fulfilment of their 
needs and demands. This double function as organisers of mass for both 
political and class interests coincided with their power as mobIllsers. But 
the contradictions between peronist ideology and workers' needs often 
produced grassroots movements that confronted the power of bureaucracy, 
once again, on their capacity to mobilise the workforce. This dynamic has 
strongly influenced labour relations in Argentina, at least from the second 
part of the XX century, and has shaped people's cultural references and 
III ite a understanding of politics: it is not untrue to say that mobilisation is qui 
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familiar concept for the majority of Argentineans. 
The existence of this sort of structural idea of mobilisation goes with the 
economic instability that has charactensed Argentina in the historical 
period considered, and particularly in the last decade. As for many 
peripheral countries, dunng the 1990's, a programme of privatisations, 
labour flexibility and neo-liberal restructuring had been implemented 
under the auspices of the IMF. The results of these "therapies" were 
visible worldwide during the popular uprising of December 2001, but this 
was just the tip of the iceberg. Mobilisation started well in advance middle 
class "cazerolas revolution" occupied the street of Buenos Aires claiming 
back their savings. Analysing the situation at FIAT and Renault in 1996, 
with the knowledge of the events which have happened since, gives us a 
perspective on a medium period of time during which the socio-political 
conditions for mobilisation emerged gradually and at different times. "We 
were the first" said once FIAT mobilisation leader, showing a newspaper 
reporting piqueteros roadblocks in the outskirts of Cordoba. The 
flexibility of working conditions in the industrial sector, was the second 
target of the reforms introduced under Menem's governments, and this 
because the first attack was to acquired workers' rights, put in place 
during the waves of privatisation of former state enterprises. But it is true 
that the formal sector in Argentina started to decline approximately at the 
same time, and with this created a mass of unemployed people whose only 
resources for survival, to guarantee their material reproductiong was 
mobilisation. Those who went on strike at FIAT and Renault, and in 
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similar industrial areas of the country, almost contemporaneously were 
not starving but defending an achieved level of social needs and framed 
their mobilisation within this concrete threat to their rights. Although 
situated in a period of generalised social unrest, workers' struggles at 
FIAT and Renault remained substantially isolated from the rest of the 
protest. All these considerations seem to suggest that waves of 
mobilisation may be coincident and favoured by moments of economic 
recession but, at least in the cases presented, it is the extent to which 
social needs remain consistently unfulfilled (for reasons of both trade 
union incapacity and government absence) that determines the necessary 
conditions for mobilisation. Thus, while evaluating the perspectives for 
widespread mobilisation, even just by reference to the national context, 
the tendency for struggles to be fragmented has to be considered. 
Workers' solidarity may be a powerful resource for mobilisation, as I have 
tried to show, but it has to be considered with reference to the situation of 
a particular group of workers. People at FIAT realised they "were the 
first" just when they mobilised, when they became conscious and it was 
not a surprise for them to be almost alone in their struggle. Despite 
political calls for solidarity, the cases show that in situations of economic 
recession what counts is often a short term perspective based on the 
satisfaction of immediate needs. 
The struggles of the 1990's, although scattered, with a short-term vision 
and limited, remained as part of the social expenences of those Nvho 
mobilised, and were the signals of an unstable economic system for those 
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at that time unaffected, and were the examples and the pool for 
recruitment for those who were organ'sing the new forms of resistance9 
which have appeared in the last few years. In Argentina, new proletarians 
have emerged from the ashes of formal employment, traditional industrial 
conflict has to a certain extent disappeared and changed its forins and 
increased the strength of working people's mobilisations. 
4. Limitations and final considerations. 
This thesis, as is the case in qualitative case study research, has structural 
limitations. Despite the efforts to select representative cases, to add 
elements of comparison and to maintain a methodological accuracy, FIAT 
and Renault still remain two of the potentially infinite number of cases 
that could reach the same, or totally different, conclusions. It is important 
to stress this point, to avoid considering the findings of the research, as 
both easily applicable to other similar realities or, on the contrary, 
impossible to generalise. The identification of specific factors influencing 
the process of mobilisation has been supported by the reference to other 
works on the issues and to historical data on similar events and this should 
have increased the chances of generalisation. Yet the research remains far 
from an objective, true and "certified" reality and this requires, for the 
future, the need to add more cases and evidence to the study of 
mobilisation. 
The attention to the micro contexts and to the dynamics of collective 
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action has certainly produced a less detailed analysis of political processes 
and social mobilisation external to the plants. In particular I refer to the 
way in which conflict has been politicised and how both workers and 
companies have reacted to this. Which are the boundaries between 
workplace and social mobilisation? What's the level of needs around 
which these two different instances of action are structured? Questions 
like these still remain unanswered. In the same line of criticism and with 
the same goals, more focused research could have offered deeper cultural 
accounts of the process of mobilisation and on the meaning of struggle. 
As I said, I do not consider my findings as objectively true, I have simply 
offered an interpretation of reality on the base of the data in my possession 
and I am not too much interested in defending what concretely emerged 
from the cases studied with the positions of those who have found 
something different. I recognise the possibility to be corrected soon by an 
equally valid work by another author who will discover, for instance, the 
importance of gender (the absence of women representing another 
structural limitation of this research) for recruitment and mobilisation. 
However , in the social sciences and 
in case study research in particular, 
there is a sort of passion for details and micro conditions, an extreme 
attention to the correct balance of all the possible factors involved, an 
ni, abuse of categories and definitions that can sometimes produce 
the 
perception that what we are describing is, to be frank, almost an 
abstraction from the reality. This tendency of extreme empiricism and to 
debate just on "facts" inevitably leaves aside those elements that could 
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contribute also to understand the whole picture. As a consequence of this 
tendency, instead of moving dialectically from theory to facts and vice 
versa, we can observe theories based exclusively on facts and case study 
research that on the basis of different findings (facts) criticise a theory 
based on other "facts". A potentially infinite and circular process. 
In this research I have also tried to give attention to those objective 
elements of the social reality that are often taken for granted because they 
are considered obvious and hence do not add much to the understanding 
of our realities. In this sense the study of workers' mobilisation may imply 
the following "obvious" conditions: the pressure of the labour market and 
the lack of alternatives, the "inevitability" of workers' dependency on a 
salary to earn a living and consequently their subordination within the 
employment contract, companies' repressive methods, ideological 
dominant values produced by global competition, inequalities and lack of 
access to social development. As far as mobilisation is concerned all these 
factors are not old, or ideological but are simply facts that we cannot 
avoid considering as immanent in the lives of the majoritY of workers and 
hence, to different extents, profoundly influencing the opportunities for 
people to mobilise. 
The existence of these objective and histoncal conditions may be 
considered as the foundation upon which the analysis of collective action 
has to be placed and the categories identified in the theory can be tested 
and compared. While refusing an individualistic account of social reality, 
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this research recognises an important role for subjects in the ways in 
which they shape and give form to their reactions to an imposed system of 
rules. The understanding of these processes of social mediation and the 
questioning of the inevitability of a system formerly taken for granted, 
represents the turning point in the interpretation of mobilisation. I hope 
my thesis may have contributed to this. 
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Annex: interview with FIAT's mobilisation leader 
CuAndo entraste a la Fiat? 
En el afio 1992. 
Que hacias en ese momento? Cuäl era tu salario? 
Operario, operario. 
Especializado? 
No, no operario. Todos entramos iguales no importaba el estudio que tenga. Es mas 
cuando me hicieron la entrevista me dijeron que tenia demasiado estudio para entrar, 
cosa que me sorprendi6, despu6s lo ful entendiendo. 
Porque? 
Porque el trabajo que se tenia que hacer era muy sistematiZado, mecanizado y quizds 
ellos necesitaban gente que no tenga ninguna otra pretensl6n que hacer ese trabajo. 
Despu6s lo que ellos tornaron con la nueva fabrica tenfan corno un nivel mas 
No despuýs, cuando ellos tomaron en el 96/97 empiezan a tomar la gente empiezan a 
cambiar su segmento y van orientando la toma de la gente segün algunos criterios que 
despuýs van variando de acuerdo a la evoluclön de la lucha. Por ejemplo ellos tomaron 
plbes 16venes primero, muy capacitados. 
ZCÖnio nivel de educaciön? 
Con nivel educacional alto. Rdpidamente nosotros se los ganamos. Cambiaron, tornaban 
gente grande y sin educac16n. Nosotros le dijimos es un error. Ustedes lo han cambiado 
porque solo se los ganamos pero es un error porque la gente grande viene con manias, 
costumbres. 40/45 ahos, muchas costumbres, la disciplina de la fabrica no ........ y Sin 
estudio. Empezaron a faltar a romperse las maquinas, bajo la cualidad del trabajo. Asi 
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que fueron variando la composiciön de acuerdo a como fue evolucionando la lucha. 
Despu6s cambiaron ... porque tan grandes corno le dijunos nosotros no funciono' no 
existia. Entonces empezaron a tornar gente mas chica pero con pnmaria, sin estudios y 
alli' empezaron a tener problemas con los robos porque la mayoria lo tomaban de las 
villas nuseria. La composici6n que vema no era uniforme, era muy variada, entraba de 
todo, entonces empezaron a tener problemas con los robos. Era un problema s'stemdtIcO 
porque la variable de ellos fue la lucha nuestra. 
Claro, como empezö la .............. 
Ellos detemunaron su perfil de operario a partir de lo que no querian. 
Y no querian gente corno Gallos 
No querian gente que nosotros podiamos Ilegar rdpidamente. Y entonces tenian un 
problema grave. El problema era estrat6gico. Nuestro cuerpo de delegados era realmente 
democrätico. Eso significaba que realmente la gente elegia los mejores. Su cuerpo de 
delegados, son los jefes. Son perros. EI cuerpo delegado de la fabrica, para n-ü, para 
nosotros eran los jefes su cuerpo delegado. No eran los mejores, eran los mas alcahuetes, 
lo mäs buchones como le decimos nosotros, chupamedias. No eran los mejores. Entonces 
nosotros les Ileväbamos distancia en la cualldad de nuestros dirigentes. 
Estas hablando de que momento? 
Todo el momento de la lucha, todo, todo lo que duro' la lucha, estoy hablando de 
septiembre de 96 hasta mediado de 97. Despuýs siguiö pero muy atenuada. 
En todo ese tiempo hubo dos tomas de fabrica y diferentes, me las podes describir? 
Si, si. La primer toma yo no participe' porque yo estaba afuera. 
Afuera de la fabrica? No era tu turno? 
No era mi tumo y habia renunciado un dia antes 
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Habias renunciado? 
No, lo que pasa es lo siguiente, algo parecido. La fabrica, nosotros sabiamos que iba a 
haber cambios eso es todo lo que sabiamos. 
En el contracto, en el salario? 
En algo, en algo. Se venian los italianos a la Argentina a ampliar a la fäbrica e iba a 
haber cambios. 
Eso como es que lo sabian? 
Comentarios, totalmente infonnales. 
Y del contracto firmado por el SMATA? 
No sabiamos nada, nada. La UOM lo escond16 y el SMATA tambi6n. Hacia ocho meses 
que estaba firmado y no sabiamos nada, nada. 
No tenian la posibilidad de enterarse? 
No, no. Yo personalmente me imagine' que vema una rebaja salarial. Tal es asi que habI6 
con mi sefiora, mi mujer y le dije nos van a reducir el salario porque si vienen acd van a 
querer imponer otras condiciones. 
Y las leyes nacionales de flexibilizaciön laboral ya las habian introducido? 
No, esto era el iniclo. El acuerdo entre el Gobiemo y la Flat fue la primera pata. 0 sea la 
punta de lancha para meter la ley de flexibilizac16n laboral. Entonces le digo a mi senora 
si me bajan el salario menos de este valor no acepto y nos vamos a vivir a Mendoza, 
porque yo no tenia casa, tenia que alquilar y con un valor menor que ese no me iba a 
alcanzar para alquilar. No iba a aceptar. Un dia Ilegaron y nos dijeron: estin todos 
echados. Ahora lo contratamos de nuevo. 
Qui6n Ileg6? 
Los jefes de linea, tres por cada linea de producciön con policia y abogados. Estän todos 
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despedidos 
Y hicieron una asamblea, un comunicado? 
No nos iban Ilamando de a uno. 
De a uno? 
Si'. Te Ilamo a vos, te sentas ahi. Estas despedido. C6mo estoy despedido? Si estas 
despedido pero te vamos a tornar de nuevo. Antes ganabas 4 pesos y 80 la hora ahora vas 
a ganar 2 con 80. Me Comprendes? De 4.80 a 2.80. Y las horas extras no van a valer mas 
el 100%, van a valer el 50%. Y las vacaciones no te vamos a pagar mas las 135 horas de 
prenuo, te pagamos 85 a este valor nuevo. Aceptas o no? Y vos le decias, "para', que voy 
a Ilarnar a mi mujer para preguntarle .......... no, no es ahora. Si te vas, si te paras no 
aceptas. Si no aceptas. Si aceptas firmas. La mayoria firmo', quedarse sin trabajo era 
peor y aparte todos pensaron yo firmo despuýs lo comentare' con rru muj"er y veo si no 
me gusta no lo hago, ya la indemnizaci6n la tengo porque me despidieron. Yo no lo 
agarre' porque ya era menos del valor que habia ........ para ri-ý no era una sorpresa todo 
eso que estaba sucediendo, ya me lo habia imaginado y lo habia conversado con rrU 
sefiora. 
Y en esta negociaciön de a uno con la empresa estaba tarnWn el sindicato? 
Nooooo. El sindicato habia ido un dia antes lineas por lineas a avisamos que el otro dia 
nos iban a echar ...... Yo a uno 
lo agarre' del cuello, me lo tuvieron que sacar. 
A uno de la UOM? 
0 del SMATA, no s& que era porque'.... era cualquier cosa. Me Jos sacaron de las manos 
porque yo le decia de como es que me venia a echar 61, el sindicato. Me tenia que venir a 
echar la fdbrica, no el sindicato. tl, el compahero mio me venia a inforniar que me iban a 
echar. 
Y que explicaci6n te dio'? 
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Querno' el problema. Nos iban a baj ar el sueldo pero solo de un 10% y ellos estaban 
peleando para que sea un 5% en vez que un 10% pero que te dan toda la indenuuzac ion. 
Si ustedes firman acä' nos dan el aval a nosotros para que peleemos por el 5% en vez que 
10% de rebaj» a salarial .......... me lo sacaron de la mano, despuýs que me lo sacaron de la 
mano dije que no y me ful a nü casa. 
Dejaste el trabajo? 
Deje' el trabajo 
El dfa anterior a la firma? 
Claro. Al otro dia los muchachos entraron en la fabrica ..... esa noche no durnüö' nadie, se 
fueron a sus casas, hicieron las cuentas, se dieron cuenta que iban a ganar la nutad de la 
plata por el nusmo trabajo, se deprinlieron, Iloraron, no dumüeron, al otro dia Ilegaron 
mal, colectivamente mal a la fabrica y sin que nadie le dijera nada se juntaron. Que 
hacemos? 
0 sea, fue como una decisi6n espontinea? 
Que hacemos? Y un muchacho, Daniel, despuýs uno de los lideres de la toma Daniel 
Moyano, de la bronca agarro' un portön, pero grande, que tenia como 20 metros, perd6n 
10 metros, muy grande. Y lo tiro' asi' y se rompieron todos los vidrios. Y todo el mundo 
se dio vuelta y dijo ese es el lider, y ýI dijo vamos a tomar la fabrica. Esto me 
contaron ....... yo no estaba adentro de la fabrica. Y se tomo' la fabrica. Una vez que se 
torno' la fabrica ..... para' despu6s te cuento algo mas porque 20 
dias antes habiamos 
hecho una pelea por primera vez en la historja de Flat despuýs de 25 aftos, muy grande, 
20 dias antes de esto, era previa a esto. Se torno' la fabrica y lo primero que se hizo fue 
votar que ningün sindicato iba a entrar, la prima. Que se elegian delegados nuevos y una 
conüslön nueva y que nadie mäs podia Ilegar a entrar a la fäbrica, de los sindicatos. 
Y la comisiön que estaba antes era de obreros? 
De obreros 
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0 sea eran compafteros que estaban con el sindicato UOM? 
Vendidos totalmente con la UOM o con el SMATA, con cualquiera de los dos o lo dos 
juntos, no importaba. 
Bueno, personalmente yo Ilegue' al otro dia porque' tenia que cobrar una diferencia de 
haberes. Y estaba haciendo las cosas para irme a Mendoza y venia de averiguar cuanto 
me salia la mudanza. Llegue' a la fabrica y estaba tomada, me alegre' muchisirno ... con 
nu mujer los dos nos quedamos afuera. 
Y esto cuando fue? 
A la maüana 
EI turno empezö' a las ? 
EI tumo empezö' a las 6y media y yo habW ido a las 9,8 y medias. Y la fäbrica ya 
estaba tomada desde la 7u8 de la mafiana e hicieron esto que yo te digo. Se juntaron, 
este tiro' la puerta, se rompieron los vidrios, vamos a tomar la fabrica y se tomo'. 
Y la empresa que hizo en ese momento? 
Nada. No sabian que hacer. 
No habia ningün representante de la empresa hablando con los obreros? 
Si ....... no habia representante 
de los obreros. La empresa estaba anallZando que hacer. 
La gente de la empresa estaba en las oricinas? 
Ellos si, lo trabajadores tomando la fabrica, serrando los portones, culdando los portones. 
Una torna. 
Y las guardias que hicieron? 
Las guardias estaban aftiera 
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Las echaron y no reaccionaron'9 
Claro, porque a las guardias tambiýn les bajaban el sueldo. Las guardias no dijeron nada 
se hicieron los tontos, nada mas que eso y la empresa no tenia con quien dialogar, eso era 
bdrbaro, eso resolvia el problerna, que no habia ...... con nadle. 
Y tampoco ese Daniel se quiso poner? 
Daniel que hizo, dijo que se hace para legalizar una coMisi6n nueva? Y ..... hay que traer 
a un escribano y mando'a buscar el escribano, y trajeron a un escribano ya un abogado y 
el abogado era muy anugo nuo, pero de casualidad, y bueno unos muchachos que 
estaban afuera empezaron: " Gallito ... metete". Par6ntesis ahora. 
Veinte dias antes nos habian sacado el salario farniliar, asignac16n familiar, lo que se 
paga por hijo, por escolaridad, lo habian borrado con una ley nacional. Ese dia que se 
saca el salario familiar ftie la primera vez que se organizo' una pelea en Fiat, grande. 
que paso'9 
Lo que paso' es que en 4o5 nos pusimos de acuerdo con las nuradas y salimos a 
carrunar por el pasillo aplaudiendo y se nos surno' toda la fabrica e hicimos un abandono 
de tareas. 
Asi' espontineo? 
Asi' y fulmos hasta el gremio y le dijimos que hagan algo. 
En la fabrica? 
En la nüsma fäbrica tenian una oficina, que hicieran algo porque queriamos el salario 
familiar. El grenuo nos respond16' que era una ley no un problema de la fabrica y 
nosotros les dijimos no nos importa esta fabnca tiene plata sufIciente para pagar a 
nosotros el salario fanuliar, queremos el salario fanüllar. EI resto de los trabaiadores 
vera' nosotros queriamos el salano fanuliar. 
Y en ese momento no habia un representante de la empresa en la linea? 
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Si pero no pudo hacer nada, toda la gente se fue. 
Ni tent6'9. 
Ni tent6' porque tenian todos los mecanismos oxidados, esto no pasaba en la fabrica 
hasta 25 afios. Ellos no tenian mecanismos represivos puestos a la orden del dia corno si' 
lo han tenido despu6s. Era un desastre 
Siempre hablaban con el sindicato ............ 
Claro el sindicato arreglaba y listos. Bueno fue un abandono de tareas, vino el sindicato, 
la UOM, corriendo, y nos paro', que no podiamos abandonar. Eso fue veinte dias antes 
de la toma. Y votamos, votamos tres veces, porque ellos no querian reconocer la 
votaci6n y el 80% voto' por el abandono y ese dia no se trabaj'o'. De esta lucha tres o 
cuatros fulmos los que estuvimos al frente en el turno tarde. Cierro parýntesis. Estos tres 
o cuatro fueron lo que me vieron a mi fuera de la fdbrica y me Ilamaron. "Vem' Carlos, te 
necesitamos, vos fuiste uno de esa pelea" "No yo me voy a Mendoza" "Si, pero vos sos 
un tipo que tiene titulo de estudio, no todos lo tenemos, y necesitamos gente rdpida que 
de'respuestas" "Yo me voy a Mendoza" "Bueno dndate a Mendoza pero ven' ayýidanos 
en esta asamblea". Bueno me meto. La asamblea era un quilombo. Nadie, a ver, tema 
idea de lo que hacer. Que hacian? 
TamWn entre los obreros todos los mecanismos estaban oxidados 
Claro. Que hacemos? Esta' bien tomamos la fabrica y ahora? Entonces yo ..... me suben 
en una mulita a mi, me meti6' la comisi6n, la corMs16n estaba elegida yo no. Era tal el 
grado de desorientaciön ....... yo pedi' la palabra. "Miren 
lo que yo pienso es que hay que 
hacer esto y esto. Nada mas ordene' un poquito. Se hizo silenclo y auton'Aticamente me 
paro' uno y me dijo "repetilo" y lo repeti' y auton-idticamente la gente "ole', ole' ole' ole' 
Gallo, Gallo". Y creo que hubo dos factores elementales, que sirvieron para que esto 
sucediera. El primer factor fue que yo me iba a ir y por lo tanto los trabaj'adores podian 
tener confianza en nü, yo no me iba a quedar. Yo pienso que unos de los factores fue ese 
porque' alguien que se va a ir no me puede j oder, porque' no tiene pretensiones de 
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quedarse. Es mas lo primero que yo dije cuando subi, fue que me iba a vivir a Mendoza. 
Estoy acd' nada mas porque' me lo piclieron IOS muchachos que este', nada rriAs. Y se 
empez6' a corear nu nombre ya partir de alli' ya no pude decidir solo y irme a Mendoza, 
ya era una decisi6n colectiva de toda la gente. 
Te sentiste responsabilizado? 
Me senti' responsabilizado frente a otra gente. Bueno me fui a mi casa con otro 
muchacho y le dije a mi mujer: "mira' me parece que no nos vamos a Mendoza y le 
cont6' lo que sucedi6". Y hay fue' todo el devenir de ............ 
Se hizo otra votaci6n para elegirte? 
Ahi' me eligieron y despu&s la fabrica me rechazo' y dijo que no queria hablar con migo 
porque' ya habia renunciado. Y los trabajadores dijeron que si yo no estaba .......... 
Y adernis la empresa no sabia con quien dialogar 
No tenian nadie con quien dialogar, discutir. 
Y la gente de UOM se habia borrado'. ' 
La gente de UOM no podia entrar, los trabajadores los sacaron a patadas, a patadas. Yo 
personalmente participe' en una de esas. Sl' a bollarle el auto ya pegarle. Y el SMATA 
no se animaba. Lo que yo propuse, me acuerdo, y que despu6s lo hicimos fue buscar al 
SMATA y que legalizara nuestra lucha. Porque en la Argentina uno de los problemas 
mds grave es que cuando vos no tenes sindicato ........ hay una ley en Argentina que 
le da 
personalldad a los sindicatos a diferencia de los paises europeos donde son libres 
asociaciones. Acd' no, acd' hay una doble personeria, una personeria sencilla corno la de 
ustedes y una personeria Ilamada gremial. Quien no tenga la personeria grenual no puede 
tener los delegados, no tiene defensa legal, cobertura legal, no pueden hacer nada los 
sindicatos que no tengan esa personeria y la personeria gremial es una decislän politica, 
no se le da' personalldad gremial a un sindicato desde 30 aflos. 
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Asi que propusiste la afiliaci6n al SMATA? 
No la afiliaci6n no. Que venga el SMATA y no represente 
Y no sabian que SMATA habia firmado el convenio? 
No sabiamos nada. A la UOM no la queriamos porque' nos habia traicionado. Tampoco 
sabiamos de los del SMATA pero la UOM ya no la queriamos. Y fuimos a buscarlo al 
SMATA y el dirigente del SMATA es de lo peor, fascista, 61 entro' Como intenentor, 
colaborador de la dictadura nülitar, muyjodido, muyjodido. Bueno vino 
Un bur6crata? 
No alcanza la palabra buröcrata. A ver buröcrata es, una buena definicion es aquella 
persona que manda a hacer a otro lo que no se anima a hacer 61. Fue entregador de 
personas durante la 6poca de la dictadura militar, hubo desaparecidos por culpa de el. 
Este tipo vivia de la renta de la empresa ....... bueno ya la cosa se hace mas 
complicada ........... lo fulmos a buscar a el, la gente lo odia, lo Ilevamos, vino, lo pusimos 
arriba de la mulita y tubo que prometer paros, huelgas, luchas, movilizaciön, porque' si 
no no bajaba, lo comian. 
Prometiö' que iba a pelear por los obreros ........... 
Lo filmaron en directo, saliö' por todos los canales, las radios. Esta' todo grabado. Eso 
era lo que nosotros queriamos, que el tipo se comprometiera en algo, que no tuviera 
opciones de zafar. Lo hizo. Bajo', mucho gusto y chao, se fue'. Y la torm siguio. 
Como quedaron 
amparaba con su personeria todo lo que hiciftamos nosotros, claro nuentras tanto 
discutian con el gobierno cuanto despedidos tenia que haber, Ilego' a pactar con el 
gobiemo 
Con el Gobierno de C6rdoba? 
Clerto. 550 despidos definitivos que el Gobiemo provincial no se animo' a hacer 
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Pero no es que la FIAT habfa prometidos a todos ustedes la reintegraci6n bajo 
nuevas condiciones salariales? 
Entonces termina la primer toma, despu6s de cmco dias y con el arnparo legal pudImOs 
negociar y se da la concillaciön entre la fabrica y la comisiön nuestra con el amparo legal 
del grernio. Este gremio fn-maba todo lo que nosotros resolviamos en la conciliaciän. 
Terniina la conciliaci6n y negociamos el 95% del salario, nos pagan la indemnizaci6n, 
perd6n el 92% del salario ya los tres meses se iba al 95. Perdiamos un 5% del salario 
anterior que era lo que nos habian prometido lo de UOM, por lo tanto nos parecia 16gico 
perder algo, muy poco, y quedarse con mucha plata en el bolsillo por la indemiilzaclön 
porque' el que menos tenian eran 10 aiios de antigüedad por lo tanto se iba a Ilevar 
15000/20000 pesos lo que meno se Ilevaba. 
Los obreros tenian mucha antigtiedad? 
SI y la maquinas eran muy viejas, obsoletas, esas maquinas no las hacia andar nadie. Esto 
fue un punto fuerte de nuestra lucha que las maquinas no las podian hacer andar con 
plbes j6venes porque tenian muchas manias. Para hacerla andar ponian un palo de escoba 
le hacian fuerza de alli, y andaba. 
Eran maquinas que producian motores? 
Motores y cajas de velocidad. Muchisimas maquinas y muchisima plata. Toda la 
producclön de motores y cajas. En la nueva fabrica habia chapisteria, pinturera y 
asamblaje. Todo modemo, de illtima generac16n. Los motores del 1900 
Y eual fue la actitud de la empresa? 
Bueno la empresa se sent6' con nosotros a negociar. Y nos dijo que no tenia problemas 
en negociar con nosotros. La actitud fue cambiando. Fue cambiando a partir de que ellos 
empezaron a tener una lectwa de que nosotros teniamos una poslc, Ön de clase defin, 
da. 
La empresa se dio cuenta de eso o 
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Se fueron dando cuenta en la präctica. Nosotros nunca los dijimos. Mis discursos eran 
flores, rosas, priniaveras y nuestra prictica era otra. Entonces se nos venian ........ eso fue 
en Septiembre. Octubre, Noviembre, Diciembre trabajamos 
En la conciliaciön la actitud de la empresa como fue? 
Ellos no querian negociar con nosotros. Despu6s tuvieron que negociar con nosotros 
porque' teniamos el respaldo de los trabaiadores. No podian mover la fdbn*ca. Nos decian 
Ios vamos a echar a todos". Y echen. Nosotros nos apoyäbamos en el hecho que eran 
muy viejas las maquinas, echändonos echaban toda la experiencia. Por lo tanto toda la 
gente nueva que entraba no tenian quien la capacite es mas lanzarnos la consigna "no 
capacitar" a los trabajadores nuevos. Entonces empezaron a poner gente al lado nuestro 
para que aprendiera. 
Esto cuando, despuA de la toma? 
Despuýs de la toma. Nosotros lanzamos la consigna que la fuerza nuestra estaba en la 
experiencia y que si esta experiencia se la däbamos a otros perdiamos nuestra fuerza. Por 
lo tanto no hay que capacitar, pero hay que explicarle a los companeros porque no 
ibamos a capacitar. 
Bueno entonees en Septiernbre se acaba la toma 
En Septiernbre negociamos el 92 % del salario anterior, a los 3 meses 95,120 oras de 
vacaciones. Les quitamos todos los puntos flexibilizadores: no se podia suspender 
personalmente, no se podia suspender a un grupo que sea menor que una linea completa. 
Esto tambi6n como sanci6n disciplinar? 
Por sancl6n disciplinar sl' se podia suspender individualmente pero no se podia 
suspender por falta de trabajo si no era meno de una linea. Pero ellos querian suspender 
individualmente, con lo cual al Jefe no le gustaba tu cara y ..... te suspendia y te 
reemplazaba con otro. 
299 
Despu6s de la toma? 
Nosotros quedamos conformes, la empresa quedo' muy mal no queria reconocernos y 
tubo que aceptar. En el Gobierno naclonal Menem, digo para tener idea en que situacl6n 
estibamos peleando, el pais menemista con San Cavallo Ministro de Economia, la 
convertibilidad intocable. Nunca un corte de ruta en la Argentina, no habia sucedido 
jamas 
La primera en todo el pais. Y ustedes se daban cuanta de esto? 
Nos dimos cuanta despuýs de la toma en el medio de la toma no tuvimos tiempo de 
reflexionar esto. Despuýs cuando paramos la pelota nos empezamos a dar cuanta 
empezamos a preparar otro tipo de pelea. 
Y en los 25 afios anteriores nunca hubo una pelea abierta y siempre se negocio' con 
un sindicato "amarillo"9 
Si, siempre, siempre. Pasa esto, terrruna la toma y logramos que al otro dia terrrünada la 
toma so se trabaje porque' estdbamos todos cansados. Bueno esa fue una peleita pero 
buena. Empezamos a trabajar y la corrUslän de los nueve que ýramos la conusiön elegida 
teniamos libertad para movemos en toda la fäbrica 
Eso fue arreglado en la coneiliaciön? 
SI fue parte de la concillaciön 
La empresa reconociö' a los nueves? 
Si, si firmamos nosotros la negoclaclön 
Y el SMATA tambi6n? 
SI tambiýn pero teniamos, segün el ininisterio, y tal como habia empezado la concillaclön 
si no firmAbamos nosotros tampoco se acaba la conciliaci6n. Lo cual ya no daba una 
figura legal, minima, pero legal. Es mas hubo algunos junstas que empezaron a sacar 
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nota por el diario de que corno nos daban a nosotros esa autondad si no eramos un 
sindicato constituido. Que nos daban dernasiado espacio. Claro esa ftie una declsl6n 
politica del Gobierno de la Provincia. Menem le estaba diciendo al Gobierno de la 
Provincia que mande la infanteria para desalojamos a todos. Mestre que era Gobemador 
me llama a mi, yo no lo conocia. Tengo a Menem con la infanteria, se vienen. Que 
vengan somos 1700 trabajadores con bullones y tuercas van a tener que venir en mas de 
5000 para sacamos, esto va a ser un hecho nacional. El Gobiemo de acd' era Radical el 
Gobiemo nacional Peronista, no quiso pagar el costo, era un costo pernutir que se vengan 
los soldados. Nosotros nos jugamos a esa, sali6' bien. Menem nos hubiera metido la 
fuerza. 
Y esto tus compaiieros lo sabian? 
Si' lo discutimos en la coMislän y me respaldaron, pero no fue una decislän votada. EI 
99% de las decisiones fueron votadas. 
Y adentro de la conüsiön tus compafieros te daban un poder de negociar? 
A nü adentro de la conüslän siempre se me respeto' la relaciön nÜa con la gente. La 
gente me reconocia mucho a mi y menos al resto de la coMis16n y eso siempre se respeto 
dentro de la conüsiön a la hora de decidir pero toda la conusion participo en todo lo que 
era decisorio salvo lo que no querian participar en determinados momentos, nunca 
entraba nadie solo en ninguna discusiön, siempre tratäbamos de involucrar a la mayoria y 
a veces Ilevamos al cuerpo de delegados que era muy grande, 100 personas 
aproximadamente. 
Eso para ser capilar? 
Si era muy grande y muy activo. Apenas salimos de la toma, cuando empezamos a 
reflexionar en que pais estäbamos, todas esas cosas, empezamos a armar una 
organizaciön, salimos räpido a arinar una orgamzaciön. Entonces como podiamos 
movernos en toda la fabrica, pero la fabrica no nos pagaba el sueldo porque nosotros no 
produciamos ........ entonces nosotros 
decidimos en una asamblea que todos les paguen el 
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sueldo a los nueve, todos los trabajadores que se junten en la quincena la plata pagamos 
el sueldo y que nosotros nos ibamos a mover en toda la fabrica para ver los problemas. 
Asi' que ustedes no tenian salario? 
No. Que haciamos todo los dias? Pasäbamos linea por linea organizando la gente porque 
nosotros preveiamos que se venian Diciembre Genero y Febrero muy dlficlles porque en 
todos estos meses hay baja producci6n. Cuando hay baja producci6n la fdbrica no te 
necesita y tiene todo el tiempo del mundo como para buscarte todas las vueltas necesarias 
para jugarte. Eso suponiamos. En Noviembre, Octubre los dedicamos a hacer asambleas 
por lineas, permanente. Por tumo de trabajo y por linea se perdia 15 nünutos por dia en 
asambleas. Que haciamos nosotros: la asamblea no podia ser nunca democrdtica si previo 
a la asamblea no se discutia el temario, una asamblea de 2000 personas, entonces 
pasdbamos linea por linea informando el temario y pre-discuti6ndolo. La pre discusi6n 
significaba que se podian escuchar todas las posiciones en cada asambleita. Cada linea 
tenia entre 30 y 40 operarios. A mi y rms compaheros Ilevaba un tumo completo. Sin 
parar 
Hacian pequeflas discusiones y ponian a votaci6n 
Si'. Sin parar 
Esto por cualquier tipo de problema? 
Nosotros nos dimos una politica de meter mucho en las discusiones respeto de la 
orgamzaclön y el problema de ir fijando un plan minimo de amön, de formaclön de un 
grernio. Discutiamos que ibamos a defender de nuestras conquistas, que era lo rnds 
importante para nosotros. Entonces hay se discutiö' muy mucho sobre nuestra posicion 
de clase, se polltiZo' mucho. Tal es asi' que cuando la fabrica dice el 20 de Diciembre se 
va a inaugurar nosotros decimos si pero si el presidente va a inaugurar la fabrica ese dia 
no va a haber producclön y la conusiön de los nueve, con la direcclän de Flat y Menem 
al tel6fono se decidi6' que Menem no venia. A Menem esto lo jodia porque era en su 
mejor momento. Vino Mestre. Eso se discutiö' hasta la 5 de la mahana del 20 de 
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Diciembre. 
Y esta posici6n cuando fue discutida entre ustedes? 
Esto fue pre discutido en todas las asambleas 
Y todos los compaiieros estaban de acuerdo? 
Por supuesto. Por eso en esa ocas16n nosotros politizamos nuestra posici6n porque 
indicibamos a Menem como responsable de la flexibilizaci6n laboral y nosotros 
deciamos y Ilegamos a hacerlo colectivo eso, se discutiamos entre 2000 personas que 
primero era la Fiat pero que despu6s iba a tocar toda la clase trabajadora y que despu6s 
de los trabaj'adores iban a venir los pequefios y medianos empresarios y que no se crean 
que solo porque' son empresarlos ...... a ellos tambi6n le iba a Ilegar la flexibilizaci6n. Por 
lo tanto la pelea no era solo nuestra era de mas gente que la estdbamos empezando y nos 
dimos cuanta que la perdiamos. 
Sabian que la iban a perder" 
Sabiamos que la ibamos a perder. 
Pero no obstante eso .......... 
La pelea teniamos que darla. Discutimos eso en las asambleas 
0 sea de la posibilidad de fracasar ..... 
Sl', asi' y decidimos pelear, eso fue lo mds maravilloso 
CuAndo fue eso? 
No tengo la fecha exacta pero fue antes de la inauguracion. Esos tres meses despuýs de la 
toma nos sirvieron para Ilegar a esa d1scusl6n. Y porque' Ilegamos a esa djscusl6n? 
Porque' despuýs de la toma, como te decia, vimos lo que pasaba. Ahi tuvimos que parar 
la pelota y decir a ver donde estamos. Perdemos, perdemos, ya lo sabiamos. 
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Ya sabian que se iban a enfrentar ......... 
Con el Gobierno Provincial, el Gobierno Nacional, con todos los sindicatos y con la 
empresa y que nosotros a lo surno podiamos elegir ................. En ningun momento 
nosotros dijimos vamos a perder, por supuesto nadle pelea si no tiene alguna posIbIlIdad 
de ganar pero nosotros discutimos y votamos en asamblea que habia posibilidad de 
perder y que si perdiamos nos iban a despedir a todos. Y que teniamos que optar, esto fue 
muy importante. Hubo una discusi6n de un dia entero, primero en la comis16n y despu6s 
con el cuerpo de delegados. Habia compafieros que me decian que no se podia discutir 
con la gente la posibilidad de perder y yo y otros compafieros mds dijimos que habia que 
discutir todo con los den-ids. Dimos la posibilidad a la gente de resignar, si lo Ilamamos 
asi': es posible resignarse si no miremos a nuestro pais, esta' resignado. En ese momento 
estaba totalmente resignado y es mas ahora esta' bastante cierto. Nos n-ýramos alrededor 
y nos dimos cuenta que la resignaci6n era una posibilidad y la otra era pelear. Si 
peleamos bien y si resignamos bien. A media no. En esos t6rminos, resignar significaba 
agachar la cabeza ............. no solamente que venga Menem eso seria lo de meno. Que 
venga Menem traia emparej ado la perdida de otras cosas. La ernpresa de a poco te queria 
meter imposiciones, pasada la toma de a poco queria recuperar terreno. Y ese recuperar 
terreno nosotros lo teniamos que tener en cuenta. 
C6mo recuperaron terreno, dialogando con la comisi6n? 
No, tratando de meter contradicci6n entre la gente y nosotros, la comisi6n y los obreros. 
Trataban de meter contradicciones, por ejemplo. Todo un dia. la gerencia del personal se 
reunia con nosotros y de 15 puntos 14 los habiamos logrados, pero todo el dia ellos 
mandaban para abajo la informaci6n de que no se habia logrado nada. Vos saliste de alli 
despu6s de todo un dia de defender y la gente de decia que nuerda estdn transando? Se 
estdn arreglando? Permanentemente estaban tratando de romper el vinculo nuestro con la 
gente. 
A trav6s del REPO? 
REPO y todos los mecanismos que ellos tienen, mecanismos que consistian en el REPO, 
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jefe de linea, secciän, los psicälogos que tenian trabajando en la fäbrica. Los REPO eran 
los que mäs trabajaban en eso, lo mäs räpidos. 
Los compafieros se la creian? 
No pero siempre habia un grupo mas ........ que se la creia mids fdcil, era un grupo menor 
pero existia. Siempre existe. Y sobre ese grupo hacian presiones para agrandarlo. 
Despu6s Ilego' Enero que nosotros suponiamos muy duro y nos echan a un compa - nero. 
Cuando nos echan a un compafiero 
Por disciplina? 
Provocan, provocan la situacion, quieren Ilegar a una situaci6n extrema. Nosotros nos 
dimos cuanta que no habia otra forma que pelear, ftiimos. En la media habiamos creado 
un sindicato porque el SMATA no quiso reconocer la secciona de Ferreira. Preguntamos 
a los trabajadores que querian, fuera de las puertas de fäbrica. 
Todos los trabajadores votaron. Impresionante. Fue una demostraclön de fuerza alevosa, 
la fabrica se quedo' con los ojos abiertos. Todos los trabajadores que a la sallda 
normalmente se van tenian que hacer cola para votar y lo hicieron. Todas las asambleas 
eran a la salida y ellos ponian cdmaras para filmar a las asambleas. Eso era ftiera del 
lugar y del horario de trabajo, te filmaban, una persecuc16n total, total. Pero corno eran 
tan masivas las asambleas ....... Despuýs agarraban a uno y 
le decian vos estuviste en la 
asamblea? Si estaban todos? 
EI otro maravilloso fue cuando cada quincena los trabajador a la sallda del tumo 
versaban la cuota sindical en una cajita ...... no era por 
descuento sobre el salano, era 
voluntaria. Era realmente un estado de moviliZaci6n y de concientiZacion muy alto. 
C6mo se logro' ese estado? 
Con debate. Con mucho debate y con mucha dernocracia. 
En los 25 afios anteriores habia solidaridad entre los trabajadores, alguna forma de 
resistencia? 
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Lo que habia era companensmo y nada mäs. Por eso la gente el dia de la toma 
Iloraba ......... a ver me subian muy alto en la mulita y yo veia a toda la gente, era una 
cosa ..... yo 
Iloraba, cada media hora estaba Ilorando. Por ejemplo uno me dice "che Gallo 
me das la autorizaciön a dejar la toma? " , tenia la mujer intemada y estaba por dar a la 
luz. Como no vas a ir hermano, vas a ser padre, anda' no me pida autorizacl6n para 
abandonar la toma. Hubo algunos que quiso trasladar el casanüento a la toma, tenia 
pensado casarse ese viernes, ya teniamos cura y todo ...... Tambiýn en la segunda toma 
pasaron de estas cosas. Era para Ilorar porque' la solldaridad, todo esto naclö' de golpe, 
fue como algo que se libero' y eso le hacia bien a la gente, ya no bien en el sentido 
econ6mico. Bien en el sentido de realizarse como persona. Se sentian dignos y hoy 
cualquier persona se acuerda de esa lucha y que hizo blen, porque' se sint'6' bien. 
Menos mal que nos echaron ahi' adentro nadie se hubiera podido quedar. Ahora habian 
cambiado, esa nusma persona ya no era la de antes, ya veia el mundo diferente, habia 
pegado un salto y esto le suced16' a todos, a todos. La lucha nusma nos cambio' a todos, 
nos fue cambiando, modelando, a mi ya todos. Esta sensaci6n, este sentirMento fue muy 
fuerte. Entonces lo emotivo, en lo nuestro, yo te diria fue un elemento esencial en nuestra 
lucha. Tal es asi' que cuando fulmos a hacer la solldaridad a los compafieros de Renault 
decidimos en asamblea que no podiamos mandar un papelito ........ hay que ir, y fuimos en 
caravana. Te imaginas cuando Ilegamos!! 
En Renault habia un dirigente combativo, Tello que pertenecia al SMATA pero que 
venia peleando de abajo que habia ganado las elecciones en Renualt. Campellone 
despuýs le gano' a Tello en la conducciön del sindicato por los concesionarios de auto. 
Pero Tello gano' en Renault. Y yo le digo a Tello, "Tello Ilamemos a un paro provincial, 
esta historia no esta' escrita, no dice que vas a Ilamar a un. paro provincial? " 
"Y como se hace eso? " Es fäcil le digo Ilamamos a todos los medios y nos presentamos 
decimos tal dia paro provincial, la Fiat nosotros la paramos, la Renault esta' tomada, la 
Perkins se va a unir y Transax apoya sl nosotros estamos UnIdos, le podemos parar todo 
el cord6n industrial y si logramos esto, cosa que en ning6n paro es ficil de hacer. todo el 
resto se suma y el que no se suma plerde". No me dice. 
Esto nosotros los habiamos votado en una asamblea, Tello nos dice no ya partir 
de ese 
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no nosotros hacemos otra caracterizaciön de Tello, hoy es el secretano adjunto de 
SMATA. Cuando nosotros le propusimos esto creiamos que era muy combativo N, 
cuando nos da esa respuesta nos dimos cuenta que no. Le propusimos armar un inter 
fabrica, un cuerpo de delegados de todas las fabricas, en un solo lugar votando. Y no 
acepto'. Eso hubiera cambiado la historia de nuestra pelea. Nosotros estäbamos buscando 
esa posibiliclad porque' sabiamos que solos ........ necesitdbamos rodeamos. Y bueno vino 
Enero, echaron un compahero, nos provocaron con esa echada, ftiimos a una pelea mas 
fuerte, nosotros lo sabiamos pero no teniamos opciones. 
Y tomaron la fäbrica 
Toniamos otra vez la fäbrica 
En este caso la toma fue mäs programada? 
Mas prograniada, mäs pensada. Fue votada en asamblea y ensegulda fue ejecutada. La 
fdbrica de toda manera ya estaba prevenida. Ellos nos Ilevaban a una situac16n asi' 
nosotros lo sabiamos, pero no teniamos opciones. 
En este caso las guardias no actuaron? 
En esta segunda toma fue diferente. Las guardias anotaban gente, los jefes, los repos 
salian a tomar nota, fue totalmente diferente, la empresa ya tenia un aparado montado. 
Salimos de esa toma con 42 despidos despuýs de la conciliaclön. EI SMATA se enOio' 
con el Gobierno porque I querian 550 despidos. 
Porque? 
Era la forma con la cual podian entrar de vuelta a la fibrica y hacerse cargo. Ese me lo 
dijo Chiaravino que en ese momento era secretano de trabajo, una vers16n oficial. Bueno 
echaron a 42 compaheros. 
La conciliaciön no los ayudo'? 
Nosotros provocamos la conciliaciön como una forrna de salida de la toma. 
A esos 
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companeros despedidos le pusimos una carpa y todos los dias les preparäbamos el mate a 
los compaiieros que iban a trabajar y que pasaban por la carpa. A la sallda toda la gente 
pasaba de alli', conversaba con los muchachos, no se rompia ýI vinculo. Ya pensäbamos 
hacer una cabaiia en madera porque la carpa ya no .......... En la toma nos ganaron terreno 
porque' salimos perdiendo entonces ningun nuembro de la conüslön podia hacer su 
trabajo sindical tenia que trabajar. Tuvimos que armar una organizaciön capaz de hacer 
un montön de cosas sin ............ fue dificil pero ya veniamos con clerta preparaclön de 
antes. La fabnca supuso que nos tenia aniquilados, nosotros nos dimos una politica de 
juntar la gente en la derrota, estäbamos derrotados, juntäbamos de a3a4 compafieros y 
le däbamos tareas, pegar calcomanias en los baüos, escribir con un aerosol y asi' ibamos 
comprometiendo a la gente 
La gente seguia partieipando? 
SI de estos compromisos, no haciamos asambleas. Nos dimos una politica de 
clandestiMdad y juntamos la gente asi' por grupos, en la ora de la merienda, pasäbamos 
consignas cortitas por una mäs räplda difuslän y haciamos la batucada. La batucada fue 
un arma organizativa impresionante se paraba un muchacho delante de toda le linea y 
hacia tarn, tam, tam, pegando dos veces las machinas. Llegamos a hacer batucada de toda 
la planta. Teniamos un nivel organizativo muy alto y en un momento deternünado 
haciamos paro de tareas. Abandonäbamos las tareas, saliamos nos movillZäbamos y 
asamblea. Durante tres meses despu6s de la segunda toma hemos tenido esta täctica de 
clandestinidad y exigiamos la legalidad de nuestra organizaciön. Hicimos una asamblea 
de 1500 trabajadores y decidimos marchar hacia el centro, 1500 trabajadores a pata 15 
Km hacia el centro. Fue nuestro principal acierto y nuestro principal error. Fue nuestro 
principal acierto porque' logramos un grado de afinidad tremendo, un espirltu de cuerpo. 
Y nuestro principal error porque' le mostramos a la fabrica toda nuestra capacidad 
organizativa y la fabrica ese nusmo, dia decidi6' que con menos de 1200 despidos ese 
problema no se iba a resolver. A partir de alli' hubo tres semanas seguidas que nosotros 
todos los rrfl6rcoles haciamos paro. La sorpresa era que alli' haciamos una asamblea y 
decidiamos. Hubo una asamblea que ftie maravillosa y duro' dos nunutos, la mas corta, 
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nos pasamos linea por linea la consigna de que la medida que se iba a votar era tal era 
por si o por no, no queriamos que nadie se enterara ni la prensa m la empresa. Entonces 
sallmos todos, la prensa filmando en directo yo me pare y pregunte': "Bueno muchachos 
por SI, y levantaron las manos, por NO", gano' el SI, vamos y con el Sl decidiamos 
abandonar las tareas el dia despu6s a una determinada hora. La prensa preguntaba que es 
SI, ya vieron ustedes se voto' por el Sl y esto es lo que vamos a hacer. Ese era el nivel 
organizativo que logramos. 
Cuantos de los trabajadores de Cormee estaban con SITRAMF? 
Nosotros hicimos en los primeros dias de afiliac16n 960 afillados y Ilegamos a tener 1200 
afillados. 
A vos te echaron en Mayo con que excusa? 
EI despido nüo viene con una excusa disciplinaria, yo dije que no habia que sacar a la 
gente, no habia que salir a pelear, porque' ya estäbamos muy golpeados. AI final echaron 
1200 compafieros en 5 meses. Quedaron los mas comprometido con la empresa pero 
tambiýn algunos de lo nuestro porque' a la empresa le faltaba informaclön correcta. Un 
afio despuýs de todo esto, en que ya no habia lucha, se reventaron motores de la linea de 
montaje, una medida de protesta organizada, la fabrica lo torno' como un sabotaje 
organizado fue un nivel bajo pero fue una medida de compaiieros que todavia estaban 
adentro de la empresa. Nosotros no estäbamos de acuerdo pero ....... 
Que relaci6n tenian con los que trabajaban en otras partes de la fabrica? 
Poca, a la gente nueva, con perfil 16venes y formados, los primeros 600 habiamos terudo 
Ilegada. De los 600 470 votaron en el plebiscito. Fue alli que la empresa pago' el perfil 
de los nuevos. Llegaron vieJos y con perfil educativo bajo, ellos no nos dieron pelota 
pero tampoco a la empresa ........... 
Segiin Fiat solo en propaganda ellos perdieron 250 
millones de d6lares con la pelea nuestra, yo no s6 si serd' cierto. Solo en propaganda, es 
muchisima plata. Una parte de esa plata la gastaron para que nosotros no nos meti&ramos 
a ningfin medio de comunicaci6n, pagando. Una vez unos periodistas de la Voz 
del 
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interior me invitaron a una cena y me contaron' que ya no podian comprometerse mas 
porque' la empresa le habia regalado un auto a cada uno. En un. canal de televisi6n nos 
invitaron pero no pudimos pronunciar la palabra FIAT, decidi' no ir, a hablar de que, de 
ffitbol? Ellos re contra re pagaban. Ellos gastaron mucha guiita porque nosotros sacamos 
una publicidad: NO COMPRE FIAT, volanteando toda la ciudad. Si FIAT no mejora la 
relaci6n con sus trabajadores, los trabajadores de FIAT no van a poder cumplir con los 
niveles de cualidad. Era muy dura, por toda la ciudad con pintadas, volantes ese en el 
momento final de la pelea. Era lo que quedaba para hacer. 
Asi' que fue una decisi6n colectiva la de luchar hasta el final? 
Si' la decisi6n colectiva fue un poco despu6s de la primer toma, antes la venida de 
Menem. Para Ilegar a esa decisi6n colectiva pasamos tres meses en ayuda a generar un 
debate politico bastante profundo. Una vez terrmnado ese debate politico estdbamos en 
condiciön de decidir al respecto y decidimos. 
Cömo Ilevaban la concientizacion? 
Con discuslön permanente en la linea de producclön en todo el tiempo que pudimos dar 
vuelta por la fabrica. 
Eran discusiones sobre aspectos de la producciÖn? 
Sacamos un periödico semanal, tuvimos que armar todo un equipo de redacclön y los 
delegados, teniamos un cuerpo de delegados muy aceitado, generalmente de jovenes. 
Los delegados eran amigos? 
Algunos si'. EI cuerpo era muy dinamico hacia cosas permanentemente, las lineas 
estaban siempre informadas. Y todos esperaban el nuýrcoles el periödico nuestro. En el 
boletin habia notas de fondo sobre la producciön, la situaciön politica del pais, sobre 
otros lugares del mundo, veces. Los de Brasil vinieron y yo fui para alli'. Lo de Brasil, 
de Uruguay estuvieron en asambleas lo de Italia, FIOM, vinieron tambi6n cuando un I de 
Mayo nos reprirmeron. Vino la gente de Piccinini de Villa Constituci6n. Los italianos no 
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entendian nada, balas de goma por todo lado. Despuýs tuplmos un desarrollo bastante 
bueno en el terreno de las ideas respecto a lo que era la flexibilizaciön laboral y el 
toyotismo. Hicimos seminarios de informaciön con los delegados, vino gente de Bs. As. 
que nosotros invitamos. Un compahero nuestro conocia a1guien porque era del 
MAS(Movinuento al Socialism) y vino un compahero que trabaja por el CONICET a 
damos un seminario. Las conclusiones del seminario fueron escritas, divulgadas. Desde 
el punto de vista ideol6gico fue una. discusi6n muy interesante. 
Habia gente con formacion y experiencia politica? 
Pocos 
Fueron como una base para despu6s desarrollar .......... ? 
Si eran los mds abiertos. La izquierda argentina organizada no estaba con nosotros. 0 sea 
estaba porque' no podia dejar de estar ........ digo Partido Obrero, lzquierda Unida. 
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List of abbreviations 
AAA: Alianza Anticomunista. Argentina/Argentine Anticommunist 
Alliance. 
ACINDAR: Industria Argentina de Aceros/Argentine Steel Industry. 
CGIL: Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro/General Italian 
Confederation of Labour. 
CGT: Confederacion General del Trabajo/ General Confederation of 
Labour. 
CGTA: ConfederaciOn General de los Trabajadores Argentinos/ General 
Confederation of Argentine Workers. 
CORMEC: Cordoba Mecanica/ Cordoba Mechanical Workshops. 
CPI: Conduttore di Processi Integrati/ Foreman. 
CTA: Congreso de los Trabajadores Argentinos/ Congress of Argentine 
Workers. 
ENTel: Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones/National Company for 
Telecommunications. 
FIAT: Fabbrica Italiana Autornobili Torino/ Italian Company Automotive 
Tonno. 
FIM: Federazione Italiana Metalmeccanici/Italian Federation of 
Metalworkers. 
HRM: Human Resource Management. 
IMF: International Monetary Fund. 
IKA: Industnas Kaiser Argentina/Kaiser Industnes Argentina. 
MTA: Movirniento de los Trabajadores Argentinos/ Movement of 
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Argentine Workers. 
REPO: Rappresentante dell'ufficio Personale/Representant of the 
Personnel Office. 
SITRAC: Sindicato de Trabajadores de Concord/ Concord Workers Trade 
union. 
SITRAM: Sindicato de Trabajadores de Materfer/Materfer Workers 
Trade Union. 
SITRAMF: Sindicato de Trabajadores Mecanicos de Ferreyra/ Trade 
Union of Ferreyra's Mechanical Workers. 
SITRAP: Sindicato de Trabajadores de Perkins/ Perkins Workers Trade 
union. 
SMATA: Sindicato de Mecanicos y Afines del Transporte 
Automotor/Trade Union of Mechanics and Automotive Transport 
Workers. 
UCR: Union Civica Radical/ Radical Civil Union. 
UILM: Unione Italiana Lavoratori Metalmeccanici/Italian Union of 
Metalworkers. 
UIA: Union Industrial Argentina/ Argentine Industrial Union. 
UOM: Union Obrera Metalurgica/ Metalworkers' Trade Union. 
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